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In this dissertation I explore several dimensions of risk in banking, while also
considering its implications on rms’ access to credit. The global economic and
nancial crisis made clear that a stable and well-functioning banking system
is a key pillar of economic growth. Against this background, in the following
four chapters of this dissertation I try to shed some light on issues that may
critically in uence the stability of the nancial system and, ultimately, of the
economy.
First, in Chapter 21, I consider the role of strategic interactions in bank risk
taking, focusing on liquidity risk. Banks individually optimize their liquidity
risk management, often neglecting the externalities generated by their choices
on the overall risk of the nancial system. This is the main argument to sup-
port the regulation of liquidity risk. However, there may be incentives, related
for instance to the role of the lender of last resort, for banks to optimize their
choices not strictly at the individual level, but engaging instead in collective
risk taking strategies, which may intensify systemic risk. In this chapter, I
1This chapter is based on joint work with Moshe Kim.
1
Chapter 1 Introduction
look for evidence of such herding behaviors, with an emphasis on the period
preceding the global nancial crisis. I nd strong and robust evidence of peer
eects in banks’ liquidity risk management, even after adequately controlling
for potential endogeneity problems associated with the estimation of peer ef-
fects. This result suggests that incentives for collective risk taking behaviors
may play a role in banks’ choices, thus calling for a macroprudential approach
to liquidity risk regulation.
In Chapter 32, I explore another dimension of bank risk, by examining the
in uence of macroeconomic conditions on credit risk. Indeed, understanding if
credit risk is driven mostly by idiosyncratic rm characteristics or by system-
atic factors is an important issue for the assessment of nancial stability. By
exploring the links between credit risk and macroeconomic developments, I ob-
serve that in periods of economic growth there may be some tendency towards
excessive risk-taking. Using an extensive dataset with detailed information
for more than 30,000 rms, I show that default probabilities are in uenced by
several rm-specic characteristics. When time-eect controls or macroeco-
nomic variables are also taken into account, the results improve substantially.
Hence, though the rms’ nancial situation has a central role in explaining
2This chapter is based on Bonm, D. (2009), Credit risk drivers: evaluating the con-
tribution of rm level information and macroeconomic dynamics, Journal of Banking and
Finance, 33(2), 2009, pp. 281-299.
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default probabilities, macroeconomic conditions are also very important when
assessing default probabilities over time.
In Chapter 43, I examine a related issue. Though there is an extensive
literature on why rms default, there is surprisingly scarce evidence about what
happens to rms after they default. In this chapter I investigate what happens
to rms after they default on their bank loans. I approach this question by
establishing a set of stylized facts concerning the evolution of corporate default
and its resolution, focusing on access to credit after default. Using a unique
dataset from Portugal, I observe that half of the corporate default episodes
last 5 quarters. Most rms continue to have access to credit immediately after
resolving default, though only a minority has access to new loans. Firms have
more di!culties in regaining access to credit if they are small, if their default
was long and severe, if they borrow from only one bank or if they default with
their main lender. Further, half of the defaulting rms record another default
in the future. I observe that rms with repeated defaults are, on average,
smaller and experience longer and more severe defaults.
Finally, in the last chapter4, I examine another common event in banking,
3This chapter is based on joint work with Daniel Dias and Christine Richmond, published
as Bonm, D., D. Dias and C. Richmond (2012), What happens after corporate default?
Stylized facts on access to credit, Journal of Banking and Finance, 36(7), 2012, pp. 2007-
2025.
4This chapter is based on joint work with Pedro Pita Barros, Moshe Kim and Nuno Mar-
tins, published as Barros, P.P., D. Bonm, M. Kim and N. Martins (2013), Counterfactual
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which may aect the stability of the banking system, as well as rms’ and
households’ access to credit. Indeed, bank merger waves may generate struc-
tural changes in the equilibrium of credit markets, thereby changing prices
and quantities in these markets, with important implications on competition.
I derive a counterfactual analysis of banks mergers, combining the pre-merger
equilibrium setting with post-merger environmental characteristics, while ac-
counting for endogenously propagated changes in market structure. Using this
procedure I am able to estimate the eects on loan  ows and interest rates
that would have been observed if the pre-merger equilibrium was not altered.
Results are obtained for rms, households and banks inside and outside the
merging circles separately. I nd that mergers increased rms’ access to credit,
but had an opposite eect on households and led to a widespread decrease in
interest rates.
In sum, this dissertation addresses several dimensions of risk in banking.
In Chapter 2 I analyze what is perhaps the most critical dimension of banking
risk: the funding liquidity risk that is intrinsically associated with banks’ key
functions of liquidity creation and maturity transformation. In Chapters 3 and
4 I deal with credit risk, another key dimension of risk in banks, which often
leads to sizeable losses. Finally, in Chapter 5 I assess how structural changes
Analysis of Bank Mergers, Empirical Economics, forthcoming.
4
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may aect banks’ behaviors in the loan market.
By denition, there cannot be banks without some type of risk-taking.
Indeed, banks need to take risks to nance households and rms. In this
dissertation, I also explore dierent aspects of access to credit, most notably
in Chapter 4, in which I analyze what happens after corporate default (the
determinants of which are analyzed in Chapter 3). To some extent, this issue
is also addressed in Chapter 5, where I assess how changes in market structure
aect loan  ows and interest rates of dierent banks.
5
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CHAPTER 2
2 Liquidity risk in banking: is there herding?
2.1 Introduction
Banks create liquidity in an economy, funding illiquid assets (such as loans)
with liquid liabilities (such as deposits), as discussed by Berger and Bouwman
(2009) and Bouwman (2013)5. This basic intermediation role of banks relies
on a maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities, making them exposed
to bank runs or, more generally, to funding liquidity risk. There is a vast
and prominent theoretical literature on this problem. Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) and Bryant (1980) provided the pillars for the analysis of banks’ liquid-
ity risk and bank runs, while other very relevant contributions include Klein
(1971), Calomiris and Kahn (1991), Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001a and
2001b), Allen and Gale (2004a, 2004b), and, more recently, Wagner (2007a)
or Ratnovski (2009). However, there is surprisingly scarce empirical evidence
on banks’ maturity mismatches and funding liquidity risk.
In this paper, we contribute to ll in this gap by empirically analyzing the
5This chapter re ects joint work with Moshe Kim.
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way banks manage their liquidity risk. More specically, we analyze the de-
terminants of banks’ liquidity risk management choices, explicitly considering
potential strategic interactions among banks. This issue has relevant policy
implications, as banks may have incentives to engage in collective risk-taking
strategies when there is a strong belief that a (collective) bailout is possible
(Farhi and Tirole, 2012, Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007, Acharya et al, 2013).
When other banks are taking more risk, a given bank may be encouraged to
pursue similar strategies if its managers believe they are likely to be rescued
in case of distress. These collective risk-taking strategies may be optimal from
an individual perspective, as they should allow banks to increase protability
without increasing the likelihood of bankruptcy, due to the explicit or implicit
commitment of the lender of last resort. Hence, these risk-taking strategies
may be mutually reinforcing in some circumstances. This collective behavior
transforms a traditionally microprudential dimension of banking risk into a
macroprudential risk, which may ultimately generate much larger costs to the
economy.
The rst step in our analysis is to provide detailed empirical evidence on
banks’ liquidity risk management. We begin by discussing how to measure
banks’ liquidity risk, as several indicators may be relevant to quantify how ex-
posed to this risk is an institution (Tirole, 2011). Subsequently, using a panel
7
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dataset of European and North-American banks for the period 2002-2009, we
analyze which factors may be relevant in explaining why some banks adopt
a globally prudent behavior in managing the liquidity risk underlying their
nancial intermediation functions, whereas others engage in more aggressive
risk-taking strategies. We nd that when banks become larger and more prof-
itable, they tend to adopt riskier liquidity strategies, most notably if they have
a more traditional intermediation prole. In turn, when banks record larger
net interest margins and better cost-e!ciency ratios, they are generally less
risky in their liquidity management. We cannot nd empirical evidence of any
relationship between capital and liquidity ratios.
Next, in order to search for evidence on collective risk taking behaviors in
liquidity risk management, we compute a simple measure of herd behavior,
based on Lakonishok et al (1992). Our results suggest that there was some
herding in the pre-crisis period, re ected in a global deterioration of liquidity
indicators.
Nevertheless, this herding measure is clearly insu!cient to fully identify
strategic interactions, as many factors may be driving the results. A multi-
variate setting allows to consider this issue in a more integrated way, through
the estimation of the impact of peer eects (other banks’ liquidity choices) on
the liquidity indicators of each bank, while controlling for other potentially
8
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relevant explanatory variables. Using this approach, we nd strong evidence
of peer eects in liquidity risk management.
However, it is important to note that the empirical estimation of these
peer eects amongst banks raises some econometric challenges. As discussed
by Manski (1993), the identication of endogenous and exogenous eects is
undermined by the re ection problem associated with the reverse causality
of peer eects. In other words, if we argue that peers’ choices may aect
the decisions of a specic bank, we cannot rule out that the decisions of that
bank will not, in turn, aect the choices made by peers. Our solution to this
critical identication problem relies on the use of an instrument, which has
to be orthogonal to systematic or herding eects (Leary and Roberts, 2013).
Specically, the instrument used for the peer eects is the predicted values of
liquidity indicators of peer banks used in the regressions of the determinants of
liquidity indicators. Thus, the predicted values depend on the characteristics of
the banks in the peer group. These predicted values depend only on observable
bank characteristics and should therefore be orthogonal to herding eects. In
other words, the predicted value of the liquidity indicators of peer banks should
not directly aect the liquidity indicators of bank l at time w, as these predicted
values are based solely on observable bank characteristics. By controlling also
for time xed-eects, we are able to orthogonalize all systematic and common
9
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shocks to banks. Furthermore, we control for country-year xed eects. This
allows to control for all country-specic time-varying shocks, such as changes
in macroeconomic and nancial conditions, as well as changes in the regulatory
environment. The benchmark peer group is the banks operating in the same
country in each year, as these are the banks that are more likely to share
common beliefs about the likelihood of being bailed out by their common
lender of last resort.
After adequately dealing with the peer eect estimation, we obtain strong
and consistent evidence of collective risk-taking behaviors in liquidity risk man-
agement, under a wide set of specications. These results have relevant policy
implications: liquidity risk is usually regulated from amicroprudential perspec-
tive, but our results show that a macroprudential approach to the regulation
of systemic liquidity risk should not be disregarded. Given this, even though
the new Basel III package on liquidity risk is a huge step forward in the reg-
ulation of liquidity risk, additional macroprudential policy tools may need to
be considered, as the new regulation is still dominantly microprudential. For
instance, macroprudential authorities may consider imposing tighter liquidity
regulation or limits to certain types of exposures, in order to mitigate conta-
gion and systemic risks, thereby providing the correct incentives to minimize
negative externalities.
10
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The contribution of our paper is manyfold. Even though the theoretical lit-
erature provides many relevant insights regarding banks’ liquidity risk, there
is scarce empirical evidence on banks’ liquidity risk management. Further-
more, we focus on a period of particular relevance, as there is an extensive
discussion regarding excessive risk-taking in the years preceding the global -
nancial crisis. We provide detailed empirical evidence on the determinants of
liquidity risk, and, more importantly, we extend the analysis by focusing on
strategic interactions and herding behavior. In this respect, we consider not
only traditional herding measures, but we also make an eort to provide a
correct and rigorous econometric treatment for the endogeneity of peer eects
in a multivariate setting. Finally, our results provide important insights for
policy makers, most notably in what concerns the macroprudential regulation
of systemic liquidity risk.
This chapter is organized as follows. We begin by reviewing the expand-
ing literature on bank’s funding liquidity risk and its regulation, in Section
2.2. In Section 2.3 we discuss several indicators of banks’ liquidity risk and
characterize the dataset used for the empirical analysis, including an overview
of banks’ liquidity and funding choices in the run up to the recent global -
nancial crisis. In Section 2.4 we analyze how banks manage their liquidity
risk and in Section 2.5 we address the most relevant question in our paper:
11
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do banks take into account peers’ liquidity strategies when making their own
choices on liquidity risk management? More importantly, was this relevant to
the build-up of global risks in the nancial system that eventually led to the
Great Recession? In Section 2.6 we summarize our main ndings and discuss
their policy implications.
2.2 Related literature and regulation
Over recent years, banks became increasingly complex institutions, being ex-
posed to an intertwined set of risks. The 2008 nancial crisis provided a painful
illustration of how severe these risks can be and how they can seriously aect
the real economy. However, regardless of how complex banks have become,
there is an intrinsic risk that lies deep in their core function: banks are special
due to their unique intermediation role. They grant loans to entrepreneurs and
consumers, providing them with the necessary liquidity to nance their invest-
ment and consumption needs. However, banks use only a limited amount of
their own resources to grant this funding. Capital requirements on risky assets
constitute a binding constraint for the minimum amount of own funds needed.
Most of the funds used by banks are associated with liabilities to third parties.
Traditionally, these liabilities would take the form of deposits. These liquid
claims allow consumers to intertemporally optimize their consumption prefer-
12
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ences, but leave banks exposed to the risk of bank runs, as shown by Diamond
and Dybvig (1983). However, the risk of runs acts as a disciplining device
on banks (Diamond and Rajan, 2001b), given that depositors (Calomiris and
Kahn, 1991), as well as borrowers (Kim et al, 2005), have incentives to monitor
the risks taken by banks.
Through time, banks gained access to a more diversied set of liabilities
to fund their lending activities, thus being exposed not only to traditional
runs from depositors, but also to the drying up of funds in wholesale markets,
as discussed by Huang and Ratnovski (2011) or Borio (2010), amongst many
others.
The increased reliance on wholesale funding makes the relationship between
funding and market liquidity risk much stronger, as discussed by Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2009), Cai and Thakor (2009), Drehmann and Nikolau (2009),
Freixas et al (2011), Krishnamurthy (2010), Milne (2008), Strahan (2008), and
Tirole (2011). Funding and market liquidity risk are two distinct concepts:
whereas the former can be broadly dened as the risk of losing access to fund-
ing (through the form of runs or renancing risk), the latter can be dened
as the ability to sell assets without disrupting their markets prices (see, for
instance, Cai and Thakor, 2009, Milne, 2008, or Tirole, 2011). Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2009) and Brunnermeier (2009) show that under certain condi-
13
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tions market and funding liquidity risk may be mutually reinforcing, leading
to liquidity spirals, most notably when there are systemic risk concerns. For
example, if a bank is not able to rollover some of its debt, it may be forced
to sell some of its assets to obtain liquidity. However, the re sale of assets
will depress asset prices and shrink banks’ assets, given that they are marked-
to-market, thus making access to funding even more constrained (Nikolau,
2009).
Given this, even though banks are the main providers of liquidity to the
economy (Berger and Bouwman, 2009; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), they
have to adequately manage the liquidity risk underlying their balance sheet
structure, as their maturity transformation function makes them inherently
illiquid. To alleviate the maturity gap between assets and liabilities, banks
can hold a buer of liquid assets (Acharya et al, 2011, Acharya et al, 2013,
Allen and Gale, 2004a and 2004b, Bouwman, 2013, Calomiris et al, 2013,
Farhi et al, 2009, Feinman, 1993, Gale and Yorulmazer, 2013, Rochet and
Vives, 2004, Tirole, 2011, and Vives, 2011). However, holding liquid assets is
costly, given that they provide lower returns than illiquid assets. Moreover,
holding a liquidity buer may also be ine!cient, as it limits banks’ ability to
provide liquidity to entrepreneurs and consumers. Hence, even though banks
have some incentives to hold a fraction of liquid assets (in the form of cash,
14
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short term assets or government bonds, for instance), these buers will hardly
ever be su!cient to fully insure against a bank run or a sudden dry up in
wholesale markets.
Against this setting, regulation becomes necessary to mitigate some of
these risks (Bouwman, 2013). One justication for the need to regulate liq-
uidity risk is related to the fact that banks do not take into account the social
optimum when they optimize the relationship between risk and return. How-
ever, a bank failure may constitute a huge externality on other banks and,
ultimately, on the whole economy. This risk is exacerbated by the fact that
liquidity shocks are events with very low probability (though with potentially
very high impact), thus making it easy to overlook them during good periods.
Allen and Gale (2004a, 2004b) show that liquidity risk regulation is necessary
when nancial markets are incomplete, though emphasizing that all interven-
tions inevitably create distortions. Furthermore, Rochet (2004) argues that
banks take excessive risk if they anticipate that there is a high likelihood of
being bailed-out in case of distress. Ex-ante regulation of banks’ liquidity may
mitigate this behavior. Many other authors share the view that liquidity risk
regulation is necessary (Acharya et al, 2011, Brunnermeier et al, 2009, Cao
and Illing, 2010, Gale and Yorulmazer, 2013, Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998, and
Tirole, 2011, for example).
15
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However, a consensus is far from being reached on the optimal regulatory
framework to mitigate liquidity risk, both academically and politically, though
a remarkable progress has been achieved during the last few years. Tradition-
ally, reserve requirements on bank deposits were the main tool for liquidity risk
management, though they also play an important role in the implementation
of monetary policy (Robitaille, 2011). More importantly, deposit insurance
is by now broadly recognized as an important tool in preventing depositors’
bank runs6. Explicit deposit insurance can prevent runs on bank deposits,
as shown by Diamond and Dybvig (1983)7. However, deposit insurance can
only be e!cient in minimizing the likelihood of bank runs by depositors. For
instance, Bruche and Suarez (2010) show that deposit insurance can cause a
freeze in interbank markets, when there are dierences in counterparty risk.
Indeed, deposit insurance is not su!cient to forestall all liquidity-related risks
and may generate moral hazard (Ioannidou and Penas, 2010, Martin, 2006).
Given the increased diversication of banks’ funding sources (Strahan, 2008),
other regulatory mechanisms must be envisaged to ensure the correct align-
ment of incentives. The dispersion of creditors and the diversication of risks
6During the recent crisis, many governments in advanced economies decided to increase
the coverage of their national deposit insurance schemes to avoid panic runs.
7However, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detagriache (2002) nd that explicit deposit insurance
increases the likelihood of banking crises, using data for 61 countries. This empirical result
is stronger when bank interest rates are deregulated, the institutional environment is weak
and the scheme is run or funded by the government.
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and activities undertaken by banks make this issue even more complex.
A few recent and ongoing discussions have suggested the possibility of
further increasing capital requirements to also include liquidity risks8 (Brun-
nermeier et al, 20099). However, there are several opponents to this view and
a consensus has emerged on the need to regulate explicitly liquidity risk. As
argued by Ratnovski (2013), funding liquidity risk is in part related to asym-
metric information on banks’ solvency. Increasing solvency without reducing
the asymmetric information problem would not reduce renancing risk. Per-
otti and Suarez (2009) have also put forth a proposal regarding a liquidity
insurance mechanism to avoid systemic crises.
Many authors discuss the importance of holding a liquidity buer. In a re-
cent paper, Ratnovski (2009) discusses the trade-os between imposing quan-
titative requirements on banks’ liquidity holdings and improving the incentive
scheme in lender of last resort policies. This author argues that quantitative
requirements can achieve the optimal liquidity level, but not without impos-
ing costs, whereas a lender of last resort policy that takes into account bank
capital information may reduce distortionary rents, thus allowing for a more
e!cient solution. There are many other contributions in the academic litera-
8In Basel II, capital requirements were set to explicitly cover credit, market and opera-
tional risks, but not liquidity risk.
9The model in Diamond and Rajan (2001b) implicitly considers this possibility.
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ture pointing to the possibility of imposing minimum holdings of liquid assets
(Acharya et al, 2011, Allen and Gale, 2004a and 2004b, Farhi et al, 2009,
Gale and Yorulmazer, 2013, Rochet and Vives, 2004, Tirole, 2011, and Vives,
2011). However, Wagner (2007b) shows that, paradoxically, holding more liq-
uid assets may induce more risk-taking by banks. Freixas et al (2011) show
that central banks can manage interest rates to induce banks to hold liquid
assets, i.e., monetary policy can help to promote nancial stability. In turn,
Bengui (2010) nds arguments to support a tax on short-term debt, whereas
Cao and Illing (2011) show that imposing minimum liquidity standards for
banks ex-ante is a crucial requirement for sensible lender of last resort poli-
cies. Finally, Diamond and Rajan (2005) and Wagner (2007a) focus on ex-post
interventions.
Against this background, the new international regulatory framework will
be based on imposing minimum holdings of liquid assets. Globally, liquid-
ity risk regulation was perhaps somewhat overlooked before the global nan-
cial crisis, with almost non-existent internationally harmonized rules (Rochet,
2008). However, the role played by funding liquidity during the global nancial
crisis made clear that a new international regulatory framework was necessary.
In December 2010, the Basel Committee disclosed the nal version of the in-
ternational framework for liquidity risk regulation (Basel Committee, 2010),
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which is an important part of the new Basel III regulatory package. This
new regulation provides the necessary incentives for banks to hold adequate
liquidity buers and to avoid over relying on short-term funding. Liquidity
risk regulation will be based upon two key indicators: the Liquidity Cover-
age Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). The LCR will
require banks to hold su!cient high-quality liquid assets to withstand a 30-
day stressed funding scenario, being a ratio between the value of the stock of
high quality liquid assets in stressed conditions and total net cash out ows,
calculated according to scenario parameters dened in the regulation. In turn,
the NSFR is a longer-term structural ratio designed to address liquidity mis-
matches and to encourage an increased reliance on medium and long-term
funding, thus increasing the average maturity of banks’ liabilities. The NSFR
is the ratio between the available and the required amount of stable funding,
which should be at least 100%. The two indicators are complementary and
ensure that banks hold an adequate pool of liquid assets, while simultaneously
adopting a reasonable and prudent maturity mismatch.
Still, when regulation fails to preemptively address risks, there is always
the lender of last resort. Bagehot (1837) was amongst the rst to acknowledge
that such mechanism was a central piece in crisis management10. Since then,
10"Theory suggests, and experience proves, that in a panic the holders of the ultimate
bank reserve (whether one bank or many) should lend to all that bring good securities
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the consensus has been to lend freely, usually at penalty rates, to all solvent
but illiquid banks (though it is in practice very hard to draw the line between
solvency and liquidity problems). The recent nancial crisis demonstrated
the importance of the lender of last resort. From August 2007 onwards, the
freeze in interbank money markets made lending from central banks world-
wide crucial11. The failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 vividly
demonstrated the dramatic consequences of a failure of a systemic nancial
institution12. However, the lender of last resort has an intrinsic moral haz-
ard problem (see, for example, Freixas et al, 2004, Gorton and Huang, 2004,
Ratnovski, 2009, Rochet and Tirole, 1996, Rochet and Vives, 2004, Wagner,
2007a). This mechanism has to be credible ex-ante to prevent crises. But if
the mechanism is in fact credible, banks will know they will be helped out if
they face severe di!culties, thus having perverse incentives to engage in ex-
cessive risk-taking behaviors. For instance, Gonzales-Eiras (2004) nds that
banks’ holding of liquid assets decrease when there is a lender of last resort,
quickly, freely, and readily. By that policy they allay a panic; by every other policy they
intensify it.", Bagehot (1837).
11Lending from central banks during the initial stages of the crisis occurred mainly through
monetary policy operations and not through emergency liquid assistance (which corresponds
to the function of lender of last resort). For further details and analysis of the freeze in
interbank markets in 2007 we refer to Acharya and Merrouche (2012), Afonso et al (2011),
Allen and Carletti (2008), Angelini et al (2011), Brunnermeier (2009), and Cornett et al
(2011).
12Two excellent analyzes of the crisis are Acharya and Richardson (2009) and Brunner-
meier et al (2009). Both present a set of proposals to rethink the regulation of the nancial
system globally.
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using a natural experiment in Argentina. This moral hazard problem is further
aggravated by systemic behavior13.
Indeed, when most banks are overtaking risks, each bank manager has clear
incentives to herd, instead of leaning against the wind. Ratnovski (2009) ar-
gues that, in equilibrium, banks have incentives to herd in risk management,
choosing suboptimal liquidity as long as other banks are expected to do the
same. These collective risk-taking strategies may be optimal from an individ-
ual perspective, as they should allow banks to increase protability without
increasing the likelihood of bankruptcy, due to the explicit or implicit bail out
commitment of the lender of last resort. These arguments are discussed in
detail by Farhi and Tirole (2012), who argue that when banks simultaneously
increase their liquidity risk, through larger maturity mismatches, current and
future social costs are being created. Given all these market failures, regu-
lation is needed to ensure that these externalities are considered by banks in
their liquidity risk management. Nevertheless, the costs and distortions gen-
erated by such regulation also need to be taken into account. Acharya and
Yorulmazer (2007) and Acharya et al (2013) also discuss bailouts when there
are many potentially correlated failures. Acharya et al (2011) consider the
13Citigroup’s former CEO, Charles Prince, has been repeatedly quoted by saying before
August 2007 that “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated.
But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing”.
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eect of the business cycle on banks’ optimal liquidity choices and prove that
during upturns banks’ choice of liquid assets jointly decreases. In turn, Allen
et al (2012) show that when banks make similar portfolio decisions systemic
risk increases, as defaults become more correlated. Jain and Gupta (1987) nd
(weak) evidence on bank herding during a crisis period. Collective risk taking
incentives and behaviors are also discussed by Acharya (2009), Acharya and
Yorulmazer (2008), Boot (2011), Rajan (2006), Tirole (2011), and Van den
End and Tabbae (2012). This emerging evidence on systemic liquidity risk
calls for adequate macroprudential instruments that address the sources of
such risks, as discussed by Farhi and Tirole (2012), Boot (2011), and Cao and
Illing (2010). Nevertheless, most of these conclusions are supported by the-
oretical results, lacking empirical support. Our paper intends to ll this gap
in the literature, by providing empirical evidence of herd behavior in liquidity
risk management.
2.3 How to measure liquidity risk?
The maturity transformation role of banks generates funding liquidity risk (Di-
amond and Dybvig, 1983). As banks’ liabilities usually have shorter maturities
than those of banks’ assets, banks have to repeatedly renance their assets.
This renancing risk is larger the wider is the mismatch between assets’ and li-
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abilities’ average maturities. In the run up to the global nancial crisis, many
banks were engaging in funding strategies that heavily relied on short-term
funding (Brunnermeier, 2009 and CGFS, 2010), thus signicantly increasing
their exposure to funding liquidity risk. Nevertheless, this risk can be miti-
gated if banks hold a su!ciently large buer of highly liquid and good quality
assets, which they can easily use when hit by unforeseen funding shocks.
In this section, we brie y review several ways to measure funding liquid-
ity risk, which will later be used in our empirical analysis. As discussed by
Tirole (2011), liquidity cannot be measured by relying on a single variable or
ratio, given its complexity and the multitude of potential risk sources. This
section also includes a brief description of the data used in this paper and an
overview of banks’ liquidity and funding choices in the years preceding the
global nancial crisis.
2.3.1 Liquidity indicators
An analysis of balance sheet structure can provide an important insight on
banks’ liquidity risk. More specically, the ratio between credit granted and
deposits taken from customers provides a broad structural characterization of
banks’ main funding risks. Given that customers deposits are a broadly stable
funding source (in the absence of bank runs), those banks that nance most
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or all of their credit with deposits should, ceteris paribus, be less exposed to
liquidity risk. In contrast, banks that show a large funding gap, i.e., a very
high loan-to-deposit ratio, will be more exposed to this risk, as they will need
to rely on wholesale funding markets14. Against this background, banks in
which wholesale market funding as a percentage of assets is higher will be
more sensitive to renancing risk. This latter risk will be higher the shorter
is the maturity of market funding. Hence, the analysis of the balance sheet
structure based on the above mentioned liquidity indicators (loan-to-deposit
ratio, funding gap or market funding as a percentage of assets) does not allow
for a complete assessment of liquidity risk, as these indicators are unable to
take into account the maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities.
Another important dimension of funding liquidity risk that became a key
issue since the summer of 2007 is the reliance on interbank funding. Interbank
markets allow markets to close, by allowing banks with short-term liquidity
needs to obtain funds from other banks with temporary excess liquidity. How-
ever, after August 2007, unsecured money markets became severely impaired
14It is also possible that the mismatch between loans and deposits is nanced with more
equity, rather than with wholesale funding. If a bank has strong equity ratios and does
not rely on wholesale funding, a high loan-to-deposit ratio does not imply strictly higher
risk. However, very few banks rely entirely on deposit funding, as most banks approach the
interbank market to match short-term mismatches between assets and liabilities and many
banks obtain regular funding from debt markets. To control for this interaction between
equity and the loan-to-deposit ratio, we control for capital ratios in the multivariate analysis
conducted in this paper (see sections 3 and 4).
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for a long period (Afonso et al, 2011, Cornett et al, 2011, Brunnermeier, 2009,
Allen and Carletti, 2008, and Angelini et al, 2011). Wagner (2007a) shows that
the interbank markets may be ine!cient in providing liquidity when banks are
hit by aggregate liquidity shocks. Against this background, the interbank ratio
measured, for instance, as the ratio between interbank assets and interbank
liabilities, may also be an important input to the assessment of liquidity risk.
In fact, if banks structurally rely on funding from interbank markets, which is
usually characterized by very short maturities, they may have severe di!culties
in rolling over their debt in periods of distress.
Another important dimension of liquidity risk is related to the buer of
liquid assets held by banks. Renancing risk may be mitigated if banks hold
a comfortable buer of high quality very liquid assets that they can easily
dispose of in case of unexpected funding constraints. In this respect, the
ratio of liquid assets to short-term funding also provides important insights
into banks’ liquidity risk. Even though the available data does not allow to
compute the Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), this liquidity indicator
may be taken as a close approximation.
All the above mentioned indicators consider only parts of banks’ balance
sheets. Hence, a more encompassing analysis of the liquidity of assets and lia-
bilities may be desirable. Ideally, a complete liquidity indicator would rely on
25
Chapter 2 Liquidity risk in banking
the overall liquidity mismatch between assets and liabilities. However, the data
necessary for such an indicator is usually not publicly available. Nevertheless,
some approximation may be feasible. One interesting approach was suggested
by Berger and Bouwman (2009). These authors dene liquidity creation as:
olt_fuhdwlrq = {1@2  loolt_dvvhwv+ 0  vhpl_olt_dvvhwv 1@2  olt_dvvhwv}
+ {1@2  olt_olde=+ 0  vhpl_olt_olde= 1@2  loolt_olde=}
1@2  fdslwdo
The higher this variable is, the more liquidity a bank is creating, i.e., the
larger is its maturity transformation role. More liquidity is created when illiq-
uid assets are transformed into liquid liabilities. Of course, liquidity creation
is positively related with funding liquidity risk, given that banks that create
more liquidity have less liquid assets to meet short-term funding pressures15.
Ultimately, the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) included in the Basel III
package provides the broadest way to characterize the global liquidity prole
of a bank. As mentioned before, the NSFR is the ratio between the avail-
15Berger and Bouwman (2009) consider two dierent measures of liquidity creation. Be-
sides the one presented above, there is another denition that considers o-balance sheet
data. Tough the latter denition is more encompassing, capturing better the liquidity cre-
ated by a bank, the data available in Bankscope does not allow us to compute it for our
sample.
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able and the required amount of stable funding. The higher this ratio is, the
more comfortable is the institution’s liquidity position. Though the available
data does not allow for the accurate computation of this indicator, a gross
approximation is possible.
In sum, given the challenges in measuring funding liquidity risk, our em-
pirical analysis will be based on the analysis of ve complementary indicators:
the credit to deposit ratio, an interbank ratio, a liquidity ratio, a liquidity
creation indicator and a net stable funding ratio, all of them dened in detail
in Section 2.3.3. These indicators allow us to capture dierent dimensions of
liquidity risk, including structural balance sheet risks, exposures to short-term
funding in interbank markets, the availability of a pool of highly liquid assets
to face unexpected shocks, and the magnitude of maturity transformation.
2.3.2 Data
Given that one of our objectives is to assess the extent to which banks take
each others’ choices into account when managing liquidity risk, it is relevant
to consider a su!ciently heterogeneous group of banks. With that in mind,
we collect data from Bankscope for the period between 2002 and 2009, thus
covering both crisis and pre-crisis years. We collect data on European and
North-American banks, selecting only commercial banks and bank holding
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companies for which consolidated statements are available in universal for-
mat, so as to ensure the comparability of variables across countries. Savings
and investment banks were not included in the dataset, as they usually have
dierent liquidity risk proles and funding strategies. Using these lters, we
obtain data for almost 3,500 banks during 8 years, for 45 countries16. Exclud-
ing banks without information on total assets, we obtain 17,643 bank-year
observations.
In Table 2.1 we summarize the major characteristics of the banks included
in the sample. To avoid having results aected by outliers, all variables were
winsorised in their 1st and 99th percentiles. We observe that there is a sub-
stantial dispersion in bank size, measured by total assets. The average total
capital ratio is 14.5% (12.9% for the median bank). There is also substantial
dispersion in banks’ protability, measured both by return on assets and by the
net interest margin, and in banks’ e!ciency, measured by the cost-to-income
ratio. Loans represent almost two thirds of the assets of the banks included
in the sample, even though the table shows that there are banks with very
16These countries are Albania, Andorra, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Lux-
embourg, Malta, Moldova Republic, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portu-
gal, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and United States. In Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Liechtenstein, Moldova Republic, Montenegro and San Marino there are less
than 10 observations for the entire sample period. Given this, we exclude these ve countries
from all cross-country analysis.
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dierent specializations, as loans range from 5.1% to 90.6% of banks’ assets.
N mean min p25 p50 p75 max
Total  assets 17620 21,200 92 295 659 2,183 772,000
Total  capita l ratio 10211 14.5 7.3 11.3 12.9 15.6 44.5
Tier 1 ratio 9851 12.6 4.7 9.5 11.2 13.9 41.6
Net interest margin 17561 3.7 0.3 3.0 3.8 4.4 10.4
Return on assets 17596 0.9 -4.9 0.5 1.0 1.3 5.1
Cost to income 17510 67.1 27.4 56.7 65.0 74.2 165.1
Net loans to  tota l  assets 17509 63.0 5.1 55.1 66.4 75.2 90.6
Table 2 .1 - Banks' characteristics
Notes: Total assets in millions of USD. The total capital and Tier 1 ratios are calculated according 
to the regulatory rules defined by the Basel Committee. Net interest margin is defined as net 
interest income as a percentage of earning assets. Return on assets computed as net income as a 
percentage of average assets. The cost-to-income ratio is computed as banks operational costs 
(overheads) as a percentage of income generated before provisions. These variables are included in 
the Bankscope database. The statistics presented refer to data after outliers were winsorized.
2.3.3 An overview of banks’ liquidity and funding choices in the
run up to the global nancial crisis and afterwards
In Table 2.2 we summarize the information on liquidity risk for the banks
included in the sample. Taking into account our discussion of liquidity indi-
cators in Section 2.3.1, we focus our analysis of liquidity risk on ve dierent
indicators: i) loans to customer deposits; ii) the interbank ratio, dened as the
ratio between interbank assets (loans to other banks) and interbank liabili-
ties (loans from other banks, including central bank funding); iii) the liquidity
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ratio, dened as liquid assets (deposits and loans to banks with less than 3
months residual maturity, quoted/listed government bonds realizable within 3
months, cash and equivalents) as a percentage of customer deposits and short-
term funding; iv) liquidity creation as a percentage of total assets, which is
a proxy of the liquidity indicator proposed by Berger and Bouwman (2009);
and v) a Net Stable Funding Ratio, which is an approximation of the indica-
tor proposed by the Basel Committee. The rst three variables are computed
in a standardized way in the Bankscope database. The remaining two were
computed using balance sheet data (details are presented in the Appendix).
In Panel A of Table 2.2 we present summary statistics for these ve indicators
and in Panel B we depict their evolution during the sample period. In Figures
2.1 to 2.10 we present the empirical distributions of these indicators.
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mean min p25 p50 p75 max
Loans to  customer deposits 94.5 0.0 73.9 88.1 102.7 365.6
Interbank ratio 143.0 0.0 31.8 71.7 168.1 895.2
Liquidity ratio 16.3 1.2 4.2 7.5 16.7 125.6
Liquidity creation 9.1 -35.7 -4.8 4.8 22.1 69.2
NSFR 115.1 27.8 106.7 121.2 129.9 155.1
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
Loans to  customer deposits 84.1 84.9 89.6 93.0 103.1 106.0 107.9 98.7 94.5
Interbank ratio 195.7 172.2 163.2 152.2 143.8 132.2 122.8 122.1 143.0
Liquidity ratio 14.7 13.4 13.7 15.0 20.6 19.7 18.1 19.1 16.3
Liquidity creation 2.7 2.5 3.8 6.9 13.0 13.7 13.9 24.9 9.1
NSFR 122.2 122.6 119.9 116.9 109.4 108.5 108.2 104.5 115.1
Notes: The interbank ratio is defined as interbank assets as a percentage of interbank liabilities (loans to other banks as a 
percentage of loans from other banks). The liquidity ratio is defined as liquid assets (deposits and loans to banks with less than 3 
months residual maturity, quoted/listed government bonds realizable within 3 months, cash and equivalent), as a percentage of 
customer deposits and short term funding. The first three variables in this table are included in the Bankscope database. Liquidity 
creation is a proxy of the liquidity indicator proposed by Berger and Bouwman (2009). The higher this variable is, the more 
liquidity a bank is creating, i.e., the larger is its maturity transformation role. NSFR is an approximation of the Net Stable 
Funding Ratio defined in Basel III, which considers the available stable funding as a percentage of the required stable funding (i.e., 
assests that need to be funded). These last two variables are defined in detail in the Appendix. The statistics presented refer to data 
after outliers were winsorized.
Panel A - Global  summary statistics
Panel  B - Liquidity indicators over time (mean)







As mentioned above, the ratio between loans and customer deposits is
a structural indicator of funding liquidity risk. A ratio above 100% means
that the bank has to nance part of its loans with wholesale market funding,
which may be more expensive and less stable than customer deposits. The
dierence between loans and customer deposits is usually referred to as the
funding gap. During the last decades, banks have moved from a traditional
intermediation paradigm in which most loans were funded through deposits
(thus implying loan to deposits ratios not far from 100%) to a new framework
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of bank funding. As access to wholesale markets became more generalized,
banks were able to diversify their funding sources. This had implications on
the maturity transformation role of banks. Looking at our sample period, we
observe a consistent increase in this ratio, from 84.1 per cent in 2002 to 107.9
per cent in 2008. There is a signicant dispersion in the ratios recorded by
banks in dierent countries.
Figure 2.1
Empirical  distribution of the ratio  between loans and customers 
deposits
Figure 2.2
Empirical  distribution of the ratio  between loans and customers 
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However, this indicator, in and by itself, is insu!cient to globally assess the
liquidity position of credit institutions. Several limitations of this indicator can
be mentioned. First, it is essentially a structural indicator and thus strategic
and cyclical changes may take some time to be re ected in the data. Second,
the increased use of securitization operations by banks during the last decade
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undermines to some extent the analysis of this indicator (when banks securitize
loans, these are usually removed from their loan books, thus generating a
somewhat misleading decrease in the credit to deposit ratio). Finally, this
indicator does not take into account the maturity mismatch between assets
and liabilities, which is a key element of liquidity risk analysis.
The interbank ratio allows to assess another dimension of bank’s funding
liquidity risk, evaluating whether banks are net borrowers or net lenders in
interbank markets. As we dene this indicator as the ratio between loans to
other banks and loans from other banks, a ratio above 100% means that a
bank is a net lender in interbank markets, thus signaling a more comfortable
liquidity position than otherwise.
During our sample period, this ratio decreased gradually, thus implying a
deterioration on the average position of banks in these markets. Comparing
the interbank positions at the beginning and end of the sample period, some
countries recorded a signicant decline, whereas others recorded the opposite
evolution. All in all, Figure 2.4 clearly illustrates that the dispersion of this
ratio decreased markedly during the sample period.
The freeze in interbank markets observed since the nancial market turmoil
started in August 2007 makes the intertemporal analysis of this ratio more
challenging. During most of the global nancial crisis, the lack of condence led
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to severe disruptions in the functioning of interbank markets. Uncollateralized
operations almost ceased to exist during signicant periods and high haircuts
were imposed on collateralized operations. Thus, there is a clear series break
in this indicator from August 2007 onwards, which will be analyzed further
ahead. Furthermore, it is important to note that end-of-year data for this ratio
may sometimes be subject to some window-dressing, thus not fully re ecting
the average values shown throughout the year.
Figure 2 .3 Figure 2 .4
Empirica l  distribution o f the interbank ratio Empirica l  distribution o f the interbank ratio  - by year
Note: The interbank ratio is defined as interbank assets as a percentage of 
interbank liabilities (loans to other banks as a percentage of loans from other 
banks).  
Note: The interbank ratio is defined as interbank assets as a percentage of interbank 
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Again, the interbank ratio allows for the evaluation of only one dimension
of liquidity risk. A more encompassing indicator is the ratio of liquid assets to
customer and short-term funding. The lower the ratio, the more challenging
it may be for banks to honor their short-term nancial commitments. This
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ratio increased up until the nancial turmoil in the summer of 2007. Hence,
there does not seem to exist evidence of any dilapidation of the buer of liquid
assets or of a relative increase in short-term funding of European and North-
American banks in the run up to the crisis. However, in 2007 and 2008 there
was some deterioration in this liquidity ratio, mainly due to the strong growth
in customer and short-term funding.
Again, the cross-country dispersion is considerable. For most countries, this
ratio shows remarkable volatility during the sample period, as it easily re ects
changes in banks’ strategic behavior in terms of liquidity risk management.
Note: The liquidity ratio is defined as liquid assets (deposits and loans to banks 
with less than 3 months residual maturity, quoted/listed government bonds 
realizable within 3 months, cash and equivalent), as a percentage of customer 
deposits and short term funding. 
Notes: The liquidity ratio is defined as liquid assets (deposits and loans to banks with 
less than 3 months residual maturity, quoted/listed government bonds realizable within 
3 months, cash and equivalent), as a percentage of customer deposits and short term 
funding.
Figure 2 .5 Figure 2.6
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Liquidity creation increased steadily during the sample period, including
during the crisis years. Actually, its highest value was recorded in 2009, thus
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showing that banks continued to create liquidity even during the global nan-
cial crisis. However, this also implies that liquidity risk increased during this
period, according to this indicator. From all the indicators analyzed, this is
the one which presents a distribution closer to the normal, though having a
fat right tail.
Figure 2 .7 Figure 2.8
Empirica l  distribution o f the l iquidity creation ratio Empirical  distribution o f the l iquidi ty creation ratio - by year
Note: Liquidity creation is a proxy of the liquidity indicator proposed by Berger 
and Bouwman (2009). The higher this variable is, the more liquidity a bank is 
creating, i.e., the larger is its maturity transformation role. Please see Appendix 
for further details.
Note: Liquidity creation is a proxy of the liquidity indicator proposed by Berger and 
Bouwman (2009). The higher this variable is, the more liquidity a bank is creating, i.e., 
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Finally, the NSFR showed some deterioration in the run up to the crisis. It
is important to stress that this indicator is a rough approximation of the indi-
cator proposed by the Basel Committee. As such, the 100 per cent minimum
threshold dened for this ratio for prudential purposes cannot be considered
for our indicator. There is a remarkable cross-country heterogeneity in this
indicator.
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Figure 2 .9 Figure 2 .10
Empirica l distribution of the NSFR Empirica l distribution of the NSFR - by year
Note: NSFR is an approximation of the Net Stable Funding Ratio defined in 
Basel III, which considers the available stable funding as a percentage of the 
required stable funding (i.e., assests that need to be funded). Please see Appendix 
for further details.
Note: NSFR is an approximation of the Net Stable Funding Ratio defined in Basel III, 
which considers the available stable funding as a percentage of the required stable 
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All in all, the analysis of these complementary liquidity indicators shows
that there is a considerable heterogeneity in liquidity indicators both across
countries and over time. Before the crisis, the loan-to-deposit ratio, the inter-
bank ratio and the NSFR showed some deterioration. In turn, the liquidity
ratio decreased after the crisis started, with a marked growth of customer
deposits and short-term funding (while liquid assets recorded only a mild in-
crease). Hence, even though most banks did not have to sell liquid assets
to face short term funding needs, their maturity prole took a pronounced
turn for the worse. During this period, many banks were not able to issue
medium and long-term debt securities, thus shortening the average maturity
of their liabilities. Nevertheless, liquidity creation does not seem to have been
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aected by these developments. Despite evident balance sheet adjustments,
banks worldwide continued to perform their vital intermediation function.
In the next section we will provide some insight on which factors are rele-
vant to explain the heterogeneity in liquidity indicators.
2.4 How do banks manage liquidity risk?
Even though liquidity risk management is one of the most important decisions
in the prudent management of nancial institutions, there is scarce empirical
evidence on the determinants of liquidity indicators. Using our dataset, we
are able to explore which bank characteristics may be relevant in explaining
liquidity indicators. In Table 2.3 we present some results on the ve liquidity
indicators described in the previous section: i) loans to customer deposits
(column 1); ii) the interbank ratio (column 2); iii) the liquidity ratio (column
3); iv) liquidity creation (column 4); and v) net stable funding ratio (column 5).
All specications use robust standard errors, bank xed-eects and country-
year xed eects, such that:
Olt{lw = 0+l+qw+1Fdslwdolw31+ 2Edqnvl}hlw+ 3Surilwdelolw|lw31+
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+4Frvw_lqflw31 + 5Ohqg_vshflw31 + 6(Olt  {lw31) + lw + %lw (2.1)
where Olt{lw is the liquidity indicator analyzed, 0 is a constant, l is the
bank xed eect, qw is the country-year xed eect, lw is the year xed eect
and %lw is the estimation residual. Bank xed eects allow to control for all
time-invariant bank characteristics, while country-year xed eects control for
all country-specic time-varying shocks, such as changes in macroeconomic and
nancial conditions, or changes in the regulatory environment. By controlling
also for time xed-eects, we are able to orthogonalize all systematic and com-
mon shocks to banks. As explanatory variables, we use a set of core bank in-
dicators on solvency, size, protability, e!ciency and specialization. Fdslwdolw
is the total capital ratio calculated according to the rules dened by the Basel
Committee. Edqnvl}hlw is measured by the log of Assets and surilwdelolw|lw
includes the return on assets and the net interest margin. Frvw_lqflw refers to
the cost-to-income ratio, which is a proxy for cost-e!ciency, and ohqg_vshflw
measures to what extent a bank is specialized in lending, by considering net
loans as a percentage of total assets. Finally, (Olt  {lw) refers to the other
liquidity indicators, i.e., {lw 6= {lw (the only exception is the interbank ratio,
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which is never included as an explanatory variable, given that it would imply
a considerable reduction in the sample size). All variables are lagged by one
period to mitigate concerns of simultaneity and reverse causality.
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Dependent variable:
Total capital ratio t-1 0.19 -0.46 0.08 -0.14 0.07
1.01 -0.46 1.15 -1.56 0.85
Log Assets t 5.09 ** -8.05 -2.50 ** -5.87 *** -2.69 **
2.09 -0.46 -2.23 -4.96 -2.46
Net interest margin t-1 -1.82 ** 3.35 -0.05 -1.37 *** 2.11 ***
-2.29 0.78 -0.17 -3.96 5.95
Return on assets t-1 1.42 * -1.51 -0.63 ** 0.68 * -1.43 ***
1.73 -0.25 -2.11 1.81 -3.66
Cost-to-income t-1 0.02 -0.13 0.00 0.08 *** -0.04 **
0.43 -0.54 -0.04 3.72 -2.10
Net loans to total assets t-1 1.04 *** -2.24 ** -0.20 *** 0.29 *** 0.11 **
8.79 -2.24 -5.51 6.72 2.03
Loans to customer deposits t-1 - 0.16 0.00 -0.02 ** -0.08 ***
- 1.31 -0.39 -2.01 -5.77
Interbank ratio t-1 - - - - -
- - - - -
Liquidity ratio t-1 0.30 *** 0.02 - 0.23 *** 0.04
3.54 0.05 - 7.90 1.36
Liquidity creation t-1 -0.49 *** 1.59 *** 0.11 *** - -0.14 ***
-5.13 3.21 3.63 - -4.22
NSFR t-1 -0.61 *** 1.30 *** 0.17 *** -0.15 *** -
-7.38 2.73 6.16 -5.31 -
D2004 1.67 ** 0.48 -0.34 -3.74 *** 2.10 ***
2.18 0.03 -0.93 -10.36 5.36
D2005 2.27 ** 6.28 -0.53 -3.66 *** 1.13 **
2.26 0.43 -1.49 -8.58 2.55
D2006 3.64 *** 9.37 0.36 -7.35 *** 4.49 ***
4.44 0.72 1.15 -21.51 11.57
D2007 5.56 *** -0.93 -0.02 -9.08 *** 4.79 ***
6.58 -0.08 -0.07 -23.22 12.18
D2008 7.50 *** -6.93 -1.38 *** -11.59 *** 5.08 ***
10.76 -0.80 -5.37 -27.44 13.43
Constant 348.9 *** 445.2 -19.8 -593.2 *** 355.24 ***
4.82 0.66 -0.63 -15.33 9.92
Number of observations 7,018 1,885 7,018 7,020 7,020
Number of banks 1,735 529 1,736 1,738 1,738
R2 within 0.160 0.059 0.102 0.366 0.160
R2 between 0.151 0.038 0.303 0.139 0.165
R2 overall 0.129 0.017 0.276 0.103 0.138
Frac. of variance due to bank FE 0.965 0.729 0.966 0.998 0.984
Notes:  All regressions include country-year fixed-effects, bank fixed-effects and robust standard errors. t-
statistics in italics. The total capital  ratio is calculated according to the regulatory rules defined by the Basel 
Committee. Net interest margin is defined as net interest income as a percentage of earning assets. Return on 
assets computed as net income as a percentage of average assets. The cost-to-income ratio is computed as 
banks operational costs (overheads) as a percentage of income generated before provisions. The interbank ratio 
is defined as interbank assets as a percentage of interbank liabilities (loans to other banks as a percentage of 
loans from other banks). The liquidity ratio is defined as liquid assets (deposits and loans to banks with less 
than 3 months residual maturity, quoted/listed government bonds realizable within 3 months, cash and 
equivalent), as a percentage of customer deposits and short term funding. All these variables are included in the 
Bankscope database.  Liquidity creation is a proxy of the liquidity indicator proposed by Berger and Bouwman 
(2009). The higher this variable is, the more liquidity a bank is creating, i.e., the larger is its maturity 
transformation role. NSFR is an approximation of the Net Stable Funding Ratio defined in Basel III, which 
considers the available stable funding as a percentage of the required stable funding (i.e., assests that need to 
be funded). These last two variables are defined in detail in the Appendix. *** significant at 1%; ** significant 
at 5%; * significant at 10%.
Table 2.3 - Determinants of liquidity indicators
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On average, when banks become larger, they seem to become generally
riskier in what concerns liquidity risk management, showing higher loan-to-
deposit ratios, weaker interbank positions, smaller liquidity buers and less
stable funding structures. However, larger banks seem to create less liquidity,
as a percentage of total assets, thus being less exposed in this risk dimension.
Even though some relationship between capital and liquidity could be ex-
pected (Berger and Bouwman, 2009, Diamond and Rajan, 2000, 2001a), the
total capital ratio is not statistically signicant in any of the specications
tested.
The relationship between protability and liquidity risk is rather mixed.
On the one hand, when banks obtain larger net interest margins, they seem
to display lower liquidity risk (measured by loan to deposits, liquidity creation
and NSFR). On the other hand, when banks record higher overall protabil-
ity, as measured by return on assets, they show more liquidity risk (higher
loan to deposit ratios, more liquidity creation, lower liquidity buers and less
stable funding structures). Banks that are more protable in their basic in-
termediation function seem to have less risky funding structures, while banks
that are broadly more protable (possibly obtaining larger gains from other
income sources) tend to be riskier in their liquidity risk management. These
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are possibly banks that adopt riskier strategies in order to boost protability,
thus being more vulnerable to funding liquidity risk. This result is in line with
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), who show that banks that rely on strate-
gies based on non-interest income and on short-term funding are signicantly
riskier.
In turn, when banks become more e!cient, with lower cost-to-income ra-
tios, they create, on average, less liquidity and have larger net stable funding
ratios. Finally, one of the most relevant variables in explaining liquidity ratios
is bank specialization, measured as net loans as a percentage of total assets:
banks that become more specialized in lending to customers tend to have, as
would be expected, higher loan to deposit ratios and create more liquidity.
These banks also display lower interbank ratios (i.e., they are more likely net
borrowers) and lower liquidity ratios. Hence, even though banks that concen-
trate most of their assets in lending are usually perceived as having a more
traditional, and perhaps more stable, intermediation prole, these are the
banks that tend to show worse liquidity ratios (the only exception is the result
obtained for the NSFR, which goes in the opposite direction). Hence, even
though these banks are usually deemed as globally less prone to risk-taking,
they tend to show larger funding gaps and maturity mismatches.
The coe!cients on liquidity indicators show that these capture dierent
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dimensions of liquidity risk. Indeed, with the exception with the coe!cients
associated with the NSFR, the signals of these coe!cients are contrary to what
could be expected ex-ante. This conrms the need to simultaneously assess
these dierent dimensions of liquidity risk.
Finally, it is relevant to note that a large part of the variation in liquidity
ratios cannot be attributable to the observed nancial ratios analyzed. Indeed,
as shown in the table, bank xed eects account for a very large fraction of the
variance. This result is entirely consistent with evidence obtained by Gropp
and Heider (2010) regarding the determinants of banks’ capital ratios. These
authors nd that unobserved time invariant bank xed eects are ultimately
the most important determinant of banks’ capital ratios.
In sum, when banks become larger and more protable, they tend to ex-
hibit, on average, more liquidity risk, most notably if they have a more tra-
ditional intermediation prole, focusing on lending to customers. Given that
liquidity risk can be associated with maturity transformation (i.e., with the
main role of banks in an economy), this may imply that the banks that take
more risk in liquidity are usually those better equipped to do so, as they should
be better able to withstand adverse shocks. In turn, banks with larger net in-
terest margins and with better cost-e!ciency ratios seem to be generally less
risky in their liquidity management. Finally, there does not seem to exist an
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empirical relationship between capital and liquidity, thus suggesting that these
two dimensions should be regulated through dierent instruments.
2.5 Are other banks’ decisions relevant?
In the previous section we shed some light on the role of dierent bank char-
acteristics on their observed liquidity strategies. However, it is possible to
argue that banks do not optimize their liquidity choices strictly individually,
and may take into account other banks’ choices. In fact, when banks believe
that they may be bailed out in case of severe nancial distress (for being
too-big, too-systemic or too-interconnected to fail), they may actually have
incentives to herd, engaging in similar risk-taking and management strategies.
For instance, Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995) show that banks are more
often rescued than liquidated in case of distress. Against this background,
when other banks are taking more risk, a specic bank may have the incen-
tives to engage in similar strategies. These collective risk-taking strategies
may be optimal from an individual perspective as they should allow banks to
increase protability without increasing the likelihood of bankruptcy, due to
the explicit or implicit commitment of the lender of last resort, as theoretically
conjectured by Ratnovski (2009).
In this section, we try to nd evidence of possible herding behavior of
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banks in liquidity risk management, especially in the years before the global
nancial crisis. We begin by analyzing a herding measure that may provide
some insight on this issue, in section 2.5.1. However, the identication and
measurement of peer eects on individual choices is a challenging econometric
problem, as discussed by Manski (1993). In section 2.5.2 we brie y discuss
these identication problems and in section 2.5.3 we propose an empirical
strategy to address these concerns and present our results.
2.5.1 A traditional measure of bank herd behavior
A possible way to examine if banks take into account each others’ decisions
in liquidity risk choices is to estimate measures of herding frequently used
in nancial markets (see, for example, Graham, 1999, Grinblatt et al, 1995,
Scharfstein and Stein, 1990, or Wermers, 1999). To do that, we adapt the
often used herding measure proposed by Lakonishok et al (1992) and applied
to bank herding by Uchida and Nakagawa (2007) and, more recently, by Van
den End and Tabbae (2012). This methodology allows testing the extent to
which the liquidity choices of banks collectively deviate from what could be
suggested by overall macroeconomic conditions. Implicitly, we are considering
a concept of "rational herding", as dened by Devenow and Welch (1996).
In other words, we do not consider that banks simply mimic each other’s
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behaviors, but rather that they do so because there are important externalities
that aect the optimal decision making process.
We compute:
Kl = |Slw  Sw|H |Slw  Sw|
where Slw is the proportion of banks that show an increase in risk for a
given liquidity indicator in each country and in each year, computed as [lQl . [l
is the number of banks that recorded a deterioration of a liquidity indicator
in a country in a given year, and Ql is the total number of banks operating in
each country and in each year. For the loan-to-deposit and liquidity creation
ratios, [l refers to the number of banks that showed an increase in these
ratios, while for the other three liquidity indicators [l refers to the number
of banks that recorded a decrease in these indicators, i.e., an increase in risk.
Sw is the mean of Slw in each year (i.e., it is the average across all countries
in a given year). The dierence between Slw and Sw measures to what extent
liquidity indicators in one country and in one year deviate from the overall
liquidity indicators in that year, i.e. from common factors. According to the
methodology proposed by Lakonishok et al (1992), when banks independently
increase or decrease liquidity indicators, i.e. not due to herding eects, Slw and
Sw become closer and |Slw  Sw|$ 0. However, when several banks collectively
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deviate and increase or decrease their liquidity indicators, Slw departs from
Sw. In other words, when there is no herding, it can be assumed that some
banks will increase risk, while others will simultaneously decrease risk, thereby
leading to a smaller dierence between Slw and Sw.
The second term in the equation is used to normalize the herding measure.
If there is no herding, the expected value of the rst term is positive, as
discussed above. As such, the second term is subtracted to make the mean of
Kl equal to zero under the null hypothesis of no herding.
Computing this measure at the country level is crucial if we consider that
the incentives for herding are much stronger amongst national peers. The
common belief of bailout is more likely to be shared by banks in the same
country. Indeed, the arguments to support that banks take riskier strategies
because banks operating in other countries do so are much weaker than when
considered at the national level. This will be particularly true if competition
between banks exists within markets segmented by national borders.
Table 2.4 shows our estimates for this herding measure for the ve liquidity
indicators. The estimates presented are the annual averages of Kl for each
liquidity indicator, when Slw A Sw, i.e. when in a given country more banks
are increasing risk than the average in all the other countries taken together.
The larger the absolute value of Kl is, the stronger are herding behaviors (the
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sign of Kl cannot be interpreted as "positive" or "negative" herding, as it is
aected by the normalization term).
The evidence supporting herd behavior based on this indicator is statisti-
cally very strong for all the indicators. The only exception is the interbank
ratio. This can be explained by the fact that interbank market positions close,
i.e., net lending positions of some banks should be oset by net borrowing
positions of other banks. For all the other indicators, the results are remark-
ably strong, thus supporting the hypothesis of collective risk taking before the
crisis17.
17When there are few banks in a given country, the results might be more volatile. For
robustness purposes, we ran the estimations excluding all countries with less than 100 ob-
servations. The results are not meaningfully aected by this change.
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2003 0.124 *** 0.035 ** -0.037 *** 0.130 *** 0.117 **
2004 -0.040 *** 0.009 -0.030 *** -0.033 *** -0.034 ***
2005 0.137 *** 0.009 0.133 *** -0.030 *** -0.041 ***
2006 0.112 *** -0.007 -0.028 *** -0.031 *** -0.023 ***
2007 -0.012 *** 0.009 * 0.049 *** 0.035 *** -0.024 ***
2008 0.111 *** -0.016 *** 0.139 *** 0.057 *** 0.074 ***
2009 0.188 *** 0.032 *** 0.150 *** 0.093 *** 0.070 ***
Notes: Herd behavior measure based on Uchida and Nakagawa (2007) and 
Lakonishok et al (1992). The herding measure is computed as Hi = |Pit - Pt | - 
E|Pit - Pt |, where Pit  is the proportion of banks that show an increase in risk 
for a given liquidity indicator in each country and in each year (i.e., increases 
in the loan to deposit ratio and liquidity creation or decreases in the interbank 
ratio, liquidity ratio or NSFR) and Pt is the mean of Pit in each year. Liquidity 
indicators as defined in previous tables. In each cell are reported the annual 
averages of Hi for each liquidity indicator, when Pit>Pt, i.e. when in a given 
country more banks are increasing risk than the average in all the other 
countries taken together. The larger the absolute value of Hi is, the stronger are 
herding behaviors.*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 
10%, based on a t-test.









Nevertheless, this traditional herding measure has several limitations and
cannot be regarded as a full characterization of collective risk taking. This is
essentially a static measure and, more importantly, it only considers whether or
not there was an increase in risk, without considering its magnitude. Further-
more, this measure does not take into account all other possible determinants
of liquidity choices. It is possible that common behaviors are observed because
banks are aected by common shocks or because they share common charac-
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teristics, rather than by true herding behavior. Hence, only in a multivariate
setting, where bank specic characteristics and time eects are explicitly con-
trolled for, it becomes possible to isolate the impact of other banks’ choices on
each individual bank. In the next subsection we deal with the identication
challenges raised by this multivariate analysis.
2.5.2 The re ection problem and identication strategies
In a multivariate setting, the impact of peers’ liquidity indicators on a bank’s
liquidity decisions could be estimated through the following adapted version
of equation 1:












Qlw31 represents the average liquidity indicators of peers and all
the other variables and parameters are dened as in equation 1. In this setting,
the coe!cient 0 captures the extent to which banks’ liquidity choices re ect
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those of the relevant peer group. We recall that we are controlling for bank,
time and country-year xed eects.
However, this estimation entails some econometric problems: as we argue
that peer choices may aect the decisions of a specic bank, we cannot rule
out that the decisions of that bank will not, in turn, aect the choices made by
peers. This reverse causality problem in peer eects is usually referred to as
the re ection problem. This problem was initially described by Manski (1993),
who distinguishes three dierent dimensions of peer eects: i) exogenous or
contextual eects, related to the in uence of exogenous peer characteristics;
ii) endogenous eects, arising from the in uence of peer outcomes (in our case,
peers’ liquidity choices); and iii) correlated eects, which aect simultaneously
all elements of a peer group. Empirically, it is very challenging to disentangle
these eects. More specically, Manski (1993) discusses the di!culties aris-
ing from the distinction between eective peer eects (either endogenous or
exogenous) from other correlated eects. Furthermore, the identication of
endogenous and exogenous eects is undermined by this re ection problem,
as the simultaneity in peers’ decisions should result in a perfect collinearity
between the expected mean outcome of the group and its mean characteristics,
as discussed also by Bramoullé et al (2009) and Carrell et al (2009).
This discussion makes clear that the estimation of equation 2 may not al-
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low for the accurate estimation of peer eects. Our solution to this important
identication problem relies on the use of an instrument to address this en-
dogeneity problem. Manski (2000) argues that the re ection problem can be
solved if there is an instrumental variable that directly aects the outcomes
of some, but not all, members of the peer group18. As discussed in Leary and
Roberts (2013) and Brown et al (2008), such an instrument must be orthogo-
nal to systematic or herding eects. Given this, we use the predicted values of
liquidity indicators of peer banks based on the regressions of the determinants
of liquidity indicators presented in Table 2.3. The predicted values depend on
the characteristics of the banks in the peer group, excluding bank l. These pre-
dicted values depend only on observable bank characteristics and should thus
be orthogonal to systematic or herding eects. In other words, the predicted
value of the liquidity indicators of peer banks should not directly aect Olt{lw,
the liquidity indicator of bank l at time w, as these predicted values are based
solely on observable bank characteristics. As we control also for time eects,
we are able to orthogonalize all systematic shocks to banks. In addition, we
also control for country-year xed eects, in order to consider the eect of
18Other solutions to the re ection problem found in the literature are, for example, having
randomly assigned peer groups (Sacerdote, 2001), variations in group sizes (Lee, 2007) or
identifying social networks using spatial econometrics techniques (Bramoullé et al, 2009).
Given the characteristics of peer groups in our sample, none of these solutions can be applied
in our setting.
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time-varying country characteristics that may simultaneously aect all banks
in a given country. Furthermore, the predicted values of peer banks should
be highly correlated with the average of the observed liquidity indicators, our
potentially endogenous variable19.








+4frvw_lqflw31 + 5ohqg_vshflw31 + 6(Olt  {lw31) + lw + %lw (2.3)










+ 1fdslwdomw31 + 2edqnvl}hmw+
+3suri=mw31 + 4frvw_lqfmw31 + 5ohqg_vshfmw31 + 6(Olt  {mw31) + lw + %lw
19For a related solution to the identication of peer eects using instrumental variables,
see Leary and Roberts (2013).
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Qlw31 representing the average predicted values for Olt{lw for
the peer group in the equation:
Olt_suhg{lw = 0 + l + qw + 1fdslwdolw31 + 2edqnvl}hlw + 3suri=lw31+
+4frvw_lqflw31 + 5ohqg_vshflw31 + 6(Olt  {lw31) + lw
Using this specication, we are able to identify peer eects, after adequately
having dealt with the re ection problem. As before, we dene the benchmark
peer group as the banks operating in the same country and in the same year.
These are the banks that are more likely to engage in collective risk-taking
behaviors due to implicit or explicit bailout expectations. Let us suppose that
in a given country several banks engage in funding liquidity strategies that
are deemed as globally risky (e.g., excessive reliance in short term debt to
nance long-term assets, large funding gaps or persistent tapping of interbank
markets). If several banks engage in these strategies simultaneously, there is
naturally an increase in systemic risk. As discussed by Rochet and Tirole
(1996) and Ratnovski (2009), a lender of last resort is not necessarily going to
bailout one bank that gets into trouble because of its own idiosyncratic wrong
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choices (unless this bank is clearly too big or too systemic to fail). However, if
several banks are at risk, the lender of last resort needs to take the necessary
actions to contain systemic risk. In this case, the likelihood of a bailout should
increase, as if one of these banks gets into trouble, very likely other banks will
follow very soon, thus becoming too-many-to-fail (Acharya and Yorulmazer,
2007). Given this incentive structure, a given bank in that country has clearly
high incentives to engage in similar risky but protable strategies. However,
the same cannot be said for a bank operating in another country, where there
is a dierent lender of last resort. This reasoning justies our choice for the
reference peer group. Nevertheless, we will later relax this hypothesis and test
other possible peer groups.
2.5.3 Empirical results
In Table 2.5 we present the results of the instrumental variable approach in
the estimation of peer eects in liquidity risk management.
In the rst ve columns we present the results of the estimation of equation
2. Hence, in these columns the peer eects are included in the regressions
without properly addressing the re ection problem discussed before. When
running this simple, yet possibly biased, estimation, we nd strong evidence
of positive peer or herding eects in individual banks’ choices for all liquidity
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indicators. The riskier are the funding and liquidity strategies of other banks in
a given country, the riskier will tend to be the choices of each bank individually.
However, as discussed above, these preliminary estimates may not be dealing
adequately with the endogeneity problem underlying the estimation of peer
eects.
Peer effects 0.32 *** 0.19 ** 0.46 *** 0.81 *** 0.43 *** 0.39 *** 0.81 0.72 *** 0.56 *** 0.36 1.13 *** 0.35 *** 0.86 *** 0.92 *** 0.24 ***
4.87 2.33 7.96 18.62 7.54 6.64 1.09 8.88 9.02 1.08 32.47 3.24 29.16 31.28 7.21
Total capital ratio t-1 0.19 -0.60 0.03 -0.19 ** 0.08 0.18 * -0.87 0.01 -0.18 *** 0.08 0.12 ** 0.57 0.05 *** 0.03 -0.02
1.01 -0.61 0.46 -2.29 0.91 1.75 -0.78 0.15 -3.63 1.51 2.20 1.36 3.07 1.15 -0.83
Log Assets t 2.76 -6.20 -1.46 -1.73 -2.86 ** 2.19 * -3.24 -0.88 * -3.02 *** -2.80 *** 0.51 -4.98 -0.41 ** -2.86 *** 0.87 ***
1.12 -0.35 -1.23 -1.61 -2.56 1.77 -0.23 -1.82 -4.95 -4.77 0.79 -0.91 -2.05 -10.22 3.47
Net interest margin t-1 -1.42 * 3.17 -0.03 -1.08 *** 1.90 *** -1.32 *** 2.72 -0.02 -1.17 *** 1.94 *** -0.53 ** 0.60 -0.15 ** -0.29 *** 0.41 ***
-1.88 0.74 -0.10 -3.26 5.28 -2.92 0.71 -0.10 -5.71 7.18 -2.26 0.38 -2.05 -2.76 4.39
Return on assets t-1 1.39 * -0.70 -0.62 ** 0.56 -1.34 *** 1.36 *** 0.99 -0.62 *** 0.60 *** -1.36 *** 0.60 ** -4.16 ** -0.16 * -0.05 -0.19 *
1.78 -0.12 -2.25 1.59 -3.46 2.69 0.18 -3.18 2.60 -5.25 2.25 -2.07 -1.88 -0.39 -1.85
Cost-to-income t-1 0.02 -0.11 0.00 0.05 *** -0.04 * 0.02 -0.11 -0.01 0.06 *** -0.04 *** 0.03 ** -0.12 -0.01 0.02 *** -0.02 ***
0.56 -0.45 -0.22 2.64 -1.81 0.90 -0.36 -0.55 4.43 -2.80 2.28 -0.97 -1.31 2.79 -2.93
Net loans to tot assets t-1 0.95 *** -2.15 ** -0.16 *** 0.26 *** 0.12 ** 0.93 *** -1.67 * -0.13 *** 0.26 *** 0.12 *** 0.11 *** -0.49 -0.05 *** 0.04 ** -0.01
8.45 -2.15 -4.46 6.34 2.18 15.20 -1.88 -5.39 9.17 3.72 3.37 -1.62 -5.37 2.54 -0.99
Loans to cust deposits t-1 - 0.15 0.00 0.00 -0.08 *** - 0.10 0.00 0.00 -0.08 *** - 0.05 0.00 -0.02 *** 0.00
- 1.24 -0.30 0.43 -6.02 - 0.74 -0.49 -0.51 -10.95 - 1.01 1.03 -6.33 0.63
Interbank ratio t-1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Liquidity ratio t-1 0.31 *** -0.05 - 0.12 *** 0.05 * 0.32 *** -0.20 - 0.15 *** 0.05 ** -0.02 0.23 - 0.12 *** -0.04 ***
3.81 -0.15 - 4.34 1.90 7.47 -0.46 - 6.72 2.22 -1.07 1.36 - 11.05 -4.50
Liquidity creation t-1 -0.40 *** 1.54 *** 0.06 ** - -0.13 *** -0.38 *** 1.41 *** 0.03 - -0.13 *** -0.09 *** 0.11 0.06 *** - -0.04 ***
-4.31 3.17 1.98 - -3.79 -7.78 3.29 1.49 - -5.92 -3.68 0.65 7.54 - -4.65
NSFR t-1 -0.55 *** 1.26 *** 0.13 *** -0.12 *** - -0.54 *** 1.12 *** 0.11 *** -0.13 *** - -0.11 *** 0.14 0.05 *** -0.03 *** -
-7.11 2.70 5.11 -4.53 - -13.66 2.68 7.05 -7.58 - -5.42 0.87 7.21 -3.84 -
Constant 357.8 *** 288.2 -26.7 69.7 72.8 361.5 *** -473.7 -30.1 -137.2 ** 119.3 -303.9 *** 382.2 39.7 *** -100.9 *** 587.8 ***
4.95 0.41 -0.86 1.27 1.31 6.83 -0.56 -1.48 -2.44 0.54 -10.48 1.40 4.59 -3.84 39.78
Number of observations 7,016 1,882 7,016 7,019 7,019 7,010 1,877 7,010 7,012 7,012 7,010 1,877 7,010 7,012 7,012
Number of banks 1,734 528 1,735 1,737 1,737 1,733 527 1,734 1,736 1,736 1,733 527 1,734 1,736 1,736
R2 within 0.187 0.066 0.141 0.477 0.186 0.186 0.009 0.127 0.467 0.186 0.427 0.135 0.324 0.705 0.484
R2 between 0.155 0.079 0.135 0.329 0.501 0.158 0.003 0.000 0.095 0.524 0.330 0.041 0.573 0.399 0.555
R2 overall 0.132 0.051 0.105 0.331 0.455 0.134 0.013 0.001 0.055 0.471 0.316 0.036 0.466 0.313 0.494
Table 2.5 - Regressions on peer effects in liquidity strategies
Notes: All regressions include year, country-year and bank fixed-effects. t-statistics in italics. Peers are defined as the j?i banks operating in the same country and in the same year as bank i. Columns
1-5 show the results obtained when peer liquidity choices are considered directly in the regressions, i.e., not addressing the reflection problem. Columns 6-10 show the results of the instrumental
variables regressions (one for each liquidity indicator), where the instruments are the predicted values of peers' liquidity ratios. These predicted values result from the estimation of the regressions in
Table 2.3. Columns 11-15 show the first stage estimation results for these three instrumental variables regressions. The total capital ratio is calculated according to the regulatory rules defined by the
Basel Committee. Net interest margin is defined as net interest income as a percentage of earning assets. Return on assets computed as net income as a percentage of average assets. The cost-to-income
ratio is computed as banks operational costs (overheads) as a percentage of income generated before provisions. 
Bank peer effects - country year peer group -  
(IV = predicted values o f rivals'  l iquidity 
ratios)                    Second-step regressions
First-step regressions
Loan to  
deposits
(1) (10) (11) (12) (15)(2) (5) (6) (7)
NSFR
(9)


















The interbank ratio is defined as interbank assets as a percentage of interbank liabilities (loans to other banks as a percentage of loans from other banks). The liquidity ratio is defined as liquid assets 
(deposits and loans to banks with less than 3 months residual maturity, quoted/listed government bonds realizable within 3 months, cash and equivalent), as a percentage of customer deposits and short 
term funding. All these variables are included in the Bankscope database.  Liquidity creation is a proxy of the liquidity indicator proposed by Berger and Bouwman (2009). The higher this variable is, 
the more liquidity a bank is creating, i.e., the larger is its maturity transformation role. NSFR is an approximation of the Net Stable Funding Ratio defined in Basel III, which considers the available 
stable funding as a percentage of the required stable funding (i.e., assests that need to be funded). These last two variables are defined in detail in the Appendix. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 













Chapter 2 Liquidity risk in banking
The second group of columns (6-10) displays our main empirical results,
when adequately dealing with the endogeneity problem created by considering
peer eects. When we use the predicted values of peer’s liquidity indicators
as instruments, we conclude that the results presented in the rst columns do
not hold for all specications: peer eects are not statistically signicant for
the interbank ratio and NSFR. For the other indicators, peer eects continue
to be strongly statistically signicant and vary between 0.39 (for the loan to
deposit ratio) and 0.72 (for the liquidity ratio). The dierent results obtained
when the endogeneity problem is addressed are an indication that neglecting
endogeneity in peer eects may originate biased and incorrect results.
As discussed before, a good instrument should have an important contribu-
tion in explaining the potentially endogenous variable, i.e. the average peers’
liquidity choices, but it should not directly aect that the dependent variable.
In the previous sub-section we discussed why the latter condition holds in our
setting, whereas in the last group of columns of Table 2.5 we show that the
chosen instrument is strongly statistically signicant in all the regressions.
To better understand how these peer eects work and to ensure that the
results are consistent under a wide set of specications, we run a large battery
of robustness tests.
In Table 2.6 we present some of the most relevant tests conducted. All
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the estimations were performed without and with instrumental variables, in
columns (1)-(5) and (6)-(10), respectively. First step regressions are reported
in columns (11)-(15).
Basel ine
Peer effects 0.32 *** 0.19 ** 0.46 *** 0.81 *** 0.43 *** 0.39 *** 0.81 0.72 *** 0.56 *** 0.36 1.13 *** 0.35 *** 0.86 *** 0.92 *** 0.24 ***
4.87 2.33 7.96 18.62 7.54 6.64 1.09 8.88 9.02 1.08 32.47 3.24 29.16 31.28 7.21
Before the crisi s
Peer effects 0.04 0.06 0.31 *** 0.46 *** 0.12 0.33 1.36 0.76 ** 0.35 *** 0.33 * 0.48 *** -0.15 0.33 ** 0.57 *** -0.63 ***
0.50 0.51 2.86 5.24 1.54 1.44 0.37 2.32 2.74 1.94 8.04 -0.74 2.32 16.12 -15.89
Removing banks with asset growth above 50% 
Peer effects 0.32 *** 0.16 * 0.42 *** 0.79 *** 0.39 *** 0.42 *** 0.21 0.64 *** 0.53 *** 0.42 *** 0.87 *** 0.17 0.84 *** 0.70 *** 0.53 ***
4.50 1.83 6.99 17.94 7.00 6.06 0.13 7.98 7.97 2.60 27.29 1.43 29.51 27.98 14.46
Excluding US banks
Peer effects 0.26 *** 0.18 ** 0.25 *** 0.24 *** 0.19 *** 0.22 ** 0.80 0.42 ** -1.87 0.28 * 1.07 *** 0.29 *** 0.77 *** 0.18 ** 0.73 ***
4.16 2.15 4.24 2.92 2.94 2.22 0.92 2.43 -1.47 1.95 16.23 2.76 12.86 2.51 14.31
Exclude smal ler countries (less than 50  observations)
Peer effects 0.37 *** 0.18 0.52 *** 0.84 *** 0.46 *** 0.48 *** 0.12 0.69 *** 0.56 *** 0.25 1.22 *** 0.59 *** 0.97 *** 1.14 *** 0.39 ***
5.33 1.64 7.62 18.78 7.06 8.37 0.24 8.66 10.60 1.06 38.73 5.40 32.91 38.84 10.67
Western Europe banks
Peer effects -0.01 0.15 0.00 0.24 ** 0.19 *** 0.24 -0.71 -1.95 -10.43 0.24 1.02 *** -0.14 *** -0.05 ** -0.02 -0.10 ***
-0.12 1.61 0.00 2.45 2.79 1.03 -0.77 -1.20 -0.42 0.43 8.06 -2.64 -1.97 -0.44 -3.31
Eastern Europe banks
Peer effects 0.42 *** 0.14 0.40 *** 0.20 0.13 0.35 *** 1.05 1.09 ** 0.28 0.25 * 1.30 *** -0.08 0.37 *** 0.22 ** 1.11 ***
5.24 1.17 4.26 1.59 1.22 2.98 0.26 2.22 0.26 1.73 13.89 -0.61 4.62 2.15 17.58
US,  Canada and Western Europe banks
Peer effects 0.02 0.22 ** 0.38 *** 0.79 *** 0.43 *** 0.05 -0.47 10.01 0.63 *** 0.23 1.62 *** -0.17 ** 0.04 1.85 *** -0.49 ***
0.30 2.47 4.41 13.12 6.60 0.57 -0.48 0.89 8.78 1.47 25.47 -2.42 0.89 32.36 -18.32
Excluding countries more directly a ffected during  the g loba l crisi s
Peer effects 0.27 *** 0.19 ** 0.28 *** 0.21 ** 0.15 ** 0.18 * 0.15 0.49 *** -1.35 0.18 1.16 *** 0.39 *** 0.87 *** 0.26 *** 0.80 ***
4.09 2.09 4.36 2.41 2.06 1.80 0.21 2.86 -1.48 1.18 15.64 3.41 13.31 3.14 13.75
Without country-year fixed effects
Peer effects 0.32 *** 0.19 ** 0.46 *** 0.81 *** 0.43 *** 0.33 ** 0.81 0.72 *** 0.43 *** 0.36 0.18 *** 0.35 *** 0.86 *** 0.04 *** 0.24 ***
4.87 2.33 7.96 18.62 7.54 2.57 1.09 8.88 3.46 1.08 13.68 3.24 29.16 14.63 7.21
With country and year fixed effects (random-effects estimation)
Peer effects 0.24 *** 0.03 0.37 *** 0.78 *** 0.37 *** 0.23 *** -0.29 0.33 *** 0.46 *** 0.02 1.08 *** 0.34 *** 1.23 *** 1.12 *** 0.29 ***
4.13 0.41 6.82 19.34 6.95 4.72 -0.71 5.02 5.21 0.11 46.27 6.48 41.18 23.40 12.83
Without l iquidity contro ls
Peer effects 0.36 *** 0.21 ** 0.53 *** 0.81 *** 0.41 *** 0.54 *** 1.33 ** 0.83 *** 0.54 *** 0.25 0.89 *** 0.49 *** 0.63 *** 1.02 *** -0.18 ***
5.33 2.47 8.51 19.91 6.90 6.37 1.97 7.17 8.58 0.44 21.72 3.83 20.48 29.89 -4.38
Control l ing for leverage (instead o f capita l  ratio )
Peer effects 0.28 *** 0.16 *** 0.45 *** 0.76 *** 0.46 *** 0.36 *** -0.11 0.59 *** 0.66 *** 0.23 *** 1.50 *** 0.77 *** 1.41 *** 1.89 *** 1.18 ***
4.05 2.73 8.95 21.44 9.97 8.46 -0.38 10.69 16.09 3.50 51.95 8.71 46.47 48.34 40.81
Only a fter 2004
Peer effects 0.41 *** 0.24 *** 0.49 *** 0.89 *** 0.53 *** 0.47 *** 1.04 * 0.77 *** 0.58 *** 0.45 ** 1.15 *** 0.54 *** 0.84 *** 0.83 *** 0.48 ***
6.18 3.85 8.04 20.90 9.01 6.51 1.80 7.11 6.41 2.31 26.73 4.37 21.83 21.72 12.38
Instrument: idiosyncratic equity returns (l i sted banks)
Peer effects 0.34 ** 0.59 *** 0.23 ** 0.53 *** 0.48 *** 0.06 -0.92 2.04 ** 1.28 * 0.59 ** -0.01 *** 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 *** 0.01 ***
2.29 4.94 2.32 4.31 5.31 0.40 -0.01 2.11 1.70 2.00 -7.78 -0.01 2.34 -3.71 9.52
Peer effects using predicted va lues (without IV)
Peer effects 0.44 *** 0.28 0.62 *** 0.51 *** 0.09 - - - - - - - - - -
6.57 1.12 8.82 8.32 1.06
Accounting fo r predicted regressors with bootstrapped standard errors
Peer effects 0.32 *** 0.19 ** 0.46 *** 0.81 *** 0.43 *** 0.39 *** 0.83 0.73 *** 0.56 *** 0.34 - - - - -
4.48 2.19 7.57 17.13 7.62 3.45 0.96 4.74 4.74 0.81
All the regressions use the same control variables as those reported in Table 2.5. All regressions include year, country-year and bank fixed-effects, unless otherwise stated. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 
5%; * significant at 10%.
(14)(6) (7)
Notes:  Peers are defined as the j?i  banks operating in the same country and in the same year as bank i . t -statistics in italics. Each line shows the coefficients for peer effects for different robustness tests. The 
pre-crisis period refers to the years 2002-2006. Countries considered as most directly affected by the global financial crisis include US, Iceland, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy. Idiosyncratic equity 
returns computed as the difference between the banks annual total equity returns and the S&P Banks Index annual return. In the regressions with bootstrapped standard errors two year dummies had to be 
excluded. Columns 1-5 show the results obtained when peer liquidity choices are considered directly in the regressions, i.e., not addressing the reflection problem. Columns 6-10 show the results of the 
instrumental variables regressions, where the instruments are the predicted values of peers' liquidity ratios. These predicted values result from the estimation of the regressions in Table 2.3. Columns 11-15 show 
the first stage estimation results for these instrumental variables regressions. 





(1) (10) (11) (12) (15)(8) (9) (13)(2) (5)(3) (4)
Table 2.6 - Regressions on peer effects in liquidity strategies - robustness
Bank peer effects - country year peer group -   
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Chapter 2 Liquidity risk in banking
First, we exclude the crisis period, so as to focus the analysis on possible
peer eects in the years before the global nancial crisis. The peer eect coef-
cient for the loan to deposit ratio is not signicant in this period, suggesting
that collective risk taking behaviors before the crisis were apparent mainly in
the liquidity ratio and in liquidity creation. In addition, the results for the
NSFR are now marginally signicant.
Second, we remove from the sample banks with year-on-year asset growth
above 50%, as these banks may have been involved in mergers and acquisitions.
Still, the results remain consistent.
US banks represent slightly less than one quarter of the sample. In order to
ensure that the results are not in uenced by this, we exclude all US banks from
the sample. The results are globally consistent, though slightly less signicant,
both economically and statistically. The results also remain broadly consistent
when we exclude smaller countries from the sample. In addition, we also
estimate the regressions separately for Western and Eastern European banks,
and for US, Canada and Western Europe banks together. The results are
not statistically signicant when only Western Europe banks are considered
and are very weak for US, Canada and Western Europe banks. In turn, the
results are stronger for banks from Eastern Europe, though still weaker than
for the entire sample. One tentative explanation for this result might be the
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strong presence of foreign banks in these countries, which may be associated
with stronger peer eects. Finally, we also exclude the countries more directly
aected by the global nancial crisis from the regressions. The results are
broadly consistent, though slightly weaker.
For robustness purposes, we also run our estimates without using country-
year xed eects, with separate country and year xed eects (using a random-
eects estimation) and without controlling for liquidity indicators. In all cases,
the results are robust, becoming slightly stronger in the last case.
In our baseline specication, we used the total capital ratio as an explana-
tory variable. However, the global nancial crisis showed that, in many cases,
the leverage ratio was better able to capture the nancial situation of banks.
To address this issue, we estimated the peer eect regressions using the lever-
age ratio (measured as equity over total assets) instead of the total capital
ratio. The results are broadly consistent and somewhat stronger, as the peer
eects on the NSFR become statistically signicant. However, it should be
noted that this change may be at least partly due to the larger number of
observations used in this estimation, given that data on the total capital ratio
is missing for many banks in the sample.
We also consider data only from 2004 onwards, in order to avoid using
accounting information that is time inconsistent, given that in many countries
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common accounting reporting standards (IFRS) were introduced around this
time. The results become generally stronger.
Finally, we test alternative ways to estimate peer eects. First, we consider
an entirely dierent instrument, based on the identication strategy followed
by Leary and Roberts (2013). To identify peer eects in corporate nancial
policy, these authors looked for an instrument that would not aect directly
the nancing decisions of a given rm, but that would in uence those of the
peer group of rms. An instrument that fullls these exclusion and relevance
conditions is the idiosyncratic component of peer rms’ equity returns. We
follow a similar approach, by computing bank-specic equity returns as the
dierence between the bank’s returns and those of the S&P banks index in
a given year20. Even though the sub-sample of listed banks used to compute
this alternative estimation of peer eects is much smaller than the original
(roughly one quarter), we are still able to obtain statistically signicant peer
eects for the liquidity ratio, for liquidity creation and for the NSFR.
Second, we consider an adapted version of our identication strategy, based
on the social multiplier proposed by Sacerdote (2011) and Glaeser et al (2003).
The basic idea is to use the peer group average of the predicted values aris-
ing from the regressions on liquidity determinants directly in the peer eects
20This approach is simpler than that used by Leary and Roberts (2013), who estimate
idiosyncratic returns using an augmented factor model.
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regressions (equation 1), instead of using them as instruments for the peer
eects21. The results of this alternative estimation approach are remarkably
close to the baseline specication.
A potentially relevant econometric issue is related with the use of predicted
regressors in the estimations. To be sure that this is not aecting the results,
we present, at the bottom of Table 2.6, the results using bootstrapped standard
errors22. The results are generally consistent.
All in all, the robustness analysis points to consistent evidence of signicant
peer eects in liquidity risk decisions.
Alternative peer group denitions In Table 2.7 we explore a dierent
type of robustness analysis, by testing alternative denitions of peer groups.
Indeed, the denition of the peer group is a critical issue in the analysis of peer
eects (Manski, 2000) and deserves further analysis. Even though we believe
that dening peers as other banks in the same country is the most reasonable
assumption, due to the common lender of last resort, this denition may be
21Our estimates of the social multiplier are an adaption because of the level of aggregation
considered. As discussed by Glaeser et al (2003), several levels of aggregation may be
considered in the estimations of the social multiplier. In our case, we use the coe!cients
from an individual level regression to predict aggregate level outcomes for the peer group
of each bank. We then regress observed individual outcomes on these aggregate predicted
values to obtain the social multiplier.
22The estimated coe!cients display minor dierences because it was necessary to exclude
two year dummies from the estimations, in order to obtain the degrees of freedom necessary
for the bootstrapping.
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challenged.
Basel ine
Peer effects 0.32 *** 0.19 ** 0.46 *** 0.81 *** 0.43 *** 0.39 *** 0.81 0.72 *** 0.56 *** 0.36 1.13 *** 0.35 *** 0.86 *** 0.92 *** 0.24 ***
4.87 2.33 7.96 18.62 7.54 6.64 1.09 8.88 9.02 1.08 32.47 3.24 29.16 31.28 7.21
Lagged peers
Peer effects 0.13 ** -0.09 0.32 *** 0.38 *** 0.03 0.38 *** 0.19 0.75 *** 0.74 *** 0.79 1.19 *** 0.34 ** 0.64 *** 0.63 *** 0.09 ***
2.47 -1.20 5.18 5.83 0.65 5.78 0.23 5.76 6.00 0.67 28.06 2.47 5.76 29.18 2.63
Peers as o ther banks (in other countries) in the same quarti le
Peer effects 0.11 -0.09 -0.04 0.82 *** 0.21 *** 0.08 2.01 0.22 0.30 -0.11 0.10 *** -0.11 *** -0.14 *** 0.02 *** 0.06 ***
1.04 -0.36 -0.45 9.50 3.59 0.43 1.56 1.02 1.22 -0.39 31.52 -6.27 -29.37 19.71 13.12
Large banks (4th quarti l e in each country)
Peer effects 0.22 *** 0.07 0.30 *** 0.40 *** 0.27 *** 0.36 *** -0.05 0.39 *** 0.10 0.35 *** 1.49 *** 0.97 *** 1.51 *** 0.53 *** 1.40 ***
3.37 1.16 3.82 5.97 4.40 7.15 -0.27 5.05 0.33 5.05 29.00 7.08 23.10 6.03 27.97
Large banks (4th quarti l e in the sample)
Peer effects 0.19 *** 0.23 ** 0.40 *** 0.30 *** 0.23 *** 0.30 *** -0.04 0.34 *** 1.60 * 0.21 * 1.33 *** 0.47 *** 1.14 *** -0.18 ** 0.73 ***
3.22 2.29 6.24 4.83 4.12 4.16 -0.07 3.21 1.67 1.69 22.13 3.52 18.39 -2.21 13.61
Only larger banks (3rd and 4th quarti les)
Peer effects 0.26 *** 0.11 0.42 *** 0.63 *** 0.39 *** 0.34 *** 0.63 ** 0.59 *** 0.59 *** 0.33 ** 1.45 *** 0.88 *** 1.37 *** 1.24 *** 0.71 ***
3.39 1.24 7.46 10.45 7.38 6.49 2.26 8.46 6.64 2.46 35.78 6.54 29.27 21.26 16.48
Only smaller banks (1st and 2nd quarti l es)
Peer effects 0.21 *** 0.10 0.21 *** 0.75 *** 0.34 *** 0.24 *** 1.50 * 0.51 *** 0.98 ** 0.16 1.53 *** 0.25 *** 0.85 *** 0.14 *** 0.93 ***
3.89 1.07 3.71 12.19 4.14 3.71 1.69 3.74 1.98 1.50 21.67 2.82 13.95 3.41 18.05
Only larger banks (top 5  in each country)
Peer effects 0.04 0.07 0.21 ** 0.15 * 0.17 ** 0.31 ** -0.27 -0.09 -0.04 0.26 1.03 *** 0.46 * 0.84 *** 0.65 *** 0.70 ***
0.75 0.94 2.39 1.78 2.27 2.57 -0.40 -0.45 -0.12 1.27 9.13 1.82 5.76 3.93 6.80
Only larger banks (banks cla ssi f ied as SIFIs)
Peer effects -0.69 *** -0.20 0.70 *** -0.03 0.21 -0.70 *** 0.16 0.71 ** -0.27 0.48 0.83 *** 1.63 *** 2.03 *** 0.75 *** 1.07 ***
-2.98 -1.35 3.38 -0.14 1.11 -2.61 0.63 2.21 -0.52 1.27 4.67 4.57 3.88 2.80 4.30
Only larger banks (banks that belong to  the Euribor panel)
Peer effects 0.10 -0.16 -0.02 0.46 ** 0.17 * 0.05 -0.19 0.13 -0.37 0.38 * 1.12 *** 0.91 *** 0.46 ** 0.49 0.81 ***
0.68 -1.31 -0.08 2.55 1.70 0.26 -0.52 0.19 -0.38 1.87 6.21 3.27 2.27 1.41 6.73
Exclude larger banks (top 5 in each country)
Peer effects 0.30 *** 0.15 0.41 *** 0.76 *** 0.40 *** 0.33 *** 1.74 0.91 *** 0.58 *** -0.55 1.13 *** 0.14 0.69 *** 0.95 *** 0.14 ***
4.57 1.25 5.98 14.15 6.40 4.14 1.01 8.13 9.01 -0.81 25.33 1.61 22.73 32.34 3.84
Small  banks fo l lowing la rge banks (4th quarti le)
Peer effects 0.26 *** 0.21 ** 0.26 *** 0.59 *** -0.01 0.27 *** 0.11 0.60 *** -0.41 ** -0.15 ** 1.47 *** 0.77 *** 1.56 *** 0.79 *** 1.28 ***
5.01 2.10 4.44 7.41 -0.24 6.07 0.48 11.18 -2.35 -2.15 39.39 8.41 30.80 13.97 33.65
Small  banks fo l lowing la rge banks (top 5)
Peer effects 0.22 *** 0.09 0.17 *** -0.84 *** -0.30 *** 0.16 *** 0.00 0.67 *** -1.38 *** -0.27 *** 1.16 *** 0.55 *** 0.94 *** 0.48 *** 1.64 ***
3.86 1.28 4.47 -9.66 -7.13 3.59 0.00 10.40 -4.33 -5.71 46.14 3.94 23.56 10.94 44.99
Small  banks fo l lowing la rge banks (SIFI l ist)
Peer effects 0.10 * 0.16 0.32 *** -0.47 *** 0.00 0.25 *** 0.71 ** 1.02 *** -1.84 *** 0.33 *** 0.97 *** 0.98 *** 0.77 *** 0.77 *** 1.36 ***
1.95 1.17 3.29 -5.82 -0.01 4.57 2.46 12.33 -14.06 3.42 40.88 9.27 27.66 31.15 33.97
Small  banks fo l lowing la rge banks (Euribor panel)
Peer effects 0.17 ** 0.91 *** 0.31 *** -0.21 *** -0.03 0.26 *** 2.12 *** 1.03 *** -0.86 *** -0.30 *** 0.74 *** 0.76 *** 0.53 *** 1.18 *** 0.94 ***
2.04 2.89 3.36 -3.41 -0.51 4.37 3.58 14.41 -9.77 -4.92 58.86 10.55 50.14 38.85 60.01
Euro area  as one peer group
Peer effects 0.37 *** 0.22 ** 0.57 *** 0.85 *** 0.47 *** 0.30 *** 0.23 0.68 *** 1.29 *** 4.00 0.90 *** 0.26 ** 1.03 *** 0.18 *** 0.02
5.22 2.25 8.77 18.87 7.49 4.61 0.22 9.96 10.47 0.68 30.62 2.40 40.44 15.39 0.74
Countries with l iquidity regulation
Peer effects 0.23 *** 0.18 * 0.45 *** 0.78 *** 0.33 *** 0.44 *** -4.05 0.86 *** 0.46 *** 0.37 1.02 *** -0.06 0.71 *** 0.90 *** -0.07 **
2.91 1.87 6.85 14.98 5.57 6.07 -0.43 9.21 6.17 0.37 27.92 -0.50 24.83 27.30 -2.48
Countries without l iquidity regulation
Peer effects 0.41 *** 0.22 ** 0.18 0.07 0.36 ** 0.47 *** 0.72 ** 0.66 -0.02 0.54 *** 1.26 *** 1.42 *** 0.53 *** 0.52 *** 1.08 ***







(3) (4) (8) (9) (13) (14)
Notes:  t -statistics in italics. Each line shows the coefficients for peer effects for different robustness tests. Bank quartiles were defined based on banks' total assets. Top 5 referes to the banks classified as 
being in the top 5 by assets in each country in Bankscope. The list of SIFIs (systemically important financial institutions) is the one disclosed by the Financial Stability Board in 2011. Countries with and 
without liquidity regulation identified using the 2011 World Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey (based on questions about minimum liquid assets and maturity mismatches limits). Columns 1-5 
show the results obtained when peer liquidity choices are considered directly in the regressions, i.e., not addressing the reflection problem. Columns 6-10 show the results of the instrumental variables 
regressions, where the instruments are the predicted values of peers' liquidity ratios. These predicted values result from the estimation of the regressions in Table 2.3. Columns 11-15 show the first stage 
estimation results for these instrumental variables regressions. All the regressions use the same control variables as those reported in Table 2.5. All regressions include year, country-year and bank fixed-
effects. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
(1) (2) (5) (6) (15)(7) (10) (11) (12)
Table 2.7 - Regressions on peer ef fects in liquidity strategies - robustness on peer group def inition
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First, we consider that it is possible to argue that peer choices should not
necessarily aect the decisions of a given bank contemporaneously. To take
that into account, we use lagged peer eects instead. The results obtained are
very similar.
An additional possibility is to consider that banks focus on peer groups
outside borders, implying that the lender of last resort may not be the only
motive for excessive risk-taking in liquidity management. For example, large
international players may follow similar strategies because they are competing
to achieve higher returns on equity, possibly through riskier funding and liq-
uidity strategies. To test this additional hypothesis, we consider as peers all
the other banks of the same size quartile, regardless of their country of origin.
This hypothesis seems to be implausible, as peer eects are not statistically
signicant in any of the indicators analyzed. Collective risk taking strategies
seem to play a role mainly at the national level, possibly re ecting common
lender of last resort incentives previously discussed.
Another possibility is that the lender of last resort may only be willing to
support banks that are too big or to systemic to fail, even if several banks are
taking risks at the same time. Hence, it is possible that herding incentives are
stronger for larger banks. To test this hypothesis, we run our regressions only
for the largest banks in the sample, dened as those in the fourth quartile of
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the total assets distribution in each country. The results are slightly weaker
than for the baseline specication. Peer eects are not signicant in the liq-
uidity creation indicator for this group of banks, but, in contrast, they become
signicant in the NSFR.
A bank that is very large within borders may be a small bank in inter-
national terms. This should be especially relevant in smaller countries, with
smaller banking systems. We might argue that large internationally active
banks could also act as a peer group. To take that into account, we estimate
the same regressions for the largest banks, but now dened as those in the
fourth quartile of the worldwide total assets distribution. We also nd evi-
dence of peer eects, most notably for the loan to deposit and the liquidity
ratios.
To further examine the role of peer eects amongst larger banks, we com-
pare peer eects estimates for banks above the median to those below. The
statistical signicance of peer eects is more robust for the largest banks,
though there is also signicant evidence of herding among the smaller banks.
In turn, when only the ve largest banks in each country are considered, the
results become slightly weaker (peer eects are signicant only for the loan to
deposit ratio).
Even though the pre-crisis debate on systemic risk focused essentially on
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bank size, the global nancial crisis made clear that a small or medium-sized
institution can also be systemic if, for instance, it is too-interconnected-to-
fail. Given this, size may be an imperfect measure of systemic risk. Indeed,
the Basel Committee considers that systemically important banks should be
identied using ve dierent sets of indicators, taking into account i) cross-
jurisdictional activity, ii) size, iii) interconnectedness, iv) substitutability, and
v) complexity23. Each set of indicators has an equal weight of 20%. That
said, size is only one of the dimensions that allow identifying a systemically
important institution. However, the other four dimensions rely on a set of in-
dicators that are generally not publicly available. Against this background, we
also considered the list of systemically important nancial institutions (SIFIs)
recently disclosed by the Financial Stability Board, in order to test whether
there are signicant peer eects within this group of banks. The results are
slightly weaker than for the initial large banks denition, remaining statisti-
cally signicant and positive only for the liquidity ratio. In addition, we also
considered the set of banks that belong to the Euribor panel, which may be
seen as an alternative list of systemic nancial institutions. In this case, the
results are marginally signicant only for the NSFR.
In sum, when we consider stricter denitions of large banks, such as banks
23http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs255.pdf.
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that are classied among the top 5 in each country, banks belonging to the
systemically important nancial institutions (SIFIs) list recently disclosed by
the Financial Stability Board or banks in the Euribor panel, the results are
relatively weaker. This result is not surprising, as these are the banks that
have fewer incentives to engage in collective risk-taking strategies. Indeed,
these very large banks are generally too-big-to-fail, beneting permanently
from implicit bailout guarantees. As such, these banks are the ones who face
lower incentives to engage in riskier strategies when other banks are doing so,
given that their probability of being bailed out hardly changes. Indeed, when
we exclude the top ve banks from the estimation, the results remain virtually
unchanged, thus showing that herd behavior is not dominated by the largest
banks.
Given these results, another important dimension to test is whether small
banks tend to replicate the behavior of the larger banks. Using dierent de-
nitions of small and large banks, we obtain evidence of signicant peer eects,
most notably for the loan to deposits, interbank, and liquidity ratios. Inter-
estingly, we obtain negative peer eects in some specications for liquidity
creation and for the NSFR. This means that, in these cases, small banks ac-
tually decrease liquidity risk when the largest banks are increasing it.
Given the strong nancial integration in the euro area, we also test whether
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banks operating in euro area countries behave as a peer group. The results
are consistent with the baseline specication.
Finally, another potentially relevant issue is whether having in place some
form of liquidity regulation aects the strategic interactions between banks.
To address this issue, we use the 2011 World Bank Regulation and Supervi-
sion Survey, which includes two questions on liquidity regulation (namely, on
whether countries have regulation on minimum liquid assets or on maximum
maturity mismatches). The results are presented at the bottom of Table 2.7
and are not conclusive. For countries with liquidity regulation, we nd sta-
tistically signicant peer eects in the loan to deposit, liquidity and liquidity
creation ratios. In turn, for countries without such regulation, peer eects
seem to be relevant in the loan to deposit and interbank ratios, as well as for
the NSFR. As such, peer eects seem to exist, regardless of the existence of
liquidity regulation.
Peer eects by year In Section 2.3.3, we looked into the evolution and
dispersion of liquidity indicators in the run up to the global nancial crisis,
observing that there was a general deterioration in several liquidity indicators
during this period. Furthermore, in Table 2.4 we computed herding statistics
for all the years in the sample, nding that there were statistically signicant
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strategic interactions during most of the period analyzed. In this subsection,
we estimate peer eects for each year. The results are presented in Table 2.8.
Full sample 0.39 *** 0.81 0.72 *** 0.56 *** 0.36
6.64 1.09 8.88 9.02 1.08
2003 0.28 ** 0.08 0.46 *** 0.52 *** 0.14 *
2.06 0.15 9.75 8.44 1.92
2004 0.27 ** -0.89 0.48 *** 0.38 *** 0.18 **
2.06 -0.97 8.48 4.89 2.04
2005 0.38 *** 0.18 0.63 *** 0.51 *** 0.03
2.62 0.65 12.01 6.49 0.44
2006 0.66 *** 0.21 0.63 *** 0.68 *** -0.04
8.26 0.83 18.63 12.93 -0.94
2007 0.52 *** 0.33 0.54 *** 0.74 *** -0.08 *
6.68 1.46 14.90 14.01 -1.66
2008 0.62 *** 0.39 * 0.51 *** 0.76 *** 0.09 **
10.12 1.75 13.27 14.18 2.02
2009 0.41 *** 0.51 ** 0.64 *** 0.13 0.21 ***
7.40 2.50 14.37 1.25 3.69
Table 2.8 - Peer effects by year









Bank peer effects - country year peer group -    
(IV = predicted va lues o f riva ls'  l iquidity ratios) 
Second-step regressions
Notes:  t -statistics in italics. Each line shows the coefficients for peer effects 
for different years. All the regressions use the same control variables as 
those reported in Table 2.5. All regressions include year, country-year and 
bank fixed-effects. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant 
at 10%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
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In terms of statistical signicance, there were peer eects in almost all
years in the loan to deposit ratio, the liquidity ratio and liquidity creation.
The results are somewhat weaker for the NSFR and much weaker for the
interbank ratio.
Looking at the economic signicance of the estimated peer eects, some
interesting conclusions may be drawn. Indeed, peer eects were larger in
the years immediately before the global nancial crisis, most notably in the
loan to deposit ratio, the liquidity ratio and liquidity creation. This suggests
that there were indeed observable collective risk-taking behaviors right before
the global nancial crisis, which possibly made banks more vulnerable to the
shocks they were later faced with. It is also interesting to note that there were
signicant peer eects during the crisis years, when banks were simultaneously
reshaping their balance sheets to manage risks in the new environment in which
they were operating, marked by heightened funding pressures and deleveraging
incentives.
Summing up Looking across the board at the extensive robustness analysis
conducted, peer eects seem to be more apparent in some liquidity indicators.
The results are stronger for the loan-to-deposit ratio, which is perhaps the
simplest indicator of the ve considered. When other banks rely more on
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wholesale funding, each bank individually tends to replicate the behaviors of
its peers. It should be noted that we are controlling for country-year xed
eects. As such, this result is not being aected by changes in aggregate
demand, neither by changes in the cost of wholesale funding. Furthermore,
by using bank xed eects, we are also controlling for bank-specic loan and
deposit demand, as well as by its cost of funding.
Together with the loan-to-deposit ratio, the liquidity creation measure and
the NSFR also capture the structural liquidity position of a bank. Even though
the results do not seem to be very strong for the NSFR, peer eects are also
quite robust for the liquidity creation indicator. When other banks are creating
more liquidity, each bank seems to follow along. Again, demand eects are
controlled for with the country-year xed eects.
Peer eects are also quite robust for the liquidity ratio. As discussed above,
this ratio may be considered a close proxy for the new Basel III liquidity
coverage ratio (LCR), which will be under close scrutiny bymarket participants
and regulators. Banks hold less liquidity buers or rely more on short-term
funding when other banks do the same.
Finally, the results for the interbank ratio are relatively weak. This is
not surprising, as interbank ratios can change easily overnight and, moreover,
end-of-year gures may sometimes be misleading.
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All in all, our results show that there are signicant and consistent peer
eects across dierent dimensions of liquidity risk, most notably in what con-
cerns banks’ reliance on wholesale debt markets, their ability to create liq-
uidity through maturity transformation and their holdings of liquid assets.
Macroprudential authorities should therefore accompany these dimensions of
risk-taking, as these collective behaviors substantially aggravate systemic risk.
2.6 Concluding remarks
Banks’ liquidity risk was at the core of the global nancial crisis since its
early days. By transforming liquid liabilities (deposits) into illiquid claims
(loans), banks are intrinsically exposed to funding liquidity risk, though this
risk materializes only occasionally. In this paper we provide empirical insight
on how banks manage their liquidity risk and consider explicitly the role of
collective risk-taking strategies on herding behavior. Indeed, when other banks
are taking more risk, any given bank may have incentives to engage in similar
strategies.
By adapting the herding measure proposed by Lakonishok et al (1992)
to our setting we nd that there was strong herding behavior in the pre-
crisis period, re ected in a broad deterioration of liquidity indicators. Herding
persisted though the crisis, as banks simultaneously adjusted their business
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models.
Given the limitations of this herding measure, we extend our analysis to a
multivariate setting. However, the empirical estimation of these peer eects
amongst banks in such a framework raises some econometric challenges. Based
on the arguments put forth by Manski (1993), if we consider that peer choices
may aect the decisions of a specic bank, we cannot rule out that the deci-
sions of that bank will not, in turn, aect the choices made by peers (re ection
problem). To overcome this critical identication problem we use as an instru-
mental variable the predicted values of liquidity indicators of peer banks based
on the regressions of the determinants of liquidity indicators. These predicted
values depend only on observable bank characteristics and should thus be or-
thogonal to systematic or herding eects. Using this methodology we can
nd evidence of signicant peer eects, which is strengthened by extensive
robustness tests.
Our results provide an important contribution to the ongoing policy debate.
These collective risk-taking behaviors call for regulation to adequately align
the incentives and minimize negative externalities. The collective behavior of
banks transforms a traditionally microprudential dimension of banking risk
into a macroprudential risk, which may ultimately generate much larger costs
to the economy.
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The new Basel III regulatory framework represents a huge step forward
in the international regulation of banks. At the microprudential level, new
liquidity requirements are going to be gradually imposed, reducing excessive
maturity mismatches and ensuring that banks hold enough liquid assets to
survive during a short stress period. However, our results suggest that there
may be a missing element in the new regulatory framework: the systemic
component of liquidity risk. The new liquidity risk regulation will ensure
that, at the microprudential level, institutions are less exposed to liquidity
risk. Nevertheless, additional macroprudential policy tools may eventually
be considered to mitigate the incentives for collective risk-taking strategies.
These may include tighter (cyclical or sectoral) liquidity regulation or limits
to certain types of exposures or funding sources. Moreover, a well functioning
resolution and bail-in framework is critical to mitigate bail-out expectations.
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2.7 Appendix
NSFR NSFR
Classi fication Weights Weights Classi fication Weights Weights
 Residential Mortgage Loans SL 0 0.65  Customer Deposits - Current L 0.5      
 Other Mortgage Loans SL 0 0.65  Customer Deposits - Savings L 0.5      
 Other Consumer/ Retail Loans SL 0 0.85  Customer Deposits - Term SL 0
 Corporate & Commercial Loans I 0.5 0.85  Total Customer Deposits 0.85
 Other Loans I 0.5 0.85  Deposits from Banks L 0.5      0.00
 Less: Reserves for Impaired Loans/ NPLs -1.00  Repos and Cash Collateral L 0.5      0.00
 Net Loans  Other Deposits and Short-term Borrowings L 0.5      0.00
 Loans and Advances to Banks SL 0 0.50  Total Deposits,  Money Market and Short-term Funding
 Reverse Repos and Cash Collateral 0.00  Total Long Term Funding I -0.5 1.00
 Trading Securities and at FV through Income 0.50  Derivatives L 0.5      0.00
 Derivatives 0.50  Trading Liabi l ities L 0.5      0.00
 Available for Sale Securities 0.50
 Held to Maturity Securities 1.00  Total Funding
 At-equity Investments in Associates 1.00
 Other Securities 1.00  Fair Value Portion o f Debt SL 0.0 0.00
 Total Securities L -0.5  Credit impairment reserves SL 0.0 0.00
 Investments in Property I 0.5 1.00  Reserves for Pensions and Other SL 0.0 0.00
 Insurance Assets I 0.5 1.00  Current Tax Liabi l iti es SL 0.0 0.00
 Other Earning Assets I 0.5 1.00  Deferred Tax Liabi l ities SL 0.0 0.00
 Other Deferred Liabi l ities SL 0.0 0.00
 Total Earning Assets  Discontinued Operations SL 0.0 0.00
 Insurance Liabi l iti es SL 0.0 0.00
 Cash and Due From Banks L -0.5 0.00  Other Liabi l iti es SL 0.0 0.00
 Foreclosed Real Estate I 0.5 1.00
 Fixed Assets I 0.5 1.00
 Goodwil l I 0.5 1.00  Total Liabilities
 Other Intangibles I 0.5 1.00
 Current Tax Assets I 0.5 1.00  Pref.  Shares and Hybrid Capita l accounted for as Debt I -0.5 1.00
 Deferred Tax Assets I 0.5 1.00 Pref.  Shares and Hybrid Capita l accounted for as Equit I -0.5 1.00
 Discontinued Operations I 0.5 1.00  Total Equity I -0.5 1.00
 Other Assets I 0.5 1.00
 Total Assets  Total Liabilities and Equity
Liquidity creation Liquidity creation
Notes: Liquidity creation is a proxy of the liquidity indicator proposed by
Berger and Bouwman (2009). The higher this variable is, the more liquidity
a bank is creating, i.e., the larger is its maturity transformation role. The
variable is dened as:
olt_fuhdwlrq = {1@2  loolt_dvvhwv+ 0  vhpl_olt_dvvhwv 1@2  olt_dvvhwv}
+ {1@2  olt_olde=+ 0  vhpl_olt_olde= 1@2  loolt_olde=}
1@2  fdslwdo
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Assets and liabilities are classied as liquid, semi-liquid or illiquid based
on the criteria used by Berger and Bouwman (2009). The classication for
each accounting item is displayed in the table above. Some assumptions were
made, as the accounting classication is not identical to the one used in Berger
and Bouwman (2009). We consider liquidity creation as a percentage of total
assets.
NSFR is an approximation of the Net Stable Funding Ratio dened in
Basel III, which considers the available stable funding relative to the required
stable funding (i.e., assets that need to be funded). The higher this ratio is,
the more comfortable is the institution’s liquidity position. It is dened as:
QVIU = dydlodeoh_vwdeoh_ixqglqjuhtxluhg_vwdeoh_ixqglqj  100
Each accounting item was given a weight based on the Basel Committee’s
guidelines. However, it is important to note that this is a rough approximation,
as the accounting data available on Bankscope does not allow to accurately
classify all the items. The weights chosen are presented in the table above.
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CHAPTER 3
3 Credit risk drivers: evaluating the con-
tribution of rm level information and of
macroeconomic dynamics
3.1 Introduction
Understanding the determinants of credit risk is a major issue for nancial sta-
bility24. Banks and other nancial intermediaries try to maximize their prots,
which requires an accurate pricing of the risks contained in their assets portfo-
lios. Given the weight loans to rms have on banks’ assets, understanding why
do some rms default, while others do not, may be a very important question
to address. A clearer understanding of credit risk drivers may help to predict
if and when will a rm default on its credit liabilities. Against this back-
ground, it is interesting to understand if credit default risk is mostly driven
by idiosyncratic or by systematic factors (or both). On one hand, rm-specic
24This chapter is based on Bonm, D. (2009), Credit risk drivers: evaluating the con-
tribution of rm level information and macroeconomic dynamics, Journal of Banking and
Finance, 33(2), 2009, pp. 281-299.
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characteristics should clearly be determinant on their decision to default on
bank loans. On the other hand, it has become clearer that macroeconomic
developments may also have an important role in explaining the evolution
of credit risk over time. Under this setup, the main purpose of this chapter
is to empirically examine the determinants of corporate credit default, tak-
ing simultaneously into account rm-specic data as well as macroeconomic
information.
The results obtained show that there are some important links between
credit risk and macroeconomic developments. In fact, periods of strong eco-
nomic growth, which are sometimes accompanied by robust credit growth, are
sometimes followed by an increase in default rates, possibly as a consequence
of imbalances generated in those periods. When micro information is used to
assess the determinants of loan default, it becomes clearer that the rms’ nan-
cial situation is relevant to determine whether they will default on their loan
commitments. However, when time eect controls or macroeconomic variables
are also taken into account, the results improve considerably. The results ob-
tained allow us to conclude that macroeconomic dynamics have an important
additional (and independent) contribution in explaining why do rms default.
In the late 90’s, discussions concerning the design of a new international
bank capital accord, usually known as Basel II, generated a renewed interest
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in credit risk modeling. This capital accord (Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (2004)) proposes the use of credit risk models to determine banks’
capital requirements. Banks can use internal (or external) rating models to
classify borrowers according to their risk. Capital requirements can then be
determined based on such credit exposure, instead of being constant per credit
type, as under the previous accord. Under this new regulatory setup, it became
crucial to accurately measure credit risk. On the one hand, banks must hold
enough capital to limit risks for depositors and to reduce insolvency risks. On
the other hand, holding excessive capital is costly and limits e!ciency. This
recent surge in credit risk modeling, to some extent associated with Basel II,
is leading to several new contributions. A brief overview of some of the most
important contributions in this eld may be found in Crouhy et al. (2000),
Du!e and Singleton (2003), Gordy (2000), or Saunders and Allen (2002). In
order to simplify the description of these models, we can try to group them
according with their required inputs. We can identify three dierent groups
of models, using this criteria: i) models which rely mostly on accounting vari-
ables, ii) models which use mostly market information, and iii) models which
use macroeconomic variables or which consider default correlation issues.
The rst group of models borrows from Altman’s (1968) work, even though
such variables can be used under dierent modeling techniques. Some work
80
Chapter 3 Credit risk drivers
in this domain includes Bernhardsen (2001), Eklund et al. (2001), Bunn and
Redwood (2003) or Benito et al. (2004). It should be borne in mind, however,
that most of the models here mentioned do not rely solely on accounting
information.
In the second group of models (those which rely mostly on market informa-
tion), we can include Merton-type approaches to credit risk modeling25 (see,
for instance, Tudela and Young (2003), Gersbach and Lipponer (2003) or even
Moody’s KMVmodel (2004)), as well as other modeling setups, such as Jarrow
and Turnbull (1995), Shumway (2001) or Couderc and Renault (2005). The
major drawback of such models is that, as they rely on market information,
usually they can only be applied to quoted companies.
Finally, we can identify a third set of credit risk models as those which
use macroeconomic variables or consider default correlation issues. Discus-
sions resulting from the implementation of Basel II made clear that credit
risk varies over time and, most notably, it varies with overall macroeconomic
conditions. The main idea is that most risk is built up during upturns, when
banks apply looser credit standards. However, most of the risk materializes
only when the economy hits a downturn. Some authors, such as Pederzoli
25Merton (1974) introduced the idea of applying option pricing theory to the valuation of
risky bonds and loans (by modelling loans as zero-coupon bonds with xed maturities). In
this model, a borrower will have an incentive to default whenever the market value of the
rm becomes lower than the amount borrowed.
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and Torricelli (2005), Jiménez and Saurina (2006), Kent and D’Arcy (2001)
or Borio et al. (2001) argue that high default rates during recessions are just
a materialization of the risk that is built up during expansions, most notably
when strong economic growth is accompanied by the creation of unsustainable
nancial imbalances. It should therefore be emphasized that there is a large
dierence between potential and observed risk26.
Our objective is to evaluate simultaneously the eects of some of these
dimensions of corporate credit risk. In order to achieve such objective, we will
consider rm-specic accounting information, as well as macroeconomic and
nancial data, trying to understand how do idiosyncratic and systematic risk
factors in uence the default process.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2 we brie y
present the modeling setup underlying the empirical work which will be de-
veloped further ahead. In Section 3.3 we try to understand some of the links
26Wilson (1998), who developed CreditPortfolioView (McKinsey’s credit risk model), was
one of the rst authors to emphasize the role macroeconomic variables could have in ex-
plaining credit defaults, using a multi-factor model of systematic default risk. Bangia et
al. (2002) also had a crucial role in demonstrating the importance of macroeconomic de-
velopments in credit risk. Allen and Saunders (2003) provide a survey of cyclical eects in
existing credit risk models. Other authors who tried to consider business cycle conditions in
credit risk models include Lis et al. (2000), Nickell et al. (2000), Kent and D’Arcy (2001),
Lowe (2002), Berger and Udell (2004), Carling et al. (2002, 2004) or Jiménez and Saurina
(2006). More recently, Foos et al. (2010) showed that loan growth is usually associated
with more credit risk a few years later. During the last few years, an extensive literature on
the risk-taking channel of monetary policy has  ourished, arguing that banks that excessive
risks in their loan portfolios when interest rates are low (Jiménez et al., 2013, Maddaloni
and Peydró, 2011).
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between credit risk and macroeconomic developments at an aggregate level.
For that purpose, we look at correlations between the cyclical components of
credit overdue and of a large set of macroeconomic and nancial variables. In
Section 3.4 we nally look at rm-specic evidence. In this section, we begin
by describing the panel dataset used in our work. In this extensive dataset we
have information for more than 30.000 Portuguese rms for the period com-
prised between 1996 and 2002. This dataset contains information on rms’
credit liabilities as well as detailed accounting information for each rm. In
order to explore the determinants of loan default at a micro level, we use two
dierent econometric techniques. We begin by using discrete choice models to
understand why do some rms default, but later we complement our analysis
using duration models. The introduction of the time dimension encompassed
in duration models may provide some additional evidence on the timing of
loan default, thereby addressing the question of when do rms default. Fi-
nally, Section 3.5 presents some concluding remarks.
3.2 Modeling default probabilities
The theoretical modeling setup underlying the empirical analysis which will
be developed in Section 3.4 draws to some extent on previous work done by
Rosch (2003) and Hamerle et al. (2004). Under this modeling framework, we
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1 if rm l defaults in w
0 otherwise
(3.1)
The time-discrete hazard rate can be dened as:
lw = Prob (\lw = 1) (3.2)
We will consider two vectors of explanatory variables. The rst one is a set
of rm-specic variables, which shall account for idiosyncratic risk (]lw). This
vector will include contemporaneous and lagged variables regarding several
dimensions of the rm’s nancial situation, such as age, size, asset growth,
protability, leverage and liquidity. The second vector comprises a set of ag-
gregate time-varying regressors, which intend to account for systematic risk
([w). These may include variables such as GDP growth, industrial produc-
tion, condence levels, credit growth, interest rates, equity prices (and their
volatility) and bond spreads.
We can use a two-state one factor return generating model, which can be
used under the framework of Basel II to calibrate risk weights (Rosch (2003)
develops an application using a similar modeling setup). The discrete-time
process for the return on a rm’s assets (Ulw), in a given period, follows a
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where [w  Q(0> 1), ]lw  Q(0> 1) (normalized returns assumption).
The exposure to the common factor is given by
s. If we consider that
the idiosyncratic component is independent from the systematic factor, as well
as independent across borrowers, then  measures the correlation between the
normalized asset returns of any two borrowers.
However, these assumptions may be too strict. In fact, empirical evidence
suggests that the idiosyncratic component may not always be independent
from the systematic factor. Furthermore, the assumption of a unique com-
mon factor may be too poor if we want to fully understand which factors are
more important in driving default probabilities. So, taking into account these
considerations, the return model may be slightly adapted, yielding:
Ulw = K[w +{]lw (3.4)
where K and { are parameter vectors, which can be estimated through a
linear panel model such as:
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Ulw = + [w + ]lw + xlw (3.5)
where  is the model constant term,  and  are the estimates of K and {,
and xlw is the error-term.
The borrower will default if his returns fall below a given threshold flw:
Ulw  flw / \lw = 1 (3.6)
The realization of the risk drivers [w and ]lw and of the default indicator
\lw is observable, but the returns Ulw are not. The link between the risk factors
and the default probability can be accomplished with a threshold model. So,
we can redene the probability of default at time w for borrower l (time-discrete
hazard) as:
lw = Prob (\lw = 1) = Prob (Ulw  flw) = (3.7)
= Prob (K[w +{]lw  flw) = !(flw)
where !(=) denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution function.
Taking into account the estimated linear panel model we can write:
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lw([w> ]lw) = Prob (\lw = 1 | [w>]lw) = (3.8)
= Prob (Ulw  flw | [w>]lw) =
= Prob (+ [w + ]lw + xlw  flw | [w>]lw) =
= Prob (xlw  flw   [w  ]lw | [w>]lw) =
= I (˜+ ˜[w + ˜]lw)
where I (=) denotes the cumulative distribution function of the error term,
˜ = flw   (assuming flw = f>;lw), ˜ =  and ˜ = .
Before exploring the information available at the rm-level, we will begin
by trying to draw some conclusions on the relationship between credit risk
and macroeconomic information at an aggregate level. Hence, this modeling
setup will be applied in Section 3.4, where we will use micro data to assess the
determinants of default probabilities at the rm-level.
3.3 Credit risk and macroeconomic dynamics: an ag-
gregate approach
Before looking at evidence provided by rm-level data, we will try to under-
stand some of the links between credit risk and macroeconomic developments
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at an aggregate level. In order to achieve such objective, we built up correla-
tion matrices between the cyclical components of credit overdue and of a large
set of macroeconomic and nancial variables. These matrices may provide
a clearer understanding of the cyclical comovement between credit overdue
and other variables, which can later be used as explanatory variables under a
regression analysis framework, together with rm-specic variables.
3.3.1 Data and methodology
In order to evaluate the relationship between credit risk and macroeconomic
developments, we gathered a large set of macroeconomic and nancial time
series. In this analysis, credit default is measured as credit and interest which
have become overdue within the last 3 to 6 months. There is, however, one
caveat in using this measure of credit overdue: it is not possible to separately
assess the evolution of non-nancial corporations’ and households’ credit over-
due. To partly overcome this issue, estimations were also performed using the
stock of non-performing loans of non-nancial corporations, though this stock
variable should not perform so well in capturing the dynamics of new credit
overdue.
Macroeconomic and nancial series include information on national ac-
counts, in ation, labor market data, loans, loan loss provisions, interest rates
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and stock market prices. All time series, considered at a quarterly frequency,
were detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott lter27. The cyclical components
obtained through ltering were then used to compute correlations with our
aggregate credit risk measure, considering several time lags.
3.3.2 Some results
As mentioned above, the analysis of the cyclical components of several macro-
economic and nancial variables (and of their correlation with non-performing
loans) may shed some light on the links between credit risk and overall macro-
economic developments. A large set of time series was taken into account.
Table 3.1 reports some of the most signicant correlation coe!cients obtained
for the period comprised between 1990Q1 and 2004Q4.
27The smoothing parameter was set to be 1600.
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xt : i  = -8 = -7 = -6 = -5 = -4 = -3 = -2 = -1 i  = 0 i = 1 i  = 2 i = 3 i  = 4 i = 5 i  = 6 i = 7 i  = 8
Loans
Loans to non-financial corp. -0.41 -0.32 -0.28 -0.18 -0.03 0.15 0.27 0.31 0.41 0.52 0.56 0.62 0.62 0.64 0.58 0.50 0.43
   Agriculture -0.22 -0.07 0.08 0.19 0.37 0.46 0.41 0.35 0.36 0.21 0.11 0.18 0.19 0.26 0.27 0.31 0.22
   Mining -0.27 -0.21 -0.12 -0.03 0.11 0.27 0.33 0.36 0.35 0.25 0.20 0.27 0.30 0.43 0.49 0.53 0.48
   Manufacturing -0.28 -0.17 -0.14 -0.07 0.05 0.19 0.30 0.33 0.38 0.47 0.52 0.64 0.63 0.55 0.46 0.46 0.45
   Utilities -0.38 -0.29 -0.17 -0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.15 0.23 0.31 0.41 0.37 0.48 0.54 0.60 0.51
   Construction -0.46 -0.38 -0.29 -0.14 0.02 0.15 0.26 0.33 0.41 0.45 0.50 0.54 0.53 0.54 0.51 0.40 0.26
   Services -0.38 -0.32 -0.31 -0.23 -0.08 0.14 0.25 0.30 0.41 0.55 0.58 0.60 0.61 0.65 0.60 0.47 0.40
Nationa l  accounts
Private consumption -0.40 -0.38 -0.40 -0.30 -0.17 -0.12 -0.04 0.12 0.27 0.21 0.23 0.40 0.52 0.56 0.59 0.69 0.74
   Durables -0.48 -0.39 -0.43 -0.36 -0.27 -0.26 -0.26 -0.19 -0.06 -0.05 0.03 0.17 0.33 0.45 0.45 0.57 0.66
   Non-durables -0.26 -0.29 -0.30 -0.20 -0.09 -0.02 0.09 0.27 0.40 0.32 0.31 0.47 0.53 0.52 0.55 0.62 0.63
Public consumption -0.46 -0.47 -0.43 -0.36 -0.24 -0.11 -0.01 0.11 0.23 0.27 0.33 0.42 0.52 0.63 0.69 0.71 0.67
GFCF -0.61 -0.58 -0.50 -0.46 -0.40 -0.42 -0.38 -0.33 -0.27 -0.15 0.04 0.24 0.38 0.53 0.59 0.58 0.53
Exports -0.10 -0.03 0.03 -0.07 -0.21 -0.37 -0.42 -0.49 -0.54 -0.38 -0.29 -0.19 -0.09 -0.01 0.04 0.04 0.10
   Goods 0.03 0.13 0.20 0.11 -0.05 -0.24 -0.37 -0.49 -0.54 -0.40 -0.34 -0.29 -0.19 -0.10 -0.06 -0.10 -0.05
   Services -0.37 -0.41 -0.34 -0.40 -0.42 -0.43 -0.32 -0.27 -0.31 -0.20 -0.04 0.10 0.18 0.20 0.23 0.32 0.36
Imports -0.38 -0.31 -0.25 -0.31 -0.36 -0.47 -0.41 -0.40 -0.46 -0.34 -0.15 -0.04 0.14 0.29 0.38 0.37 0.42
   Goods -0.37 -0.28 -0.22 -0.27 -0.34 -0.44 -0.39 -0.40 -0.47 -0.36 -0.20 -0.09 0.09 0.26 0.36 0.34 0.41
   Services -0.16 -0.28 -0.28 -0.30 -0.23 -0.33 -0.31 -0.13 -0.05 -0.01 0.21 0.32 0.35 0.26 0.30 0.35 0.21
GDP -0.52 -0.45 -0.39 -0.26 -0.14 -0.16 -0.20 -0.16 -0.04 0.08 0.14 0.35 0.42 0.45 0.47 0.56 0.57
Other economic indicators
Coincident indic. for econ. act. -0.57 -0.60 -0.60 -0.59 -0.56 -0.54 -0.52 -0.45 -0.36 -0.26 -0.13 0.01 0.16 0.26 0.33 0.40 0.44
Inflation
CPI growth 0.08 0.24 0.17 0.15 0.21 0.28 0.29 0.45 0.58 0.54 0.37 0.37 0.42 0.35 0.16 0.11 0.15
Bank interest rates
Interest rate on firms -0.15 -0.15 -0.17 -0.21 -0.24 -0.24 -0.22 -0.18 -0.13 0.10 0.24 0.27 0.35 0.29 0.25 0.25 0.30
Interest rate housing -0.20 -0.22 -0.23 -0.27 -0.29 -0.26 -0.22 -0.17 -0.13 0.12 0.29 0.32 0.39 0.33 0.29 0.26 0.28
Interest rate households other -0.03 -0.05 -0.12 -0.19 -0.22 -0.24 -0.24 -0.23 -0.20 0.02 0.15 0.19 0.28 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.29
Stock market data
PSI Geral -0.35 -0.31 -0.36 -0.46 -0.38 -0.31 -0.39 -0.41 -0.37 -0.17 -0.07 0.00 0.16 0.11 0.03 0.06 0.27
PSI 20 -0.32 -0.26 -0.29 -0.36 -0.25 -0.14 -0.20 -0.18 -0.10 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.22 0.33 0.23 0.11 0.26
Bond yields
Gov bond DE 5 -0.22 -0.11 0.00 0.12 0.16 0.02 -0.10 -0.09 -0.10 -0.15 -0.15 0.04 0.22 0.33 0.39 0.42 0.34
Gov bond DE 10 -0.04 0.07 0.14 0.23 0.28 0.13 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.12 -0.16 -0.01 0.16 0.27 0.32 0.35 0.30
Gov bond EMU 10 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.16 -0.26 -0.26 -0.26 -0.09 0.06 0.13 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.34
Correlation coeffic ient o f xt  with credit overduet +i
Table 3 .1
Note: This table reports correlation coefficients between the cyclical component of each listed variable at t (xt) and the cyclical component 
of credit overdue at different time periods (credit overduet+i), using quarterly information for the period comprised between 1990Q1 and 
2004Q4 (except for Government bond yields, for which only slightly shorter time series are available). This definition of credit overdue 
comprises credit and interest overdue for more than 3 and less than 6 months. The highest correlation for each variable is highlighted in 
grey. The coincident indicator for economic activity refers to the cyclical component underlying the construction of this business cycle 
indicator. The data source for most time series is Banco de Portugal. The only exceptions are CPI growth (INE), stock market data 
(Euronext) and government bond yields (Reuters).
First of all, the correlation between loans to non-nancial corporations at
w and credit overdue at w+5 is quite high and positive (0.64), as illustrated in
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the rst panel of Table 3.1. This evidence helps to support the hypothesis that
most credit risk is built up during periods of strong credit growth, materializing
only when the economy hits a downturn, as discussed above (see Pederzoli and
Torricelli (2005) or Jiménez and Saurina (2006), for instance). In turn, the
correlation between loans to non-nancial corporations at w and credit overdue
at w 8 is also relatively high, but it is now negative (-0.41), implying that a
strong growth in credit overdue at w is correlated with a contraction in total
credit at w+ 8. This may suggest that banks apply tighter standards on loan
approval after a period in which non-performing loans increase signicantly.
Moreover, in a period of economic slowdown, loan demand is expected to
remain subdued.
The cyclical component of GDP displays a positive leading correlation with
the cycle of credit overdue (the strongest correlation is seen between GDP at
w and new credit overdue at w + 8). This result implies that a period of ro-
bust economic growth is usually followed by an increase in new credit overdue,
with a lag of at least two years. This result is also important to conrm the
hypothesis that in periods of economic growth there may be some tendency
towards excessive risk-taking, which materializes in an increase of credit over-
due only when the economy hits a downturn. The negative contemporaneous
correlation is particularly strong if we consider the stock of non-nancial cor-
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porations’ non-performing loans instead of the  ow of new credit overdue. In
sum, in periods of strong economic growth imbalances may be building up. Ac-
cording to our results, these imbalances start to be gradually re ected in new
credit overdue with a lag of at least two years. Then, the growth of new credit
overdue is progressively re ected in an increase of the stock of non-performing
loans. When the cyclical component of non-performing loans reaches its peak
(that is, when credit risk fully materializes), the cycle of GDP is at its trough,
resulting in a strong negative contemporaneous correlation between these two
variables28.
In what concerns GDP components, the results are rather mixed. On the
one hand, the cyclical component of private (and public) consumption displays
a positive leading correlation with the cycle of new credit overdue. On the
other hand, the cyclical components of investment (measured by gross xed
capital formation), imports and exports display a negative lagged correlation.
This may suggest that credit imbalances are usually more associated with
consumption-driven expansions, though this conclusion may be very sensitive
28Most of the empirical literature on credit risk modelling focuses on the cross-section
rather than on the time-series dimension of credit risk. An exception is a recent work by
Koopman and Lucas (2005), which uses a multivariate unobserved components approach
to evaluate the dynamic behaviour of business failures, credit spreads and GDP in the
United States, using considerably long time series (1933-1997). The authors nd evidence
of negative co-cyclicality between GDP and business failures for long business cycles (with
an average duration of 11 years) and a positive relationship between the cyclical component
of business failures and credit spreads.
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to the time interval considered.
Bank interest rates display a positive correlation with the cyclical compo-
nent of new credit overdue and are leading variables. In fact, their strongest
correlation is seen at w+4, suggesting that an increase in credit overdue is often
preceded by an interest rate increase. This result may be associated, on one
hand, with the increase of interest rates during periods of stronger and pro-
longed economic growth, which are sometimes followed by an increase in credit
overdue, as discussed above. Additionally, a sizeable increase in interest rates
implies a higher debt service, which may put some strain on highly leveraged
rms. On the other hand, when interest rates increase signicantly, adverse
selection problems may become more frequent, implying higher default rates
some periods afterwards29.
Government bond yields display a pattern similar to that of bank interest
rates. Stock market indices exhibit a negative correlation, implying that posi-
tive developments in stock market prices, which usually re ect a broad-based
improvement in rms’ nancial condition, are usually associated with lower
default ratios, as should be expected.
The links between credit default and macroeconomic developments will be
29Borrowers with projects which entail relatively low risks may consider that interest
rates are higher than what is deemed adequate to ensure minimum protability levels, thus
introducing a potential bias in banks’ loan portfolios towards riskier borrowers.
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further explored in the next section, by taking simultaneously into account
rm-specic and macroeconomic variables under a regression analysis frame-
work. The insight provided by the analysis of cyclical components will then
be helpful in choosing the set of explanatory variables to be considered.
3.4 The contribution of rm level information to un-
derstand loan default
In the previous section we discussed some of the determinants of loan default
at an aggregate level, using macroeconomic and nancial time series. However,
rm level data may provide a much richer insight of credit risk drivers.
In this section we will explore an extensive and detailed dataset which
comprises information on more than 30.000 Portuguese rms. We will be-
gin by describing the dataset, presenting some revealing summary statistics.
Then we will brie y describe the econometric methodology used. First we use
discrete choice models to better understand what drives rms’ loan defaults.
Afterwards, we complement our analysis using duration models. The time
dimension encompassed in duration models allows us to focus on the time it
takes for a loan to default, rather than simply considering whether or not rms
default.
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3.4.1 Data and summary statistics
The microeconomic dataset used in this work comprises two distinct datasets
held by Banco de Portugal, namely, the Central Credit Register and the Cen-
tral Balance Sheet Database. The Central Credit Register provides informa-
tion on all credit exposures above 50 euro in Portugal. The information con-
tained in this database is reported by credit institutions (reporting is manda-
tory) and its main objective is sharing information between participant institu-
tions, in order to improve their credit risk assessment and management. This
database contains monthly information on loans granted to rms and house-
holds, including their current status (it is possible to know whether credit has
become overdue, if it was written-o banks’ balance sheets, if it was renego-
tiated or if it is an o-balance sheet risk, such as the unused parts of credit
lines or bank guarantees)30. Using end-of-year data for the period comprised
between 1996 and 2002, we have 203.655 observations31. The Central Balance
Sheet Database provides detailed accounting information for a large sample
of Portuguese rms, being used mostly for economic and statistical purposes.
30Reporting banks aggregate information on loans with similar status for each rm (infor-
mation is not reported on a loan by loan basis). There is no information on loan maturity,
collateral or interest rates. In what concerns loan maturity, nearly half of the loans granted
to non-nancial corporations in the period under analysis had maturities above one year,
taking into account aggregate statistics.
31In order to merge the two datasets, loans were aggregated within rms. Hence, one
observation is dened as a pair rm-year, summing up all credit liabilities for a given rm
in each year.
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We use annual data, though quarterly data is also available for a smaller set
of rms. Reporting is not compulsory, but the sample is considered to be
representative. Nevertheless, there may exist some bias towards larger rms.
Even though this bias represents a shortcoming of this database, it still is
an extremely rich and unique dataset on non-nancial corporations. In this
dataset we have 153.581 observations for the period comprised between 1996
and 2002. Merging the two databases we obtain a dataset containing 113.119
observations, comprising 33.084 rms.
We constructed several ratios and indicators to evaluate each rms’ nan-
cial situation, namely in what concerns their protability, nancial structure,
leverage, productivity, liquidity and investment. In variables with signicant
outliers, we replaced observations above the 99th percentile with the value of
that percentile (the same procedure was applied to observations below the 1st
percentile, whenever necessary).
Only a small percentage of rms in the sample has credit overdue. In fact,
on average, credit overdue represents only 1 per cent of total bank loans32.
The mean value of the dummy variable credit overdue (which takes the value
1 when a rm records a loan default) can be interpreted as a historical default
probability, standing at 3 per cent during the period under analysis (we observe
32Taking into account only those rms which actually default, credit overdue represents,
on average, 34 per cent of their total loans.
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3084 defaults, using end of year data).
One of our main objectives is to understand what drives credit risk at the
rm-level. This can be partly accomplished by looking separately at summary
statistics for rms which record a loan default at w, comparing them with the
remaining rms. In Table 3.2 we present the mean values for these two groups
of rms for several potentially interesting variables. A brief analysis conrms
that rms with loan defaults seem in fact to dier from other rms. On
average, rms in default are less protable, show weaker sales and investment
growth, have lower liquidity ratios and are more dependent on external funding
sources.
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Ha: di ff not 0
Pr( |T| > |t|  )
ROA 0.5 -4.9 15.18 3178 5.4 0.00 Y
Sales growth 12.9 5.7 5.74 2252 7.2 0.00 Y
Solvency ratio 23.2 1.1 26.32 3171 22.1 0.00 Y
Total credit as a % assets 12.5 16.9 -12.02 3209 -4.4 0.00 Y
Leverage 76.8 98.9 -26.32 3171 -22.1 0.00 Y
Investment rate 2.6 -2.5 11.89 2248 5.1 0.00 Y
Liquidity ratio 119.0 86.5 20.75 3356 32.5 0.00 Y
Firm age 16.3 18.6 -7.52 3252 -2.3 0.00 Y
Total assets 9123577 9771957 -0 .17 3149 -648380 0.87 N
Employees 53.6 59.3 -2.47 4389 -5.7 0.01 Y
Number of observations 100117 3084
Table 3 .2
Welch test - Ho:  di ff = 0
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mean (no 






Note: total assets are in euros. ROA, sales growth, the solvency ratio, total credit as a % of assets, leverage, the investment
rate and the liquidity ratio are displayed as percentages. ROA defined as net income to total assets. Sales growth is the year-on-
year growth rate of sales and services; the solvency ratio is defined as equity over total assets. The investment rate is computed
as the ratio between the annual variation in net fixed assets and leverage is defined as total liabilities over total assets. The
liquidity ratio is defined as the ratio between liquid assets (bank deposits and cash, debt receivables, inventories and short-term
investments) and debt payables.
On average, rms in default are slightly older, which is not what should
be expected. There is mixed evidence in the literature in what concerns the
impact of rm age. Younger rms should be more sensitive to external shocks
and should be expected to show higher bankruptcy probabilities, as argued
by Eklund et al. (2001), for instance. In turn, Shumway (2001) nds no
evidence of duration dependence in bankruptcy probabilities (rm age is never
statistically signicant, after controlling for other rm characteristics). The
positive correlation between rm age and default frequencies in our sample
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may re ect positive duration dependence: the longer the rm is at risk, the
higher should be its default probability. This issue will be discussed in more
detail with the results obtained using duration models.
The results also suggest that rms in default are, on average, slightly larger
than the remaining rms in the sample, in contrast to what is usually seen
in the literature. For instance, Bhattacharjee et al. (2009), Bunn and Red-
wood (2003), Eklund et al. (2001) and Jiménez and Saurina (2004) nd that
smaller rms are more likely to default. In turn, Pain and Vesala (2004) and
Bernhardsen (2001) conclude that any systemic eect of rm size on default is
relatively small. Furthermore, there is also contrary evidence on the impact of
rm size in the literature. According to Moody’s (2004), larger rms default
less often, but when nancial statement ratios are taken into account, the im-
pact of the size advantage declines. Hence, a small rm with healthy nancial
ratios should not be riskier than a large rm with comparable nancial state-
ments. Finally, Benito et al. (2004) obtain a result similar to ours, observing
a positive relationship between rm size and default rates (the authors argue
that their database may be biased towards "good" companies, which may also
be a problem in our database).
In order to more accurately test if these variables are in fact dierent for
rms in default, we also present in Table 3.2 the results of a mean comparison
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Welch test. For all variables considered, the mean values for rms in default
are statistically dierent from the mean values observed for rms without
default (with the exception of total assets, for which the mean value is not
statistically dierent between the two groups of rms). Hence, the set of
variables considered in this table may contribute to explain why do some rms
default, under a regression analysis framework.
Furthermore, we also computed pairwise correlations for all the variables
in the dataset, identifying which pairwise correlations are signicant at a 5
per cent signicance level. This correlation matrix was used as a guidance
tool to choose relevant rm-specic and macroeconomic variables, as well as
to identify possible multicollinearity problems between explanatory variables.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the evolution of historical default frequencies during
the sample period, depicted against the economic activity coincident indicator.
Until 2000, there was a steady decline in default frequencies, accompanied by
positive economic developments. The deterioration of economic conditions was
then mirrored (with some lag) by an increase in observed default frequencies,
as well as in the amount of credit overdue as a percentage of total credit.
The empirical distribution of this latter ratio is depicted in Figure 3.2, using
a gaussian kernel density. The distribution of this ratio is clearly two-peaked:
either rms record only small amounts of credit overdue (as a percentage of
100
Chapter 3 Credit risk drivers


























1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Default probability
Economic activity indicator (rhs)
their total credit liabilities), which may re ect transitory episodes of delin-
quency, or they default on nearly all their debt, which should be a situation
closer to bankruptcy. In this domain, it may be interesting to notice the dif-
ferences seen when rm size is taken into account. As mentioned above, large
and medium-sized rms display higher default rates, in contrast to what is
usually found in the literature. Nevertheless, the empirical distribution of the
ratio between credit overdue and total credit is remarkably dierent for rms
with dierent sizes, as illustrated in Figure 3.3. In fact, whereas the distrib-
ution for micro rms is clearly two-peaked (which is, to a lesser extent, also
true for small rms), the distribution for medium and, most notably, for large
rms is single-peaked. This result may suggest that even though larger rms
display higher default frequencies in our sample, these usually re ect small
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and, most likely, transitory episodes of loan default. Larger rms may have
fewer di!culties in overcoming credit problems in part because banks may be
more willing to renegotiate impaired loans, in order to avoid sizeable losses.
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By setting up a transition matrix, it is possible to evaluate historical default
probabilities at dierent time horizons. In Table 3.3 (panel A) are presented
average default frequencies at dierent time horizons and for dierent years.
Default probabilities are fairly stable during the rst years (decreasing slightly
until w + 3), but increase considerably afterwards. Such pattern may signal
positive duration dependence: the longer the rm is at risk, the higher should
be its default probability. By dening conditional transition probabilities, we
can trace separately the evolution of the risk prole of rms which are in
default at w (Table 3.3.B). We can see that this evolution is extremely dierent
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Figure 3.3: Empirical distribution function of the credit overdue ratio by rm
size (gaussian kernel density)
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for rms with and without default at w. For rms which are not in default at
w, default probabilities are clearly increasing over time, which was not clear
when we considered all rms in the sample. In turn, for rms which have
defaulted at w, recovery probabilities (dened as 100 per cent less the default
probability) are markedly increasing and larger than 75 per cent after 6 years.
Finally, we can also build conditional transition matrices for rms without
any prior default (in the sample period) and also for rms which did not
default at w, but which recorded at least one previous default episode in the
sample period, as depicted in Table 3.3.C (this latter group has a very limited
number of observations). Default probabilities seem to be slightly lower for
rms without any previous default in the sample period, though their time
evolution is similar to those with no default at w. In turn, for rms which are
not in default at w but had some previous default in the sample period, default
probabilities are considerably higher, implying that rms with a past record
of credit overdue are more likely to default again in the future than rms that
never defaulted before.
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t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6
1996 3 .99 3.51 3.29 2.61 2.29 3.41 3.73
1997 3 .23 3.13 2.54 2.26 3.39 3.63 -
1998 2 .90 2.51 2.22 3.30 3.52 - -
1999 2 .38 2.12 3.14 3.41 - - -
2000 2 .07 3.00 3.26 - - - -
2001 2 .86 3.24 - - - - -
2002 3 .16 - - - - - -
Average 2 .99 2.95 2 .89 2.86 3 .04 3 .52 3 .73
t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6
Firms with no 
default at t
0.00 1.63 2.06 2.23 2.57 3.07 3.34
Firms in 
default at t
100.00 54.62 42.41 36.72 31.45 30.04 23.97
Average 2.99 2.95 2.89 2.86 3.04 3.52 3.73
t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6
1996 0.00 1.52 2.13 1.81 1.65 2.84 3.34
1997 0.00 1.53 1.51 1.44 2.72 3.19 -
1998 0.00 1.19 1.23 2.61 2.98 - -
1999 0.00 0.83 2.19 2.67 - - -
2000 0.00 1.95 2.42 - - - -
2001 0.00 1.91 - - - - -
2002 0.00 - - - - - -
Average 0.00 1.48 1.89 2.09 2.42 3.01 3.34
t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6
1996 - - - - - - -
1997 0.0 8.5 8.3 6.9 16.0 13.1 -
1998 0.0 9.5 12.9 14.6 17.6 - -
1999 0.0 10.1 13.7 15.9 - - -
2000 0.0 12.8 16.8 - - - -
2001 0.0 12.9 - - - - -
2002 0.0 - - - - - -
Average 0.0 10.9 13.4 13.4 16.9 13.1 -
A - Transi tion matrix
Table 3 .3
Default probabi l i ties at di fferent time horizons for fi rms without any prior 
default (%)
Default prob. at di fferent time horizons for fi rms without default at t but 
with prior defaults (%)
Default probabi l i ties at di fferent time horizons (%)
B - Conditiona l transi tion matrix
Default probabi l i ties at di fferent time horizons (%)
C - Transi tion matrix for fi rms with and without default
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3.4.2 Econometric methodology
A common approach in the empirical credit risk literature is to use standard
discrete choice models, such as logit or probit models (see, for instance, Benito
et al. (2004), Bernhardsen (2001), Bunn and Redwood (2003), Hamerle (2004)
or Campbell et al. (2008))33. These models can be used to empirically examine
credit risk drivers, assessing their relative importance in determining whether
rms default on their credit liabilities. Recalling equation 3.8, we want to
estimate a linear panel model such as:
lw([w> ]lw) = Prob (\lw = 1 | [w>]lw) = (3.9)
= I (˜+ ˜[w + ˜]lw)
The model to be estimated will depend on the assumption made on the
error distribution function I (=). Assuming a standard normal distribution
function X(=) yields a probit model such that:
33For details on discrete choice modelling under a panel data framework see Wooldridge
(2002), Hsiao (1986), Baltagi (1995) and Maddala and Rao (1996).
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lw([w> ]lw) = X(˜+ ˜[w + ˜]lw) (3.10)
Discrete choice models may provide an interesting assessment of the de-
terminants of loan default, helping to determine whether or not a rm with
given characteristics is likely to default. However, it would also be important
to focus on the time dimension of default, understanding not only if a rm
will default, but also when will that eventually occur. The timing of loan
default is important for establishing a complete risk evaluation, as well as for
accurate loan pricing and provisioning. Duration models directly model the
survival time of a loan, taking as a dependent variable the time until default.
Although not so common, there are some applications of survival analysis to
credit risk modeling, such as Banasik et al. (1999), Carling et al. (2002, 2004)
or Couderc and Renault (2005)34.
Duration models may have some advantages over discrete choice models,
given that they can more easily incorporate the progressive deterioration of a
rm’s nancial situation before default, as they control for each rm’s time at
risk, as argued by Shumway (2001). In addition, empirical evidence suggests
that there may be duration dependence in default risk: rm age (or time at
34Shumway (2001), Bhattacharjee et al (2009), Roszbach (2004) and Antunes (2005) also
use duration models, but to address slightly dierent issues of credit risk.
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risk) may be an important explanatory variable, as found by Carling et al.
(2002, 2004)35. Therefore, traditional logit and probit models, which imply
constant hazard rates, may be less accurate than duration models36. Further-
more, the explicit introduction of the time dimension in duration models may
provide better results when taking into account macroeconomic variables, as
argued by Bhattacharjee et al. (2009). Despite all the advantages provided by
duration models, their application to our dataset is somewhat limited, given
that there is a strong left censoring problem: most rms in the dataset were
created before 1996, implying that rms’ time at risk is, for most observations,
much larger than the observation period. Though econometric software can
handle this, it still limits the conclusions to be drawn from duration models.
Hence, duration models will be used mostly to complement and verify the
empirical ndings obtained with discrete choice models.
Under the duration modeling framework, we dene W as the time until a
loan defaults37. The hazard function can be dened as the probability of a rm
defaulting on a short interval [w> w + gw), conditional on not having defaulted
before:
35As discussed in the previous sub-section, in our dataset there seems to be evidence in fa-
vor of positive duration dependence, given that older rms display higher default frequencies.
36Nevertheless, the inclusion of a duration variable, such as rm age, in logit or probit
models, should yield results similar to those obtained with duration models.
37Lancaster (1990) provides one of the most complete presentations of duration models.
Wooldridge (2002) also provides a brief introduction to these models under a panel data
framework.
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k(w) = lim
gw<0
Prob(w  W ? w+ gw | W  w)
gw (3.11)
The hazard function represents an instantaneous rate of default per unit of
time. The duration distribution function can be dened as I (w )=Prob(W ? w).
The survival function is the probability of surviving up to w, and can be dened
as:










Whenever W has an exponential distribution, the hazard function k(w) is
constant. When the hazard function is not constant, the underlying process
is said to exhibit duration dependence. If k(w)w A 0, ;w, there is positive
duration dependence, which implies that, in our framework, the probability of
default increases with time, for rms which have never defaulted before. If,
on the contrary, k(w)w ? 0, ;w, there is evidence in favor of negative duration
dependence (the longer the rm has remained without defaulting, the lower
should be its default probability).
If rms were homogenous, the setup described above could be directly ap-
plied. However, we want to focus on the opposite assumption, understanding
which rms’ specic characteristics determine their default probabilities, as
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well as their timings. As a consequence, assuming that we have two vectors of
time-varying covariates, [w and ]lw (a systematic and a rm-specic compo-
nent), we must slightly adapt the specications presented above, such that:
k(w>[(w)> ](w)) = lim
gw<0
Prob(w  W ? w+ gw | W  w>[(w+ gw)> ](w+ gw))
gw
(3.13)
where [(w) and ](w) are the covariates path up to w38.
We begin our survival regression analysis by using a Cox proportional haz-
ard model, such that:
k(w>[(w)> ](w)) = ([(w)> ](w))k0(w) (3.14)
where (=) is a non-negative function of [(w) and ](w)> and k0(w) is de-
ned as the baseline hazard, which is common to all rms (individual hazard
functions dier from each other proportionally, as a function of ([(w)> ](w)).
This is a partly non-parametric approach, given that we can estimate unknown
parameters of (=) without specifying the form of the baseline hazard. Under
this setup, the regressors do not aect the shape of the overall hazard function,
38It is important to make a distinction between exogenous and endogenous regressors.
According to Lancaster (1990), a covariate process {{(w)} is exogenous for W if and only if
Prob([(w> w+gw) | W  w+gw>[(w)) =Prob([(w> w+gw | [(w)). This means that any regressor
whose path is determined independently of whether any particular agent has defaulted or
not is exogenous. In our work, all variables used (both time-variant and time-invariant) will
be considered exogenous.
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conditioning only the relative failure risk of each rm.
We then extend our analysis by estimating parametric duration models,
using several dierent distribution functions (namely, exponential, Weibull,
Gompertz, lognormal, and log-logistic).
3.4.3 Results
Results obtained using discrete choice models In Table 3.4 we present
some of the results obtained using a random-eects probit. The rst results
presented in this table focus on 71.058 observations, for 24.668 dierent rms,
though the full sample comprises 113.119 observations for 33.084 rms (on
average, we have 3 years of observations for each rm). This dierence results
from using variables constructed with information on the previous year (such
as sales growth or the investment rate), which excludes from the regressions
all observations for 1996, as well as those which do not have two consecutive
years of information. Furthermore, several observations have missing values in
some of the variables used, being also naturally excluded from the regression
analysis (which explains the slightly dierent number of observations in some
of the models presented). Additionally, we are excluding from the regression
analysis rms in default for at least two consecutive years, considering only
their rst default observation, in order to evaluate only new transitions into
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the default state (if, however, a rm defaults twice or more during the sample
period, but in non-consecutive years, these defaults will be considered as new
transitions).
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model  5 Model  6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Sa les growth -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
-2.28 -2.68 -2.19 -2.20 -2.16 -1.79 -2.18 -2.52 -0.47 -1.97
ROA -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
-4.73 -4.34 -3.96 -3.95 -3.92 -3.75 -3.93 -3.97 -4.05 -3.66
So lvency ratio -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006
-6.52 -7.15 -7.56 -7.35 -7.36 -11.16 -11.23 -11.24 -11.87 -11.09
Investment rate -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
-5.38 -5.35 -5.01 -4.99 -4.99 -4.44 -4.82 -5.18 -4.52
Liquidity ratio -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
-5.24 -4.56 -4.47 -4.48 -4.51
Firm age 0.001
0.63








Avai lable co l latera l (aprox.) 0.001
1.51
Smal l -0.044 -0.035 -0.048 -0.006 -0.035 -0.034 -0.044
-0.52 -0.41 -0.58 -0.07 -0.42 -0.41 -0.53
Micro -0.013 -0.001 -0.027 0.014 -0.011 -0.059 -0.025
-0.15 -0.01 -0.32 0.16 -0.13 -0.69 -0.29
Medium -0.026 -0.022 -0.025 0.007 -0.015 -0.005 -0.023
-0.30 -0.25 -0.28 0.07 -0.17 -0.06 -0.27
1997 -0.303 -0.303 -0.302 -0.313 -0.291 -0.312 -0.284 -0.313
-5.61 -5.59 -5.56 -5.76 -5.38 -5.76 -5.25 -5.76
1998 -0.229 -0.230 -0.228 -0.235 -0.220 -0.236 -0.206 -0.235
-4.55 -4.55 -4.50 -4.65 -4.36 -4.68 -4.09 -4.65
1999 -0.340 -0.341 -0.339 -0.342 -0.330 -0.343 -0.329 -0.342
-6.38 -6.37 -6.34 -6.39 -6.18 -6.44 -6.15 -6.39
2000 -0.390 -0.390 -0.390 -0.393 -0.389 -0.391 -0.391 -0.393
-6.51 -6.51 -6.51 -6.57 -6.50 -6.56 -6.50 -6.56
2001
2002 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.002 -0.001 0.011 -0.013 0.002
0.12 0.12 0.11 0.04 -0.03 0.21 -0.26 0.05
Constant -2.377 -2.296 -2.184 -2.153 -2.175 -2.245 -2.336 -2.048 -1.907 -2.304
-36.82 -35.88 -29.42 -20.17 -19.27 -21.55 -21.80 -11.85 -18.61 -21.12
Number o f observations 71058 71058 71058 71058 71058 71078 71406 71078 71406 71078
Number o f fi rms 24668 24668 24668 24668 24668 24589 24731 24589 24731 24589
Sectora l dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Log-l ikel ihood -5574.7 -5531.8 -5484.1 -5483.7 -5483.5 -5468.2 -5503.7 -5481.5 -5404.0 -5471.1
Log-likelihood of the 
constant only model, for 
this sample -5746.11 -5746.11 -5746.11 -5746.11 -5746.11 -5721.08 -5763.56 -5719.51 -5763.56 -5763.56
Pseudo-R2 0.030 0.037 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.044 0.045 0.042 0.062 0.051
Wald Chi2 286.9 333.2 346.3 347.0 346.7 348.7 356.6 338.1 412.5 345.8
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
rho 0.341 0.336 0.397 0.396 0.396 0.397 0.398 0.392 0.389 0.399
Prob >= chibar2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 3 .4  - Probit regressions (dependent variable :  dummy credit overdue)
Note: z-scores in italics. All models estimated using a random-effects probit estimator, where the dependent variable is the dummy credit
overdue. The pseudo-R2 is a measure of goodness of the fit, being computed as function of the model's log-likelihood and of the log-
likelihood of the constant-only model, for the sub-sample used in each estimation. The Wald test evaluates the overall statistical
significance of the estimated coefficients. Finally, rho measures the proportion of the total variance resulting from the panel-level variance
component. Sales growth is the year-on-year growth rate of sales and services. ROA is defined as net income to total assets and the
solvency ratio is equity over total assets. The investment rate is computed as the ratio between the annual variation in net fixed assets and
the liquidity ratio is defined as the ratio between liquid assets and debt payables.
113
Chapter 3 Credit risk drivers
Taking into account the mean comparisons between rms with and with-
out default presented in Table 3.2, we started by performing some estimations
using a limited set of variables. The pairwise correlations previously computed
were also taken into account, not only to identify which rm variables are more
correlated with default frequencies, but also to avoid possible multicollinearity
problems. In the rst model presented in Table 3.4, the set of explanatory
variables comprises sales growth, return on assets (ROA), a solvency ratio, an
investment rate and a liquidity indicator. Sales growth displays a negative
coe!cient, suggesting that rms with stronger sales growth rates should have
lower default probabilities. Protability seems to oer an important contri-
bution in explaining why do some rms default, exhibiting also a negative
coe!cient, as should be expected (more protable rms should have a more
solid nancial situation and, consequently, display lower default probabilities).
The solvency ratio, which is dened as the ratio between equity and total as-
sets, also suggests that rms with healthier nancial conditions are less likely
to default on their loan commitments. Moreover, rms with stronger invest-
ment rates also show lower default probabilities. In fact, it seems reasonable to
admit that rms under nancial pressure are not expected to engage in large
investment projects. Finally, the liquidity ratio, dened as short-term assets as
a percentage of the rm’s total debt, has a negative impact on default prob-
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abilities, implying that rms facing stronger liquidity constraints may have
higher di!culties in paying their debt commitments, which is consistent with
the results obtained by Bunn and Redwood (2003) or Benito et al. (2004), for
instance.
Even though the rm-specic variables taken into account seem to play an
important role in predicting loan default, they should be seen as contingent
on the rm’s size, as well as on the sector in which it operates. Therefore,
in model 2 we added sector dummies to our rst specication (omitting the
dummy variable for manufacturing rms). The results for these sector dum-
mies suggest that there may be some dierences in credit risk drivers across
dierent sectors. Overall, the coe!cients associated with rms’ nancial ratios
remain robust. Though macroeconomic variables will be introduced further
ahead, we will include for now year dummies, in order to control for any possi-
ble systematic eects (model 3). The fact that most of the coe!cients for year
dummies are signicant gives support to the hypothesis that macroeconomic
developments may also be important in explaining loan default, as thoroughly
discussed in Section 3.3. Finally, we also included size dummies (model 4).
Though micro and small rms seem to have lower default probabilities than
larger rms, conrming the results obtained with descriptive statistics, these
dierences are not statistically signicant. Therefore, even though larger rms
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display higher default frequencies in our sample, after controlling for the rm’s
nancial situation, the eect of rm size on default probabilities does not seem
to remain signicant.
Departing from this latter model, we tried several other possibly interesting
variables. For instance, in Section 3.4.1, we had concluded that rms with de-
fault were, on average, older than the remaining rms in the sample. However,
rm age does not seem to be statistically signicant under a regression analysis
framework (model 5). We also tried to take into account some productivity
measures, such as capital productivity, measured as the ratio of sales to tangi-
ble assets (model 6). Though signicant, its marginal contribution to explain
loan default is rather small. Nevertheless, it helps to conrm that more pro-
ductive rms should have, on average, lower default probabilities (though the
productivity measure used can be highly sensitive to the sector in which the
rm operates). Given the correlation between this indicator and sales growth,
the latter ceases to be signicant in this estimation. We also tried to consider
whether capital intensity could help predict default (model 7). Even though
the associated coe!cient is very small, there seems to be evidence that rms
more intensive on capital than on labor should display slightly higher default
probabilities. Another variable considered was the share of tangible assets on
rms’ total non-nancial xed assets. This variable displays a negative coef-
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cient, implying that the higher the share of tangible assets, the lower is the
default probability, after controlling for the rm’s economic sector. Neverthe-
less, the estimated coe!cient for this variable is hardly statistically signicant.
Additionally, rms with higher turnover ratios (dened as sales to assets) are,
as expected, rms with lower default risk (nevertheless, this variable is, to
some extent, correlated with sales growth, which ceases to be signicant when
the turnover ratio is introduced in the regression). Given that the database
does not provide information on the collateral used to guarantee loans, we
tried to build an approximate measure of total available collateral (tangible
assets as a percentage of total assets), but it did not prove to be signicant in
the estimated regression models.
Though most of the variables discussed above have some explanatory power
in predicting loan default, we should focus our analysis on a limited set of
variables, which comprehensively cover the more important dimensions of the
rm’s situation. Model 4 seems to provide a reasonable compromise between
these two aspects, taking into account the rm’s protability, its sales evo-
lution, its nancial structure, its recent investment policy and its liquidity
position, after controlling for size and economic sector, as well as for time-
eects. Hence, this model will be considered as our baseline specication and
all further extensions will be built upon it.
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In the lower part of Table 3.4 some additional information on the estima-
tions performed is displayed. Both the log-likelihood and the pseudo-R2 do
not change signicantly across the dierent specications presented, suggest-
ing that most of these variables have similar contributions in predicting loan
default39. According to the Wald test reported, coe!cients are overall signif-
icant for the models considered. We also report , which provides a measure
of the proportion of the total variance resulting from the panel-level variance
component (when  is zero, the panel-level variance component is irrelevant
and hence the panel estimator should be equal to the pooled estimator).
As mentioned above, the estimations presented in Table 3.4 were obtained
using a random-eects probit. For robustness purposes, we also estimated
some of these models using alternative estimation procedures. We rst used
a population-averaged estimator instead of the random-eects estimator, ob-
taining minor dierences in the estimated coe!cients, though without any
qualitative changes40. We have also estimated the same population-averaged
39The pseudo-R2 is a measure of goodness of the t, being computed as 0() , where
0 is the log-likelihood of the constant-only model, for the sample used in the estimation, and
 is the log-likelihood of the estimated regression. This ratio is a measure of the percentage
of the variance on the dependent variable that is captured by the model.
40For a general model, the main dierence between random-eects and population-
averaged estimators is that the former t the model Prob(\lw = 1 | [lw> xl) = I ([lw+ xl),
whereas population-averaged estimators t the model Prob(\lw = 1 | [lw) = J([lw). The
subtle dierence is that  and  are dierent population parameters: while the former takes
into account the same rm for dierent values of the regressors, the latter focuses on average
rm values (implying that H(\lw | [lw) = H(\lw | [l)>;w). For further details on population-
averaged models (also known as generalised estimating equations (GEE) approach) please
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model using robust variance estimates, yielding minor changes in some }-
scores. Finally, we also tried to estimate the baseline model without imposing
a panel data structure. More specically, we estimated three additional simple
probit regressions: two using clustered standard errors (one of them clustering
by rms and other clustering by years) and one without any clustering proce-
dure (which would imply admitting that all observations are independent both
across time and within each rm). The results are broadly similar, with one
single exception: sales growth is not statistically signicant when observations
are clustered only by rm and when the clustering procedure is ignored.
The dierent model specications outlined in Table 3.4 help to identify
some of the rm-specic determinants of loan default. However, it should also
be of interest to evaluate how the rm’s past performance aects its default
probability, which could help predicting future defaults. Moreover, given that
rm-specic data is usually available with a considerable lag, it becomes cru-
cial to try to assess whether a rm is likely to become stressed in the future by
evaluating its current nancial situation. Departing from the baseline speci-
cation presented above, in Table 3.5 we present some additional regressions,
using all rm-specic variables lagged by one, two, three and four years, re-
spectively. When all rm variables are lagged by one and two years, the results
see Wooldridge (2002).
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are mainly robust. Most of the coe!cients on rm characteristics preserve the
same signs. The most notable exception is the investment rate, which ceases
to be signicant when lagged. Moreover, the estimated coe!cient for sales
growth is not statistically signicant when more than two lags are considered,
suggesting that only the most recent sales performance truly conditions rms’
default probabilities. There seems to be an increase in the marginal eect
of protability on credit risk, and, conversely, a decrease in the relative im-
portance of the solvency ratio. Hence, sustained poor protability ratios over
time are a strong sign of rm distress, yielding possibly high future default
probabilities. When variables are lagged by three and, most notably, by four
years, there is a clear decrease in the model’s quality (most variables are no
longer signicant and the pseudo-R2 decreases considerably), suggesting that
the rm’s recent performance is, as expected, much more relevant to explain
loan default than its "historical" background.
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1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years
Sa les growth        t -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.003
-2.20 -2.60 0.23 1.23 0.99 -5.54
t-1 -0.001 -0.001
-2.84 -2.59
ROA                  t -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.003





So lvency ratio      t -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.007





Investment rate    t -0.005 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.005
-4.99 0.17 1.40 0.22 -0.10 -3.62
Liquidity ratio     t -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
-4.48 -4.68 -3.25 -3.23 -2.39 -3.99
t-1 -0.002
-4.81
Constant -2.153 -2.085 -2.130 -1.951 -1.756 -2.092 -2.083
-20.17 -17.31 -14.28 -10.88 -14.92 -16.90 -17.32
Number o f observations 71058 46608 30924 19831 12139 45335 46608
Number o f fi rms 24668 17169 12135 8623 7346 16662 17169
Log-l ikel ihood -5483.7 -3732.2 -2557.2 -1802.0 -1323.2 -3598.3 -3732.2
Log-likelihood of the 
constant only model, for 
this sample -5746.11 -3879.97 -2659.01 -1870.56 -1354.59 -3797.12 -3879.97
Pseudo-R2 0.046 0.038 0.038 0.037 0.023 0.052 0.038
Wald Chi2 347.0 196.4 119.0 65.4 55.7 250.2 196.2
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
rho 0.396 0.357 0.347 0.244 0.000 0.362 0.358
Prob >= chibar2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 1.00 0.00 0.00
Note: z-scores in italics. All regressions include the control dummies for size, sector and year presented in Table 4.
All models estimated using a random-effects probit estimator, where the dependent variable is the dummy credit
overdue. The pseudo-R2 is a measure of goodness of the fit, being computed as function of the model's log-likelihood
and of the log-likelihood of the constant-only model, for the sub-sample used in each estimation. The Wald test
evaluates the overall statistical significance of the estimated coefficients. Finally, rho measures the proportion of the
total variance resulting from the panel-level variance component.
Table 3.5 - Probit regressions
Basel ine 
speci fication




In addition, we also tried to estimate similar models using simultaneously
several time lags. First we lagged all variables up to four years, consider-
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ing also the contemporaneous information, and then we gradually dropped
those lags which proved not be signicant. Then we tried a more restricted
approach, considering only up to three year lags (and no contemporaneous
information). The results are consistent with those previously described. In
both cases, only one and two year lags turn out to be statistically signicant,
conrming that using more than three year lags gives the model much less
accuracy. Protability seems to have the highest lagged explanatory power,
though the liquidity and solvency ratios also provide interesting information
when lagged by one year (however, the solvency ratio shows a rather counter-
intuitive positive coe!cient at w  2). Again, the investment rate fails to be
signicant when lagged.
In Section 3.3 we discussed some of the links between loan default and
macroeconomic and nancial developments, at an aggregate level. In this sec-
tion we have considered several rm characteristics that may contribute to
understand why some rms default. Now, nally, we will try to simultane-
ously assess the role played by macroeconomic factors, together with rms’
specic characteristics, by adding a set of macroeconomic variables to our
panel data regressions. We considered a relatively large set of variables, tak-
ing into account some of the conclusions drawn in Section 3.3. Some of the
variables tested in the regressions were GDP growth, the coincident economic
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activity indicator, (log) employment, loan growth, an exchange rate index, 10-
year bond yields, the yield curve slope, banks interest rates applied on loans to
rms, and stock market prices variation. Some of these variables did not prove
to be signicant or displayed unexpected signs. The most insightful results are
presented in Table 3.6. From all the variables considered, the most important
seem to be the GDP growth rate (with a negative contemporaneous impact on
default probabilities, in agreement with what was discussed previously), the
coincident economic activity indicator (which also evaluates economic condi-
tions), loan growth (which also displays a negative coe!cient) and, nally,
stock market prices variation (implying, as previously discussed, that positive
developments in stock market prices, which usually re ect an improvement in
rms’ nancial conditions, are associated with lower default probabilities). All
these variables display relatively high marginal eects on default probabilities.
In fact, these marginal eects are considerably stronger than those obtained
for rm-specic variables, showing that macroeconomic conditions are very
important in explaining default probabilities.
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Model 5 Model 6 Model  5 Model  6
Sa les growth -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
-2.67 -2.20 -2.12 -2.14 -2.21 -2.33 -2.18 -2.21 -0.72 -2.65 -2.59 0.23 0.23
ROA -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006
-4.30 -3.95 -3.93 -3.96 -3.90 -4.16 -3.94 -3.94 -1.63 -3.60 -3.58 -3.09 -3.09
So lvency ratio -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
-7.06 -7.35 -7.37 -7.35 -7.34 -7.23 -7.37 -7.32 -3.08 -3.57 -3.61 -3.21 -3.21
Investment rate -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002
-5.35 -4.99 -4.99 -4.99 -4.91 -5.25 -4.97 -4.95 -2.45 0.19 0.17 1.40 1.40
Liquidity ratio -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
-4.52 -4.48 -4.46 -4.47 -4.50 -4.44 -4.49 -4.49 -4.28 -4.71 -4.68 -3.25 -3.25
Interest rate on loans to fi rms 0.026 0.111 0.117
2.26 4.10 1.66
Yield curve slope (10 y - 3  m) -0.159 0.043 -0.884
-3.43 0.25 -2.85
Loan growth -0.023 -0.019 -0.026 0.043 -0.129
-8.34 -6.02 -1.45 3.39 -2.74
Stock market price variation -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.029
-4.86 -3.48 -0.41 -4.27
GDP growth rate -0.087 -0.141
-7.54 -6.47
Coincident indicator BP -0.061 -0.075 -0.325 -0.284
-7.14 -7.07 -5.96 -3.11
Sa les growth * GDP growth rate 0.000
-0.16
ROA * GDP growth rate 0.000
-0.16
So lvency ratio *  GDP growth rate 0.000
-0.35
Investment rate *  GDP growth rate 0.000
0.26
Liquidity ratio * GDP growth rate 0.001
2.81
Constant -2.241 -2.153 -2.093 -2.192 -1.872 -2.274 -1.755 -2.321 -1.935 -1.660 -2.983 2.664 -5.821
-23.26 -20.17 -20.38 -21.40 -17.64 -22.45 -14.57 -19.71 -16.78 -7.36 -9.15 1.90 -3.82
Number of observations 71058 71058 71058 71058 71058 71058 71058 71058 71058 46608 46608 30924 30924
Number of fi rms 24668 24668 24668 24668 24668 24668 24668 24668 24668 17169 17169 12135 12135
Log-l ikel ihood -5531.2 -5483.7 -5500.3 -5503.9 -5494.1 -5518.6 -5487.0 -5501.4 -5495.5 -3754.0 -3732.2 -2557.2 -2557.2
Log-likelihood of the 
constant only model, for 
this sample -5746.11 -5746.11 -5746.11 -5746.11 -5746.11 -5746.11 -5746.11 -5746.11 -5746.11 -3879.97 -3879.97 -2659.01 -2659.01
Pseudo-R2 0.037 0.046 0.043 0.042 0.044 0.040 0.045 0.043 0.044 0.032 0.038 0.038 0.038
Likel ihood ratio test:  
model  vs basel ine 
without time dummies - 95.0 61.8 54.7 74.3 25.2 88.4 59.7 - - - - -
Wald Chi2 333.8 347.0 330.3 327.3 345.7 323.3 344.3 338.3 336.2 181.6 196.4 119.0 119.0
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
rho 0.336 0.396 0.393 0.392 0.384 0.371 0.395 0.383 0.395 0.331 0.357 0.347 0.347





Note: z-scores in italics. All regressions include the control dummies for size and sector presented in Table 4. All models estimated using a random-effects probit estimator, 
where the dependent variable is the dummy credit overdue. The pseudo-R2 is a measure of goodness of the fit, being computed as function of the model's log-likelihood and of 
the log-likelihood of the constant-only model, for the sub-sample used in each estimation. The Wald test evaluates the overall statistical significance of the estimated 
coefficients. Rho measures the proportion of the total variance resulting from the panel-level variance component. The likelihood ratio test is defined as LRT = 2 x (-ln L1+ln 
L2), where L2 is the log-likelihood of the model specified in each column and L1 is the log-likelihood of the baseline model without time dummies. The likelihood ratio test has 
an asymptotic chi-square distribution, where the degrees of freedom are the number of additional parameters in the more complex model.
Model 
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Al l  fi rm and macro variables lagged:








These rst regressions were estimated by taking into account each macro-
economic variable separately, in order to minimize the losses in terms of in-
formation provided by rm heterogeneity. However, we also tried to take
into account the joint eect of dierent macroeconomic and nancial variables
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(models 5 and 6 in Table 3.6). In model 5 we considered loan growth, stock
market prices variation and the slope of the yield curve. The slope of the
yield curve, which may re ect, to some extent, expectations on future eco-
nomic growth, has a strong negative marginal eect on default probabilities.
When the variables considered in model 5 are lagged by one year (together
with the rm-specic variables), the results are relatively disappointing, given
that none of them remains statistically signicant. Surprisingly, when we con-
sider two year lags the results improve signicantly (the marginal eect of the
yield curve slope increases, conrming the forward-looking properties of this
variable). Given the poor performance of this model when one year lags are
taken into account, we estimated a dierent model (model 6), now considering
interest rates on bank loans (which show, as expected, a positive contempora-
neous coe!cient), the coincident economic activity indicator and loan growth
(which is automatically dropped when variables are used contemporaneously,
given their high correlation). This model yields much better results when
lagged by one year, but when two-year lags are used only the coincident in-
dicator remains signicant. It is interesting to notice that, contrary to what
was suggested when we focused on aggregate time series in Section 3.3, the
coe!cient of economic growth (here proxied by the economic activity indica-
tor) does not become positive when lagged by two years. Hence, even if at an
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aggregate level it seems to be clear that signicant imbalances are created in
periods of strong economic growth, after controlling for rm-specic character-
istics this relationship is no longer apparent, possibly re ecting an asymmetric
behavior of rms with dierent characteristics during dierent phases of the
credit cycle.
Given that rms’ nancial ratios are also subject to sizeable  uctuations
over the business cycle, we tried to explicitly model these co-movements by
adding to the model interactions between rm-specic variables and the GDP
growth rate (model 7). The only signicant interaction variable is the one
associated with the liquidity indicator, suggesting that these interactions do
not play a crucial role in explaining default probabilities. The GDP growth
rate remains signicant, but the coe!cients associated with sales growth and
ROA cease to be statistically signicant in this model. However, when these
two variables are excluded from the regression, their respective interaction
with the GDP growth rate turns out signicant.
As mentioned above, all macroeconomic variables display relatively high
marginal eects on default probabilities. To accurately assess the importance
of macroeconomic conditions on default probabilities, we should begin by com-
paring the model without any time controls to the model with time dummies
and to the models with macroeconomic variables. One important thing to
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notice is that the estimated coe!cients and the }-scores for the rm specic
variables almost do not change in all these specications. This result sug-
gests that the relevant information contained in macroeconomic variables is
largely independent from that contained in rm specic variables. The in-
cremental information provided by the inclusion of the time dimension can
be conrmed by the signicant increase in the pseudo-R2 of the model which
includes time dummies, by comparison with a model without time controls.
The substitution of these time dummies by specic macroeconomic variables
(which can only capture part of the variation enclosed in time dummies) does
not yield signicant changes in the model’s overall goodness of t, suggesting
that these macroeconomic variables can capture an important part of the time
variation implicit in the year dummies. In order to more accurately test the
role performed by the inclusion of time eects in the determination of default
probabilities, we also performed likelihood ratio tests. The inclusion of year
dummies allows for a signicant increase in the likelihood of the model. When
only one macroeconomic variable is considered (models 1 to 4), the change in
the likelihood of the model is also very signicant. Loan growth and GDP
growth rate are the variables which have a higher impact on the model’s like-
lihood. In fact, their explanatory power is not much lower than that of linear
time controls. The additional explanatory power provided by the inclusion
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of three macroeconomic variables in model 5 is very similar to that of the
time dummies. Hence, these results allow us to conclude that macroeconomic
dynamics have an important additional (and independent) contribution in ex-
plaining why do rms default.
Finally, we performed some robustness checks, in order to test the validity
of the results obtained. In the sample there are rms with multiple defaults
and, as previously mentioned, only new transitions into the default state are
being considered (if a rm is in default for more than two consecutive years,
it is excluded from the regression as long as the default state persists). Tak-
ing into account the results obtained using conditional transition matrices, we
have reasons to believe that rms with previous defaults may be riskier than
other rms. To conrm this, we started by including in our sample all de-
fault observations (even if the rm is in default for more than two consecutive
years). In this new sample, which includes more 391 rms, the results are
generally robust, with the exception of protability, which is no longer signif-
icant. Nevertheless, it is interesting to notice that the model’s goodness of t
improves considerably. To better understand the dierences in the behavior of
rms with past loan defaults, we estimated a separate regression only for rms
which were in default at w  1. For the 1.236 rms considered in this regres-
sion, credit risk drivers seem to dier signicantly from the ones considered in
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our base sample. In fact, the only rm-specic variables that remain statis-
tically signicant are the solvency ratio and the investment rate. We further
extended this sample to include rms with at least one previous default during
the sample period (even if not at w 1). This model performs slightly better
(the pseudo-R2 increases considerably, as well as the proportion of the total
variance captured by the panel level component). In addition to the solvency
ratio and the investment rate, sales growth also becomes signicant. Hence,
rms with previous defaults which record relatively low solvency ratios, low
investment rates and low sales growth should be much riskier than other rms.
Also for robustness purposes, we tested the impact of slightly changing the
denition of the dependent variable, by considering that there was default only
when credit overdue was above 100 euro, 1000 euro or 1 per cent of total debt,
in order to focus only on more serious default problems. The estimation results
remain broadly unchanged, though the model’s explanatory power seems to
improve slightly. The strikingly bimodal distribution of the credit overdue
ratio which, as illustrated on Figure 3.2, displays either very high or very
low values was also taken into account in the regressions, in order to test
whether these dierent default events are driven by the same determinants.
As discussed above, low credit overdue ratios should re ect mostly transitory
episodes of delinquency, which may easily be reverted. When we only take into
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account default events in which this ratio is below 50 per cent of the rms’ total
bank debt, most of the variables considered retain their explanatory power.
The only exception is sales growth, which is no longer signicant. In turn,
when only more serious default episodes are considered (credit overdue ratio
above 50 per cent), both protability and liquidity cease to be statistically
signicant.
Still for robustness purposes, we considered other modeling techniques,
namely an ordered probit and a simple OLS with an alternative dependent
variable. Concerning the ordered probit model, we dened dierent levels of
default severity by constructing intervals for the ratio of credit overdue to total
credit. The results are broadly consistent with those previously presented,
showing only minor dierences in the estimated coe!cients. In addition to
this, we considered an alternative model where the ratio of credit overdue
to total credit was the dependent variable, instead of the binary dependent
variable considered so far (this model was estimated within a simple panel data
OLS framework). Again, the results are fairly robust, except in what concerns
the liquidity ratio, which presents a counter-intuitive positive coe!cient.
Given that reporting to the Central Balance Sheet Database is not manda-
tory, we may be leaving out of the regressions rms which are riskier than
the average rm. It is possible to argue that reporting a balance sheet may
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itself be a signal of the rm’s credit quality, given that small rms in nan-
cial distress may be less willing to fully disclosure information regarding their
situation. In fact, default frequencies for rms which do not report to the
Central Balance Sheet Database are much higher than for rms included in
this database. When all these rms are considered, the default rate during
the sample period increases from 3 to 5 per cent. In order to evaluate to what
extent reporting a balance sheet in uences default probabilities, we estimated
a regression with all rms in the Credit Register. For rms for which bal-
ance sheet information was not available, mean values were considered. We
included a dummy variable which takes the value one whenever the rm re-
ported its balance sheet. This dummy variable proved to be signicant and
has a high explanatory variable. The negative coe!cient obtained for this
variable conrms that reporting a balance sheet signicantly decreases default
probabilities.
Recalling that we had controlled for outliers by setting observations above
the 1st and 99th percentiles equal to the value of that percentile, we also tested
the impact on the estimated regressions of running an alternative procedure
for eliminating outliers, more specically, by deleting the observations above
or below those percentiles. The results are broadly consistent, but the change
in the protability coe!cient, which becomes much stronger, should not be
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ignored. Finally, we also tested the introduction of some non-linearities in the
model, by considering the squared value of some variables, as well as some
interactions between variables. However, the marginal eect of the squared
variables is almost negligible and does not seem to add much to the model.
Moreover, the variable interactions tested were not statistically signicant.
Results obtained using duration models The way the data are orga-
nized and declared is very important in survival analysis models. Given that
our database has strong left-censoring problems, this is a particularly impor-
tant issue. In fact, most rms included in the sample were created before 1996,
though in our database we do not have any information about their historical
record, more specically, we do not know whether those rms have defaulted
before that year. This problem can be partly accounted for by declaring that
rms are considered to be at risk since their creation date, though that failure
risk can be observable only after the rm enters the sample (which may even-
tually be after 1996). In these models, our variable of interest will be the time
until default, rather than a binary variable indicating whether the rm has
defaulted or not. After organizing the dataset according to these constraints,
we are left with a sample of 32.966 rms, for which we have an average of 3.3
years of information. There are 1.921 observed defaults in this sample. The
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incidence rate, dened as the number of defaults divided by the total number
of observations, is 1.8 per cent.
Given the left-censoring problems underlying our sample, we also tried to
consider only those rms created from 1996 onwards, thus totally eliminat-
ing left-censoring. This implies focusing on a much smaller set of rms (3.284
rms, for which we observe only 94 defaults). The incidence rate for these rms
is slightly lower, standing at 1.4 per cent. Figure 3.4 depicts several estimated
functions for this subset of rms. The Kaplan-Meier survival estimate shows
a steady decreasing trend, given that survival probabilities decrease over time.
The most interesting results are those provided by the smoothed hazard es-
timate, suggesting that default probabilities are strongly increasing over time
during the rst 4 years of the rm’s life. Afterwards, the hazard rate starts to
decrease, resulting in a hump-shaped smoothed hazard estimate. These results
shed some light on the previous discussions concerning the impact of rm age
on default probabilities. In fact, it can be conrmed, to some extent, that
default probabilities increase with rm age, though it is now clear that such
increase is not linear through the rm’s lifetime. Recalling from Section 3.4.2
that it can be said that there is positive duration dependence when k(w)w A 0,
;w (as dened in equation 3.11), we cannot a!rm that there is strictly positive
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duration dependence, given that for older rms we have k(w)w ? 041.
Figure 3.4: New rms
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analysis time
Smoothed hazard estimate
Within the framework of duration modeling, we estimated several regres-
sion models, in a spirit similar to that of discrete choice models. We started
by tting Cox proportional hazard models. The results obtained, presented
in Table 3.7, are broadly similar to those obtained with probit models: rms
with higher sales growth, higher protability, higher solvency, higher invest-
ment rates, and better liquidity ratios display lower default probabilities (or,
to be more precise, take a longer time to eventually default on their loan com-
mitments). However, sales growth turns out to be clearly non-signicant in
41Estimating hazard rates for the full sample comprises signicant problems, given the
abovementioned left-censoring issue. Nevertheless, the estimates performed for the full
sample also result in a hump-shaped hazard function. Default probabilities are clearly
increasing during the rst 25 years of the rm’s life. Afterwards, default probabilities
continue to increase, though at a less marked rate. Finally, for considerably older rms
(more than 75 years), the hazard rate starts to decrease.
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the estimates performed when considering robust variance estimates. Hence,
though sales growth may contribute to explain why some rms default, it does
not seem to determine the time until default, at least under a Cox proportional
hazard specication. In contrast with what was observed when using discrete
choice models, macroeconomic and nancial variables are not statistically sig-
nicant in these specications. Macroeconomic conditions thus seem to be
more relevant to explain why a rm defaults or not, rather than how long will
it take for the rm to eventually default.
In order to conrm the legitimate use of Cox models, we tested the pro-
portional hazards assumption. Global and individual tests for the estimated
regressions provide no evidence that the proportional hazards assumption is
violated.
135
Chapter 3 Credit risk drivers
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model  12
Sales growth 0.998 1.003
-1.72 1.54
ROA 0.995 0.994 0.994 0.992 0.992 0.992 0.993 0.993 0.992 0.992 0.993 0.992
-4.33 -4.83 -4.84 -2.44 -2.31 -2.31 -2.02 -1.79 -2.36 -2.37 -2.17 -2.49
Solvency ratio 0.995 0.995 0.995 1.003 1.003 1.003 1.000 1.005 1.003 1.002 1.003
-4.59 -4.56 -4.53 0.74 0.78 0.74 -0.06 1.29 0.70 0.59 0.77
Investment rate 0.990 0.989 0.989 0.993 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.993 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.994
-3.94 -4.10 -4.12 -1.23 -1.02 -1.02 -1.00 -1.47 -1.04 -1.04 -1.08 -1.02
Liquidity ratio 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.993 0.986 0.990 0.990 0.990
-4.53 -4.51 -4.54 -3.94 -4.04 -4.04 -3.89 -2.97 -5.01 -3.99 -3.97 -3.98
Leverage 0.997
-0.78




Avai lable co l la tera l 0.994
-1.32
Activity began a fter 1996 (Y/N) 0.962
-0.23




Stock market price variation 1.005
0.98
Constant - - - - - - - - - - - -
Log pseudo l ikel ihood -7291.3 -7294.0 -7294.3 -434.1 -435.3 -435.3 -428.4 -429.9 -428.2 -437.2 -437.2 -436.8
No. o f observations 76292 76292 76292 3847 3847 3847 3802 3847 3802 3847 3847 3847
No. o f subjects 25690 25690 25690 2324 2324 2324 2297 2324 2297 2324 2324 2324
No. o f fa i lures 1000 1000 1000 68 68 68 67 68 67 68 68 68
Time at ri sk 76292 76292 76292 3847 3847 3847 3802 3847 3802 3847 3847 3847
Wald chi2 583.9 581.4 577.9 35.7 34.2 34.2 35.2 39.9 44.8 31.5 31.0 31.3
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Full  sample New fi rms
Note: z-scores in italics. New firms are defined as those created from 1996 onwards. The regressions for the full sample include the control dummies for size,
sector and year presented in Table 3.4. All models estimated using a Cox regression which evaluates the time until default, using robust variance estimates. An
estimated coefficient lower than 1 should be interpreted as contributing a longer time until default eventually occurs. The Wald test evaluates the overall
significance of the estimated coefficients.
Table 3.7 - Cox regressions (hazard ratios), robust
Given the strong left-censoring in the database, we also tested whether
rms created from 1996 onwards were substantially dierent from others. In
order to achieve that, we estimated a Cox model including a dummy variable
for such rms (model 3 in Table 3.7). This dummy variable is far from being
signicant, suggesting that these rms do not substantially dier from the
remaining rms in the sample. Nevertheless, to more deeply address this
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problem, we also estimated Cox regressions for this sub-sample, which are
also displayed in Table 3.7. Both the solvency ratio and the investment rate
cease to be signicant. As argued above, these results suggest that start-up
rms have relatively dierent determinants of loan default (in our sample,
these rms show higher investment rates, as would be expected, as well as
higher leverage ratios42). In order to complete our assessment, we tested the
inclusion of other micro and macro variables. Most of the variables tested
do not seem to be statistically signicant in the determination of the time
until default of these start-up rms. The only relevant exception seems to
be the turnover ratio. Firms with lower turnover ratios should default sooner
than other rms. Interestingly, none of the macroeconomic variables tested is
signicant. Hence, macroeconomic conditions are not relevant in explaining
the time until default for start-up rms, in contrast to the results obtained
when examining the determinants of default probabilities for the full sample.
Finally, in order to complete our analysis, we estimated parametric dura-
tion models, using several dierent distribution functions (namely, exponential,
Weibull, Gompertz, lognormal, and log-logistic). The results for one of the es-
42Though higher leverage ratios are usually associated with higher default probabilities,
as discussed above, in the rst years of the rm’s life a high level of indebtedness may
be required to fund its initial investments, without implying necessarily a higher default
probability. Nevertheless, for an older rm, a highly leveraged nancial structure, when
combined with a deterioration in other nancial ratios, may signal increased credit risk, as
illustrated in the regressions presented for the full sample.
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timated models for the sub-sample of start-up rms are displayed in Table 3.8.
The estimated coe!cients are broadly robust across the dierent distribution
functions considered and do not dier substantially from those obtained using
a Cox proportional hazard model. It should be noted that some of the esti-
mated coe!cients are displayed as proportional hazard ratios (PH), whereas
others are presented as accelerated failure-time coe!cients (AFT). The latter
present signs opposite to those obtained with the Cox models because they
have a dierent interpretation. Accelerated failure-time models change the
time scale by a factor of h{s([l), in a general model. A positive coe!-
cient implies an acceleration of time, which is the same as an increase in the
expected waiting time until default. The Akaike information criteria (AIC)
suggests that the Weibull and the log-logistic distributions are the ones which
provide more accurate results.
138
Chapter 3 Credit risk drivers
Gompertz Lognormal Log-log istic Cox model
PH AFT PH AFT PH AFT AFT
ROA 0.993 0.007 0.989 0.003 0.989 0.004 0.003 0.992
-2.25 2.25 -2.94 2.36 -2.96 2.34 2.34 -2.31
Solvency ratio 1.002 -0.002 1.005 -0.001 1.005 -0.001 -0.001 1.003
0.71 -0.71 1.22 -1.30 1.22 -0.58 -1.25 0.78
Investment rate 0.994 0.006 0.996 0.001 0.996 0.000 0.001 0.994
-1.04 1.04 -0.72 0.78 -0.71 -0.15 0.72 -1.02
Liquidity ratio 0.990 0.010 0.990 0.002 0.989 0.003 0.002 0.990
-4.06 4.06 -4.04 2.93 -4.07 3.23 2.94 -4.04
Constant - 3.151 - 2.093 - 2.443 2.079 -
9.59 13.42 11.36 13.63
Log-l ikel ihood -261.0 -261.0 -237.6 -237.6 -245.1 -241.3 -237.8 -435.3
No. o f observations 3847 3847 3847 3847 3847 3847 3847 3847
No. o f subjects 2324 2324 2324 2324 2324 2324 2324 2324
No. o f fa i lures 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68
Time at risk 3847 3847 3847 3847 3847 3847 3847 3847
LR chi2 33.3 33.3 44.2 259.9 42.9 146.8 248.1 34.2
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AIC 542.06 542.06 497.20 497.20 512.15 504.68 497.58
Exponentia l Weibul l
Table 3.8 - Parametric survival models for new firms, robust
Note: z-scores in italics. New firms are defined as those created from 1996 onwards. All regressions include year control
dummies. The models presented in this table were estimated parametrically, using the exponential, Weibull, Gompertz,
log-normal and log-logistic distributions, using robust variance estimates. PH stands for proportional hazard ratios. In
this case, an estimated coefficient lower than 1 should be interpreted as contributing to lower default probabilities or,
more precisely, to a longer time until default eventually occurs. In turn, AFT stands for accelerated failure-time
coefficients. A positive coefficient implies an acceleration of time, which is the same as an increase in the expected
waiting time until default. The LR/Wald test evaluates the overall significance of the estimated coefficients. AIC stands
for Akaike Information Criteria.
Finally, an additional eort conducted to overcome the left-censoring prob-
lem was to gather information from the Central Credit Register on loan de-
faults observed between 1980 and 1995 for the rms included in the sample.
As a result, 226 new defaults were taken into account. Using this new infor-
mation, we still declare that rms are at risk since their creation date, though
now we can observe their failure since 1980. Hence, if a rm defaulted be-
tween 1980 and 1995, it will now be excluded from the regressions, given that
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it failed before entering our observation window. Using this additional infor-
mation allows to fully overcome the left-censoring problem, given that we can
argue that a default that occurred before 1980 will hardly condition the rm’s
default probability from 1996 onwards. The results using this default history
are broadly consistent with those obtained when the full default history was
not taken into account. Hence, though we have concluded that rms with
previous defaults are more likely to default again in the future, the inclusion
of a longer default history does not seem to seriously aect regression results.
3.5 Concluding remarks
This chapter focused on the determinants of credit risk, both at an aggregate
and at a rm-specic level. On one hand, we tried to understand how system-
atic factors, which simultaneously aect all rms, condition the evolution of
aggregate default rates. On the other hand, we examined how rms’ specic
characteristics aect their default probabilities.
We started by exploring the links between credit risk and macroeconomic
developments at an aggregate level. The results obtained suggest that there are
some important links between credit risk and macroeconomic developments. In
fact, these results seem to conrm the hypothesis that in periods of economic
growth, which are sometimes accompanied by strong credit growth, there may
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be some tendency towards excessive risk-taking. However, the imbalances
created in such periods only become apparent when economic growth slows
down.
After examining the determinants of credit risk at an aggregate level, we
focused our attention on an extensive dataset with detailed nancial informa-
tion for more than 30.000 rms, which also includes their loan default record.
The results obtained suggest that default probabilities are in uenced by sev-
eral rm-specic characteristics, such as their nancial structure, protability
and liquidity, as well as by their recent sales performance or their investment
policy. After controlling for the most relevant rm-characteristics, the rm’s
dimension does not seem to contribute to explain dierences in default frequen-
cies, though there are some important dierences between economic sectors.
Lagged information on the rm’s nancial situation over a short period also
seems to be important in explaining why do some rms default on their loan
commitments. Furthermore, the rm’s default history should be taken into ac-
count in the assessment of its credit risk, given that rms which recorded loan
defaults in the recent past seem to display much higher default probabilities
than other rms.
Finally, when time-eect controls or macroeconomic variables are taken
into account together with the rm-specic information, the results of the
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models improve considerably. The results obtained allow us to conclude that
macroeconomic dynamics have an important additional (and independent)
contribution in explaining why do rms default. Hence, even though the de-
terminants of loan default at the micro level are ultimately driven by the rms’
specic nancial situation, there are important relationships between overall
macroeconomic conditions and default rates, which should be assessed from a
nancial stability perspective.
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CHAPTER 4
4 What happens after corporate default? Styl-
ized facts on access to credit
4.1 Introduction
By granting credit, banks play a crucial role in the economy as liquidity
providers (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983)43. Virtually all loans granted by banks
have a positive default probability, which is taken into account by banks in
their pricing decisions. In the previous chapter we focused on which factors
may lead rms to default. The main contribution to the vast literature on
credit risk determinants was related to the analysis of the role of macroeco-
nomic conditions on default probabilities44. However, even though this litera-
ture expanded a lot during the last decade, there is surprisingly scarce evidence
on what happens to rms after they default. In this chapter, we aim to ll this
gap in the literature by studying two broad questions: What happens to rms
43This chapter is based on joint work with Daniel Dias and Christine Richmond, published
as Bonm, D., D. Dias and C. Richmond (2012), What happens after corporate default?
Stylized facts on access to credit, Journal of Banking and Finance, 36(7), 2012, pp. 2007-
2025.
44For a review of the literature on factors in uencing rm default see, for example, Du!e
and Singleton (2003) or Saunders and Allen (2002).
143
Chapter 4 What happens after corporate default?
post-default? And when are rms able to regain access to nancial markets
after experiencing an episode of nancial distress/ default?
These questions should be interesting in any context, but the increase in
bank loan delinquencies and defaults worldwide surrounding the 2008-2009
global nancial crisis makes this research even more relevant. How many of
these rms will be able to overcome nancial distress and regain access to
credit? Which factors may be more relevant in this process? Do default
characteristics in uence the likelihood of regaining access to credit markets?
By answering these questions, we hope to provide relevant and timely empirical
evidence on this issue. We contribute to the existing literature by establishing
a set of stylized facts regarding the trajectory of rms post-default. We focus
not only on the duration of nancial distress but also on the ability to re-access
credit markets.
To answer the questions mentioned above, we use a unique dataset from
Portugal, the Central Credit Register (CRC), which covers virtually all bank
loans granted to Portuguese rms between 1995 and 2008.45 This time pe-
45We acknowledge that bank credit is not the only source of external nancing that is
available to Portuguese rms. Nevertheless, and similarly to what happens in the rest of
Europe, bank credit is the main source of external nancing for Portuguese (and European)
rms. According to the results of the ECB "Survey on the access to nance of small and
medium-sized enterprises in the euro area" for H2-2009, 70% of Euro area SMEs report using
a bank loan, overdraft, or line of credit during the last 6 months, compared to market-based
nancing (where only 2.2% of SMEs had issued debt or equity securities) and to trade credit
(24% of SMEs) (ECB, 2010).
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riod captures a full credit cycle with a variety of macroeconomic conditions,
including the convergence process to the European Monetary Union and the
2008 nancial crisis. The CRC collects information on all loans undertaken
by each rm with any nancial institution in Portugal. One of its main goals
is to support participating credit institutions in the assessment of credit risk.
The information shared between banks within the scope of this database should
therefore have an important role in reducing the traditional information asym-
metry problems between borrowers and lenders.46
Our results are organized in two parts: 1) “in default” and 2) “post default”
periods. With respect to the “in default” period we nd that i) 50% of default
episodes last 5 quarters or less and, of these, half are resolved in less than 1
or 2 quarters; ii) at the same time, we also observe that if a default episode is
not solved in less than 1 year it can take several years to be cleared; iii) the
duration of the default is linked to its severity, that is, the more signicant
the default, the longer it takes to be resolved; iv) not all bank loan default
episodes generate write-os for the banks: only 31% of default events lead to
write-os; and v) of those loans that lead to a write-o, the average loss for
46Jappelli and Pagano (1993, 2006) note that public credit registries have the benets
of: (i) improving banks’ knowledge of applicants’ characteristics, reducing adverse selec-
tion problems; (ii) reducing the "informational rents" that banks could otherwise charge
customers; (iii) act as a borrower discipline device; and (iv) eliminate or reduce borrowers’
incentives to become "over-indebted", derived from simultaneously borrowing from multiple
lenders.
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the bank is 34%.
Regarding the “post default” period our results show that i) in the rst
quarter after exiting default, 59% of rms have access to credit but, of these,
less than one quarter are able to increase their bank debt; ii) if a rm is not
able to regain access to credit in the rst year after exiting default, then the
likelihood of obtaining credit at any given moment is less than 1%; iii) the
duration of exclusion is strongly related to the severity of the default episode.
That is, the larger the amount defaulted on, the larger the written-o amount,
or the longer the default period, the longer is the period of exclusion; iv) re-
access mostly occurs through banks with whom the rm had ongoing lending
relationships before the default was resolved; v) there is a high degree of
recidivism: one year after clearing the default, almost 25% of rms default
again on their bank loan(s); and vi) rms that are able to exit default during
recession periods regain access to credit faster and are less likely to default
again.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: in Section 4.2 we review
some of the relevant literature, focusing primarily on empirical ndings, and
in Section 4.3 we describe the data. Our main results are analyzed in two
separate sections: in Section 4.4 we examine what happens to rms when they
are in default, while in Section 4.5 we focus our analysis on what happens to
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rms after they are no longer classied as being in default. Finally, in Section
4.6 we conclude.
4.2 Related literature
The bulk of empirical research on rm default and recovery after nancial dis-
tress focuses on publicly traded rms in the United States, with an emphasis on
bankruptcy reorganization and liquidation procedures.47 For instance, Franks
and Torous (1989), Platt and Platt (1991), Bandopadhyaya (1994), Helwege
(1999), and Denis and Rodgers (2007) all consider samples of publicly traded
rms that le for Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization to analyze the eect
of various regressors on the duration of default. The time in default ranges
from 16-32 months on average, but size (measured by liabilities, number of
employees, or number of creditors) is an important determinant of the dura-
tion of default, with smaller rms exiting sooner (Denis and Rodgers, 2007;
Morrison, 2007).
Post default performance of large rms appears to be poor. On average,
only 29% of rms in Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization successfully reor-
47Our literature review focuses on research related to what happens to rms after an
episode of nancial distress. However, there are also some relevant papers that examine
post-distress patterns amongst other borrower types, namely personal bankruptcy (Cohen-
Cole et al., 2009 and Han and Li, 2011), commercial real estate loans (Brown et al., 2006)
and home mortgages (Adelino et al., 2013 and Haughwout et al., 2009).
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ganize each year, but Hotchkiss et al. (2008) note that many of the conrmed
reorganizations are, in fact, liquidation plans. Analysis of post-bankruptcy
cash  ows for 89 rms by Alderson and Betker (1999) corroborates earlier
ndings by Hotchkiss (1995), LoPucki and Whitford (1993), and Hotchkiss
and Mooradian (1997) that operating margins are poor and debt ratios are
above industry median levels post-bankruptcy. As a consequence of this per-
formance, recidivism rates are high, with one-quarter to one-third of rms
subsequently restructuring their debt within ve years of initially emerging
from bankruptcy. Acharya et al. (2007) also nd that creditor recoveries are
signicantly lower when the rm in default operates in a distressed industry.
It is clear that the experiences of publicly traded US rms are not repre-
sentative of the overall universe of US rms, which, on average, have only 20
employees (Axtell, 2001). However, few papers examine small or privately-held
rms; Berkowitz and White (2004) is one notable exception. The authors con-
sider how personal bankruptcy procedures aect small rms’ access to credit
in an environment where unincorporated rms debts are the liabilities of the
rm owner. Therefore, if the rm fails, the owner can le for bankruptcy, and
business and unsecured personal debts will be discharged. Using variation in
personal bankruptcy exemptions across US states, it is found that small busi-
nesses are more likely to be denied credit if they are located in states with
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high homestead exemptions, and if loans are received, the values are smaller,
with higher interest rates.
Analysis on rm default and recovery outside of the US is limited, but such
analysis is important since bankruptcy and liquidation procedures vary across
the world. In general, Claessens and Klapper (2005) nd that corporate bank-
ruptcy ling rates are higher in countries with more e!cient judicial systems.
Davydenko and Franks (2008) nd that banks in France, Germany, and the
UK signicantly adjust their lending and reorganization to the national bank-
ruptcy code, in response to dierent degrees of creditor protection. At the
time of loan origination, collateral requirements will directly re ect a bank’s
ability to realize assets upon default. As a result, adjustments by banks will
be able to reduce, but not fully eliminate, the eect of the bankruptcy code
on default outcomes.
Evidence on the duration and severity of defaults by rms outside the US
is also scarce. Franks and Sussman (2005) consider a sample of 542 small-
and medium-sized nancially distressed UK rms that are transferred to their
bank’s workout unit, nding that, on average, these rms spend 7.5 months
in the bank’s workout unit and 60% of rms in the sample operate as going
concerns. Secured creditors in the country fare well within the formal corporate
bankruptcy regime and 75% of small rms that default subsequently enter
149
Chapter 4 What happens after corporate default?
formal bankruptcy receivership, while average bank recovery rates are 75%,
as rm assets are pledged as collateral to banks in most cases. In a study of
Sweden’s auction bankruptcy system for small rms, Thorburn (2000) nds
that three-quarters of rms are auctioned as going concerns, and the direct
costs average 6.4% of pre-ling value of assets, suggesting that it is an e!cient
restructuring mechanism for small rms. In Portugal, Antunes (2005) nds
that the severity of default in uences the probability of liquidation, but that
the number of employees is the largest determinant of the time prole of the
liquidation/ recovery process.48
Finally, another important dimension of the costs of corporate default are
the losses incurred directly (and indirectly) by banks. The implementation of
Basel II contributed to some expansion of the literature on recovery rates and
loss given default (LGD). Some examples are Altman et al. (2005), Carvalho
and Dermine (2006), Bruche and González-Aguado (2010), and Bastos (2010).
All in all, most of the existing literature on corporate default and recovery
after nancial distress focuses on US publicly traded rms. Evidence on small
and medium enterprises, especially outside the US, is also relatively scarce.
Moreover, most of this literature focuses on bankruptcy, liquidation and re-
organization procedures. Our work makes a contribution to ll both of these
48In Appendix 1 we compare the bankruptcy codes of Portugal and the US.
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gaps in the literature: we analyze the entire universe of rms with access to
bank loans in a European country; and we focus on a broader event related to
nancial distress, corporate loan default.
4.3 Data
The main data source for this chapter is the Central Credit Register (CRC)
database of the Banco de Portugal. Portuguese law mandates that all nancial
institutions operating in Portugal report, on a monthly basis, to the Banco de
Portugal all loans above 50 euros and all this information is kept in the CRC
database. In addition to the information on the amounts, this database also
has information on other loan characteristics. It is possible to know if the loan
is a joint or single liability, or if it is an o-balance sheet item (such as the
undrawn amount of a credit line or a credit card). More importantly for the
purposes of our study, the database includes information on loan defaults and
renegotiations. All nancial institutions operating in Portugal are obliged to
report data to the CRC and are allowed to consult information on their current
and prospective borrowers, with their consent. As a result, when granting a
new loan, a bank can easily observe whether the applicant has any amount
of credit overdue at that moment, as well as the total amount borrowed from
dierent banks.
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Using information contained in the CRC between 1995 and 2008, we iden-
tify all rms that record at least one episode of default during this period.49
In the CRC, a default can be classied as a loan with late repayment (coded
as Type 7 in the database) or as a liability involving litigation (coded as Type
8).50 We consider that there is a default only when a rm has a loan recorded
in either of these two categories for an entire quarter. This avoids mining the
data with very short-lived episodes, which are most likely caused by reporting
errors or problems with bank transfers.51
A default is recorded by a bank in the Credit Register whenever a rm has
overdue principal or interest for more than 90 days. It should be noted that a
default is usually driven by a rm’s decision: facing liquidity constraints, the
rm nds itself in a situation in which it cannot honor its commitments and
chooses to default on a loan with a given bank (or with several). It is also
possible that the rm defaults for strategic reasons (Bolton and Scharfstein,
1990, 1996). Nevertheless, when a rm is in nancial distress, the bank may
49We exclude unincorporated businesses from this analysis, as their assets are not au-
tonomous from those of the owner. For statistical purposes, these businesses are usually
classied as households.
50The borrowers may be in arrears in relation to the principal and/or interest and other
costs. For the principal, there is a default if at least 30 days have elapsed from the due date.
For interest and other costs, there is a default from the date on which payments should have
been made.
51We do not include loan write-os in the denition of default, even though this informa-
tion is also available in the CRC. This choice is motivated by the fact that when a bank
writes-o a loan from its books it is implicitly assuming that the probability of repayment
is very small, though still positive.
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avoid forcing the rm to default if, for example, the loan is renegotiated or
restructured.
Our unit of observation is a rm-quarter pair. Using quarterly data for the
period 1995-2008, there are more than 1 million default observations, referring
to 165,165 dierent default episodes in more than 100,000 rms.52 We consider
that a rm emerges from default when it does not record a default on bank
loans in a given quarter, but was in default during the entire previous quarter.
This may mean that the rm is observed in the CRC but with no records
referring to outstanding defaults, or that the rm is no longer present in the
CRC. This latter possibility may imply that the rm closed or that it continues
to operate but without access to bank credit.
The amount and quality of the information available are superior to that
used in most papers focusing on default recoveries, which usually analyze only
a limited set of publicly traded rms, thus allowing us to conduct a richer
analysis.53
52We do not have information strictly on a loan-by-loan basis, as banks report information
for each borrower aggregated by loan type.
53In Portugal there are less than 100 publicly traded companies, while in 2008 there were
more than 350,000 rms operating in the country. This number highlights how partial and
incomplete the results would be if our study focused only on the set of publicly traded
companies.
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4.4 What happens while rms are in default?
During the last decade, the literature on the determinants of rm default
increased dramatically, in part driven by the discussion and subsequent imple-
mentation of Basel II. However, much less attention has been devoted to the
dynamics of the default process itself and, more importantly, to what happens
to rms after they fail to comply with their debt obligations. In this section
we explore the richness of the information contained in the CRC database to
analyze in detail the evolution of default episodes, from their onset until their
resolution. In Section 4.5 we proceed with our analysis by focusing on what
happens to rms after the default episode is considered resolved.
In general, a corporate default episode can be characterized by three ele-
ments: 1) incidence and amount of the default; 2) the length of the default
event; and 3) the losses ultimately faced by the nancial institution. Better
understanding these three elements is of great interest because they have a
direct impact on how nancial institutions manage their risk exposure and
how regulatory agencies design their policies. Below, we analyze each of these
elements.
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4.4.1 Default incidence and amounts
The rst question we address is how the default incidence and the correspond-
ing amounts evolved in Portugal during the sample period, 1995 to 2008. In
Table 4.1 we present various statistics regarding the amounts and the incidence
of bank loan defaults over time.





new fi rms 
with a loan
Number Mean (euros) Number Number % Mean 
(euros)
As a % 
of total 
credit







As a % of the 
number of firms 
with a loan 
(default rate)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1995 126,590 384,566 29,153 17,719 14.0 190,124 72.1 69.8 5,543 45,741 4.4
1996 138,471 382,397 24,530 18,353 13.3 188,366 74.7 72.4 6,634 64,970 4.8
1997 149,890 401,970 23,981 19,221 12.8 159,071 74.4 72.0 7,086 47,246 4.7
1998 164,463 425,245 26,560 18,854 11.5 147,865 74.0 71.6 6,000 42,107 3.6
1999 183,340 478,633 28,085 17,531 9.6 142,006 72.5 69.8 7,454 41,767 4.1
2000 202,693 534,377 27,440 19,485 9.6 118,813 69.6 67.1 8,213 24,165 4.1
2001 227,642 546,375 33,979 24,880 10.9 108,053 61.5 59.6 11,997 31,827 5.3
2002 253,211 568,362 35,010 29,122 11.5 98,057 59.2 56.8 15,522 32,089 6.1
2003 262,423 544,646 26,312 31,522 12.0 92,733 58.2 55.7 14,578 22,903 5.6
2004 272,855 523,897 24,253 33,322 12.2 83,908 59.9 57.2 13,353 24,502 4.9
2005 279,364 535,183 22,987 33,189 11.9 75,962 62.7 59.8 12,903 29,974 4.6
2006 288,852 556,805 25,633 34,440 11.9 73,246 60.6 57.9 14,983 22,058 5.2
2007 300,161 575,760 28,496 40,198 13.4 66,348 60.0 57.3 20,629 24,615 6.9
2008 307,840 608,527 25,442 45,120 14.7 74,241 60.5 57.8 20,270 35,721 6.6
Total 479,298 525,118 381,861 108,479 12.1 105,142 64.1 61.5 165,165 31,919 5.2
Number o f 
fi rms with 
a loan
Notes: Default is defined as the sum of liabilities with late repayments and of loans in litigation. We consider that there is a default only when a firm records a
loan in any of these two categories for an entire quarter. Column (1) refers to the total number of firms with a loan, in each quarter and column (2) shows the
average amount outstanding of each firm. Column (3) presents the number of new firms with a loan in each quarter, defined as firms that were not observed in
the CRC previously, during the sample period. The firms that were borrowing in 1995Q1 are not considered as new firms in 1995. Column (4) refers to the
number of firms that, in each quarter, record any amount in default. Column (5) presents the percentage of firms in default, computed as the ratio between the
number of firms in default (column 4) and the total number of firms with a loan (column 1), in each quarter. The percentage for the total is the weighted
average for the whole sample period. Column (6) refers to the average amount in default during the quarter. In column (7), the credit overdue ratio is defined as
the sum of loans in late repayment and in litigation at the end of each quarter, as a percentage of total credit granted to that firm. In column (8) this definition
is extended to include off-balance sheet liabilities in the denominator of this ratio (these include the unused amounts of credit lines, for instance). The new
episodes of default reported in columns (9), (10) and (11) refer to defaults recorded by firms without any default in the previous quarter. We exclude firms that
were in default in 1995Q1. In column (11) we present the number of new default episodes as a percentage of the number of firms with a loan (column 1), i.e., the
default rate. 
Number o f 






of fi rms in 
default
New episodes o f defaultCredit overdue ratios 
for fi rms in default
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Several interesting results arise from the analysis of this table. First, dur-
ing our sample period there was a substantial expansion of credit to rms in
Portugal, as shown by the signicant increase in the number of rms with
access to loans (column 1). As discussed in Antão et al. (2009), the liberal-
ization of the Portuguese nancial system in the late 1980s and early 1990s
created the conditions for an expansion of credit granted to the private sector.
This growth was fuelled by the signicant decrease in bank lending interest
rates during the 1990s as the economy gradually converged to meet the euro
accession criteria. The participation in the euro area improved the funding
conditions of Portuguese banks in international wholesale markets, with vir-
tually no exchange rate risk, thus further contributing to improve the access
of Portuguese non-nancial rms to bank loans. Against this background,
loans granted to non-nancial rms increased by an average annual rate of
12% during these years, re ecting not only an increase in the amount of loans
granted to each rm (column 2), but also an increase in the number of rms
with access to credit (column 3). In fact, around 80% of the rms analyzed
started to have access to credit after 1995Q1.
Second, at the same time credit expanded in Portugal, the incidence of non-
performing loans had a U-shaped path (column 5). Between 1995 and 2000
there was a signicant decrease (from 14% to 9.6%), but between 2000 and
156
Chapter 4 What happens after corporate default?
2008 this rate increased almost every year and reached a higher level than what
was experienced in 1995. Although the default incidence had a U-shaped path,
the default rate had an upward trend, most notably from 2001 onwards, with
the period average equal to 5.2% (column 11).54 Default rates peaked in 2002,
possibly re ecting the increase in interest rates and the marked slowdown of
economic activity after 2000. Most of these new defaults correspond to smaller
rms, as shown by the evolution of amounts in default (column 10). Hence,
despite the increase in default frequencies, its aggregate magnitude decreased
during most of the sample period (see Antão et al., 2009).
Third, the average amounts involved in the default episode decreased ini-
tially — from 1995 to 2000/2001 — and remained fairly constant for the rest
of the period. For the entire period the average amount in default is 105,142
euros (column 6). On average, at the beginning of a default episode, the
amount overdue is 31,919 euros (column 10). The decrease of the amounts
in default during the sample period does not necessarily suggest that defaults
became less severe, as the average rm size in the sample also decreased over
time. Therefore, to better evaluate how the severity of default evolves during
the sample period, in columns (7) and (8) we present the credit overdue ratio
54These two variables, default incidence and default rate, have dierent paths because
during the sample period the duration of the “in default” period was not constant.
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for rms in default (the latter column includes o-balance sheet liabilities).55
This ratio stands, on average, at 64 % (62% if o-balance sheet liabilities are
included), having decreased steadily during the rst half of the time period
under analysis. Therefore, even though defaults became more frequent, their
size and severity decreased simultaneously during our sample period.
In sum, during the period 1995-2008, Portugal experienced a rapid expan-
sion of credit to rms. In the rst half of this period (1995-2000/2001), there
was a steady decrease in the incidence rate of non-performing loans, but in
the second half of the period it increased to values similar to those observed
in 1995. The default rate had a more volatile behavior, mirroring to some
extent overall economic conditions. The year of 2007 marked the beginning
of the tensions in global nancial markets and, not surprisingly, we observe
that since then there has been an increase in the default incidence rate, as well
as an increase of the average amount in default. However, the credit overdue
ratios in 2007 and 2008 are not very dierent from previous years. As these
ratios are dened as the amount of credit overdue as a percentage of total
outstanding loans, the increase of the average amount in default suggests that
rms in default during this more recent period are slightly larger than before.
55These o-balance sheet liabilities include, for example, the undrawn amount of credit
lines.
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4.4.2 Time in default
The second aspect of the “in default” period we consider is its length. That
is, after a rm is declared to be in default to a bank, how long does it take
until a bank declares that the rm is no longer in default? Figure 4.1 shows
how the default duration evolved over time.


































From Figure 4.1 we see that the default duration is not extremely long.
Overall, more than 50% of rms exit default in 5 quarters or less and more
than 25% of rms exit default in 2 quarters or less. Over time, the median
duration does not vary signicantly, ranging between 3 and 6 quarters. The
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rst quartile of the distribution of default durations remains unchanged during
the full period. Regarding the rest of the distribution, the story is somewhat
dierent. In particular, the 25% longest default spells are longer than 14
quarters and during the sample period this number oscillates between 11 and
15 quarters.
If severity and length of the default episodes are positively correlated, then
it seems that over time the importance of the least problematic events did
not change much. We reach this conclusion because we see that the rst
quartile of the default duration distribution is fairly stable throughout the
sample period. On the other hand, from the variability of the third quartile of
the default distribution, it seems that the importance of the more severe cases
oscillated signicantly during the sample period.
To complement the results in Figure 4.1, we present estimates of the sur-
vival and hazard functions for the “in default” period (Figures 4.2 and 4.3).56
From these gures, two important results emerge. First, default spells can
be very long. Even though the third quartile of the distribution is less than
56The survival function is dened as the probability of remaining in default until w:
V(w) = Pr(W  w) = 1  I (w). The hazard function is dened as the probability of
a rm leaving default in the time interval [w> w + gw), conditional on being in default:
k(w) = lim Pr(wWw+gw|Ww)gw > gw$ 0. W denotes the time a rm remains in default.
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Figure 4.2: Default duration
Note: Analysis time defined as quarters since the beginning of the
first default episode. The survivor estimate is defined as the
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Figure 4.3: Hazard function for the time in default
Note: Analysis time defined as quarters since the beginning of the
first default episode. The hazard function is defined as the
probability of a firm leaving default in the time interval [t
t+dt ), conditional on being in default: h(t ) = lim
Prob(t<=T<t+dt | T>=t )/dt , as dt ->0. In the figure, the
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14 quarters, more than 10% of episodes last more than 24 quarters (6 years).
This result is visible in the survival function (Figure 4.2). Second, the exit rate
of default drops sharply in the rst 2 years, from around 20% to slightly more
than 6%. This is important because it suggests that when a default episode
is not resolved within the rst four to six quarters, then it takes substantially
longer to be resolved.
An interesting question is how the default amounts evolve as default dura-
tion increases. Tables 4.2A and 4.2B shed light on this question.
Table 4 .2A - Evolution o f the firms' si tuation since the beginning of the default episode
Number of 
observations
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median




1 165,165 31,919 2,870 37.9 13.9 375,300 30,170 2.47 2.0 1.3 1.0 68.9 66.7
2 110,208 48,675 5,000 49.9 36.9 327,402 26,302 2.37 2.0 1.4 1.0 75.2 100.0
3 86,674 63,107 7,071 58.4 67.3 315,105 24,890 2.32 2.0 1.5 1.0 79.2 100.0
4 70,016 77,239 9,510 64.4 88.4 307,386 25,115 2.31 2.0 1.6 1.0 82.0 100.0
5 60,348 87,083 11,220 69.5 98.9 296,448 24,753 2.28 2.0 1.7 1.0 84.3 100.0
6 50,377 96,381 12,450 72.8 100.0 332,136 24,773 2.29 2.0 1.8 1.0 85.9 100.0
7 42,618 106,597 14,690 75.4 100.0 291,051 26,115 2.31 2.0 1.8 1.0 87.1 100.0
Table 4 .2B - Firm and loan characteristics for defaul t epi sodes with di fferent tota l durations
Number of 
observations
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Total 
duration o f 
default
(in quarters)
1 54,957 20,958 1,730 26.8 6.6 472,415 34,890 2.6 2.0 1.1 1.0 62.3 50.0
2 23,534 24,666 2,290 33.9 10.8 316,803 28,031 2.4 2.0 1.2 1.0 68.1 60.0
3 16,658 27,249 2,340 43.7 20.0 297,521 19,105 2.2 2.0 1.2 1.0 73.3 100.0
4 9,668 32,193 2,860 40.8 17.5 288,447 24,530 2.2 2.0 1.2 1.0 72.9 100.0
5 9,971 39,706 4,228 53.5 49.0 231,072 21,803 2.1 2.0 1.4 1.0 78.8 100.0
6 7,759 23,755 2,610 54.9 56.1 623,269 14,020 2.0 2.0 1.3 1.0 79.4 100.0
7 5,591 36,689 4,190 50.2 34.9 249,616 21,760 2.2 2.0 1.4 1.0 76.9 100.0
8 4,112 43,909 4,110 46.3 27.2 239,700 26,640 2.2 2.0 1.4 1.0 74.7 100.0





rela tionships in 
default
Number of bank relations in 
default (as a  % of the tota l 
number of relationships)
Amount of to ta l 
credit outstanding 
(euros)
Number of bank 
relationships
Number of bank relations in 
default (as a  % of the tota l 
number o f relationships)  a t 
start o f default
Tota l amount of 
credit outstanding  
a t start o f default 
(euros)
Notes: In this table are depicted firm and loan characteristics for firms with different total durations of default (between 1 and 8 quarters). In each line, the variables refer
to the situation at the beginning of the default episode, for firms which default episodes lasted for x quarters. The number of bank relationships is computed as the number
of loans obtained from different financial institutions (including non-monetary financial institutions). 
Amount of credit 
overdue at start 
o f default (euros)
Notes: In this table are depicted firm and loan characteristics for firms that have been in default for 1 quarter (line 1), 2 quarters (line 2), etc., up to 7 quarters. In each
line, the variables refer to the situation in the x quarter after the default episode began. The number of bank relationships is computed as the number of loans obtained
from different financial institutions (including non-monetary financial institutions). 
Credit overdue 
ratio  a t start 
o f default (%)
Number of bank 
rela tionships  at 
start o f default
Number of bank 
rela tionships in 
default  at start 
o f default
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In these two tables we examine two dierent perspectives on default dura-
tion. First, in Table 4.2A we show what happens to the amounts in default,
the credit overdue ratio and the number of bank relationships as the length
of the default period increases. Second, in Table 4.2B we present the same
statistics but in this case at the start of the default event, for rms with dif-
ferent default durations. More specically, in Table 4.2A each row refers to
the current default duration of each rm (rms that have been in default for
1 quarter, 2 quarters, etc., up to 7 quarters), whereas in Table 4.2B each line
refers to rms with dierent total default durations (i.e., rms that recorded
a default episode that lasted for 1 quarter, 2 quarters, etc., up to 8 quarters).
The joint analysis of these two tables indicates two important results: 1)
as the default duration increases the situation worsens; and 2) the rms that
stay longer in default are those with worse initial conditions, compared to
rms that exit faster. Regarding the worsening of the situation (Table 4.2A),
there is a component that is somewhat mechanic, that is, the amounts overdue
automatically accumulate every period. Besides this accumulation eect, there
is also a true worsening of the situation. The amounts overdue and the credit
overdue ratio increase signicantly with each quarter in default. Moreover,
the percentage of bank relationships on which the rm defaults also increases
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with default duration (rms in default borrow, on average, from more than 2
dierent banks).
Regarding the conditions rms enter default with (Table 4.2B), we see that
the credit overdue ratios at the start of the event are larger for rms that ended
up staying longer in default — this is visible in columns (4) and (5). Also, the
total amount outstanding at the start of the default episode is, on average,
larger for rms with shorter default episodes, thus suggesting that larger rms
are able to leave default earlier (columns 6 and 7).
From the analysis of the default period, we conclude that the longer a
rm stays in default the more complicated its situation becomes. Another
important nding is that rms that stay longer in default are also rms whose
conditions at the start of the default are worse.
4.4.3 Losses incurred by banks
The nal aspect of the default period we analyze relates to the losses generated
by the default, that is, how costly can a default episode be for bank lenders.
In our dataset, we only observe one component of this cost: the amounts that
banks declare as write-os. In order to have a better measure of the costs of
default for banks we would need information on legal and processing costs,
as well as on collateral and guarantees that mitigate the losses. Despite the
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caveats of our measure of loss estimates, we still nd it su!ciently interesting
and informative. Table 4.3 shows the evolution of bank losses due to loan
write-os over time.
Table 4 .3 - Estimates o f losses incurred by the banks
N mean p50 p75 p99 N mean p1 p50 p99 N mean p50 p99
% % % % % % % % % % %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
1995 5,880 2.6 0.0 0.0 86.2 553 28.0 0.01 9.4 99.6 3,861 3.2 0.0 88.9
1996 6,229 6.9 0.0 0.0 97.0 1,235 34.7 0.04 19.4 99.9 3,851 8.9 0.0 98.7
1997 6,778 4.8 0.0 0.0 93.3 1,238 26.0 0.02 10.1 99.7 3,925 6.3 0.0 96.6
1998 8,626 8.7 0.0 0.0 99.3 1,805 41.8 0.00 35.0 100.0 5,889 11.5 0.0 99.8
1999 6,042 9.1 0.0 0.0 99.6 1,215 45.3 0.03 38.1 100.0 3,675 14.4 0.0 99.9
2000 6,382 8.5 0.0 0.0 98.9 1,354 40.1 0.02 26.8 99.9 3,501 12.9 0.0 99.5
2001 10,614 9.8 0.0 0.6 99.9 3,397 30.6 0.00 6.5 100.0 4,906 17.6 0.0 100.0
2002 12,234 9.8 0.0 0.7 99.0 3,840 31.2 0.00 8.6 99.9 6,220 17.8 0.0 99.8
2003 11,956 8.4 0.0 0.4 99.3 3,735 27.0 0.00 4.5 99.9 5,655 15.8 0.0 99.8
2004 13,163 11.1 0.0 1.5 99.7 4,627 31.7 0.00 8.0 100.0 6,740 19.2 0.0 99.8
2005 13,662 14.6 0.0 2.9 99.9 5,030 39.7 0.00 17.4 100.0 7,000 26.1 0.0 100.0
2006 14,636 15.4 0.0 4.5 99.9 5,761 39.0 0.00 18.3 100.0 7,230 29.0 1.5 100.0
2007 15,166 11.5 0.0 2.6 99.5 5,686 30.7 0.00 8.4 99.9 5,713 27.8 4.2 99.9
2008 12,945 11.2 0.0 3.1 99.6 4,828 30.1 0.01 10.3 99.9 5,327 25.1 4.2 99.9
Total 144,313 10.3 0.0 0.8 99.7 44,304 33.7 0.00 11.1 100.0 73,493 18.2 0.0 99.9
Notes: Estimates of losses incurred by the banks are based on write-offs and write-downs reported by banks to the Central
Credit Register. These losses do not include recovery costs and do not consider collateral. Losses are displayed as a
percentage of total loans outstanding after the default episode ends (i.e., once the firm does not record late repayments or
loans in litigation in the end of the following quarter). As in previous tables, observations refer to pairs firm-quarters,
which means that these loss estimates do not refer to a specific loan or bank, but to all outstanding credit liabilities of the 
firm. We exclude all observations in 2008Q4, the last quarter in the sample, given that these refer to situations still
unfolding.
Bank losses due to written-
o ff loans:  including al l  loans 
whose default was longer 
than 1  year
Bank losses due to  written-
off loans:  including a l l  loans
Bank losses due to written-o ff 
loans:  only including events 
that orig inated a  write-o ff
In this table we present two main statistics regarding bank losses due to
loan write-os. The rst is the unconditional loss, that is, given all default
episodes, what is the average loss incurred by the bank (columns (1)-(5)). In
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this case we nd that, on average, any given default will generate a loss due
to write-os of 10.3% of the total amount outstanding at the time the default
episode ends. This gure is much lower than the 45% loss given default rate
considered for corporate uncollateralized loans in the foundation approach of
Basel II. However, as we do not have information on collateral or legal costs,
this comparison is not clear-cut.
The second statistic is the conditional loss, that is, given all default episodes
that lead to a write-o, what is the average loss incurred by the bank (columns
(6)-(10)). In this case, the gure is substantially higher, 33.7%, but this large
dierence comes mainly from the fact that most default episodes do not lead to
any write-o (only 30% of default events generate a write-o for the bank).57
Another interesting result is that, over time, the average unconditional loss
has increased gradually (from 3% to 11%), whereas the average conditional loss
has varied signicantly during the sample period (between 26% and 45%). It
should be noted that, to a large extent, the increase in the number of loan
write-os over time re ects a mechanical accumulation process, as some banks
keep loans classied in this category for a long period.
A nal result relates to the duration of the default event and the in icted
loss. In the last 4 columns of Table 4.3 we show that for loans in default for
57The percentage of default events is the ratio between the values in columns (6) and (1)
from Table 3.
166
Chapter 4 What happens after corporate default?
more than 1 year, the unconditional loss almost doubles (18.2% vs. 10.3%).
4.5 What happens after exiting default?
A second question we address in this chapter is what happens to a rm after
leaving default. In particular, we are interested in knowing if rms are able to
borrow again, and if so, how long it takes for this to happen; when a rm is
able to borrow again does it borrow from the same lender or from a dierent
lender; and nally, do rms tend to default again or not?
In Table 4.4 we provide a broad picture with respect to some of these
questions.
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Table 4 .4 - After leaving default
Number % of 
total
Number % of 
total
Number % of 
total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1995 5,880 10.6 2,222 1,764 79.4 1,223 55.0 225 10.1
1996 6,229 10.6 3,769 2,624 69.6 2,075 55.1 492 13.1
1997 6,778 11.4 3,847 2,785 72.4 1,722 44.8 580 15.1
1998 8,626 14.8 4,978 3,190 64.1 2,586 51.9 477 9.6
1999 6,042 11.2 3,491 2,793 80.0 1,597 45.7 389 11.1
2000 6,382 11.2 3,704 3,036 82.0 1,944 52.5 300 8.1
2001 10,614 15.5 6,976 5,827 83.5 3,564 51.1 418 6.0
2002 12,234 14.7 6,997 5,985 85.5 3,436 49.1 594 8.5
2003 11,956 12.9 7,014 6,037 86.1 3,472 49.5 655 9.3
2004 13,163 13.8 7,578 6,660 87.9 3,202 42.3 694 9.2
2005 13,662 13.5 7,433 6,359 85.6 3,204 43.1 778 10.5
2006 14,636 14.7 7,942 6,861 86.4 - - - -
2007 15,166 13.6 8,860 7,201 81.3 - - - -
2008 12,945 10.0 7,668 6,059 79.0 - - - -
Total 144,313 12.8 82,479 67,181 81.5 28,025 48.3 5602 9.7
Number % of total Number % of total Number % of 
total
Number % of 
total
Number % of total
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19)
1995 330 20.5 780 48.4 27 1.7 17 1.1 458 28.4
1996 641 16.5 1,748 44.9 313 8.0 49 1.3 1,145 29.4
1997 604 16.5 1,692 46.2 176 4.8 130 3.5 1,062 29.0
1998 538 11.6 1,701 36.7 209 4.5 396 8.5 1,788 38.6
1999 761 20.0 1,533 40.2 367 9.6 451 11.8 698 18.3
2000 545 15.3 1,624 45.6 238 6.7 487 13.7 668 18.8
2001 1,189 18.2 3,149 48.2 582 8.9 462 7.1 1,149 17.6
2002 1,091 16.2 3,713 55.0 471 7.0 466 6.9 1,012 15.0
2003 957 13.4 3,950 55.3 528 7.4 735 10.3 977 13.7
2004 752 9.8 3,674 48.0 873 11.4 1,438 18.8 918 12.0
2005 577 8.6 3,274 49.0 685 10.2 1,076 16.1 1,074 16.1
2006 662 7.9 3,149 37.4 1,185 14.1 2,352 27.9 1,081 12.8
2007 985 11.5 3,800 44.4 676 7.9 1,442 16.8 1,659 19.4
2008 920 9.6 4,235 44.4 1,025 10.7 1,751 18.4 1,609 16.9
Total 10,552 12.8 38,022 46.1 7,355 8.9 11,252 13.6 15,298 18.5
Firms that continue 
in the credit register 
in the quarter after 
their first default 
ends
Firms that record 
a new default 
episode in the 3 
years after exiting 
default




a % of 
defaults in 
each year
Not in credit 
register
Firms with more 
access and without 
problem loans
Notes: A default episode is considered resolved if there is no record of loans with late repayments or in litigation in the 
end of the following quarter. We exclude firms that were in default in 2008Q4, the last quarter in the sample. The 
definition of first defaults only takes into account information since 1995.  Column (2) considers the number of default 
episodes terminated as a % of the number of observations in default. In columns (6) to (9) there is no information for 
the last 3 years given that a 3 year window is used. After default, firms can either continue to be observed in the credit 
register (columns 4 and 10-17) or they can cease to appear in the CRC (column 18). In the latter case firms can have 
either ceased to operate or they can still be in operation but without having access to loans from financial institutions. 
By construction, there are no firms in default in the quarter after the default episode ended. Firms with more access are 
those with more outstanding bank loans (including credit lines) than at the end of the default episode and without any 
record of default or write-offs. Firms with less access than before are those which have the same or less loans outstanding 
that at the end of the default episode.
Without access or 
closed
Firms with access 
but still with 
written-off loans
Firms only with 
written-off loans 
(no access)
Firms with access (but 
less than before)
Firms that are 
not in the CRC 
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The rst three columns of Table 4.4 show the number of default episodes
that are resolved every year. Even though this number increased substantially
during the sample period, the “exit rate” from default was relatively stable
during the same timeframe.58 To compute these numbers (the number of
default episodes resolved and the default “exit rate”), we count all rms that
were in default in period w  1 and were not in period w, taking into account
only the rst default episode of each rm during the sample period.
Once a rm leaves default, there are two main possibilities: either the rm
continues to be present in the Credit Register in the quarter after the rst
default episode has been resolved (column 4); or it ceases to be reported by
banks (column 18). In the latter case, the lack of presence in the CRC may
re ect the fact that the rm ceased to operate. However, it is also possible that
rms survive without having access to bank loans. A rough estimate suggests
that at least 12% of the rms that disappear from the CRC after default are
still operating afterwards. This may either re ect an inability to regain access
to bank credit after default or, alternatively, it may be a decision made by
the rms, which may prefer to use internal funds or trade credit to nance
themselves. These eects are not easily disentangled.59
58In 2008 the value is substantially lower than for the other years because the last quarter
of 2008 was excluded from the analysis.
59This estimate was conducted by searching for the rms that are not in the CRC in the 3
years after default (column 8) in another dataset, Quadros de Pessoal. This database covers
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One of the most surprising results we obtain when analyzing post-default
behavior is that almost half of the rms that resolve their rst default episode
record at least one more default episode in the following 3 years (column 7).
The intensity of this recidivist behavior is impressive, especially taking into
account that information on loan defaults is shared between banks using the
CRC.60 It appears that banks are generally willing to continue to grant loans
to rms after they resolve an episode of nancial distress, despite facing re-
markably high default probabilities. From this data we cannot tell whether
recidivism is caused by nancial (inability to borrow) or by economic (insol-
vency) problems. If nancial problems are the main reason, then there is
mutual interest of the lender and the borrower to overcome the problems that
may be originating the default, whereas if the problems are economic then it
should be optimal to not lend to the rm.61
We can distinguish between two types of re-access: i) simple access (sum-
all Portuguese rms with more than 10 employees. Hence, the estimate presented is a lower
bound for the number of rms that no longer have access to credit markets after default.
From the 5602 rms that cannot be found in the CRC in the 3 years after the default is
cleared (considering only defaults resolved until 2006), at least 686 rms are found to still be
operating, but without having access to bank loans. Given this, the maximum bankruptcy
or liquidation rate after default is around 8%, thus showing that most rms are able to
overcome a default episode.
60It should be noted that the history of past default episodes is not available to banks
participating in the CRC, who can only observe whether rms are currently in default.
61Adelino et al. (2009) and Haughwout et al. (2009) nd evidence of signicant recidi-
vism problems in mortgages (the latter paper focuses on subprime loans). In both papers,
the authors examine the interaction between renegotiation and the incentives for repeated
defaults.
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ming up columns 10 and 12); and ii) increased access (considering only column
10). In the former case, we consider that the rm regains access simply if it
continues to have access to any bank loans after the default is cleared (we re-
fer to this denition as “broad access”).62 In the latter, we consider a stricter
access denition and take into account only those cases in which the rm had
access to a new loan after default (“strict access”). Since we do not have
information on a loan-by-loan basis, we consider all cases in which the total
amount outstanding is larger than that observed when the default ended.63
Focusing on what happens in the quarter immediately after the rms’ rst
default episode is resolved, we observe that access rates depend crucially on
the access denition we use. In the case of strict access, only 13% of rms
were able to increase their bank credit in the rst quarter after default. With
respect to the broad access denition, 59% of rms had access to credit in
the rst quarter after resolving the default.64 Hence, most rms do not face a
long exclusion from credit markets as a penalty for their past defaults. Over
time these two statistics have dierent paths. While in the case of strict access
there is a fairly monotone decrease, in the case of broad access there is some
62In fact, most rms never lose access to credit completely while they are in default, as
rms usually default only on part of their total outstanding commitments.
63Given that a signicant portion of loans to rms have short maturities, a rm may have
had access to a new loan (or loan renewal) even if the total outstanding amount did not
increase. This access denition may then be too strict, thus justifying the need to consider
the two alternative denitions.
64The 59% gure is the sum of the last row of columns (11) and (13) from Table 4.
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volatility during the sample period: instantaneous access rates decreased until
1998, but peaked in 2002. Afterwards, there was a gradual decrease.
We consider two additional possible outcomes after default: rms that have
access to loans but still record some written-o loans (9%) and rms only with
written-o loans, that is, no access (14%). These two outcomes lie somewhere
between default and access. On one hand, these rms are not technically in
default. On the other hand, we cannot consider that the problems generated
by the default event are fully overcome.
4.5.1 Duration of exclusion
Above we provided some information regarding the process of regaining access
to credit after a default is cleared. In this subsection, we expand on the
previous results by analyzing more aspects of the process. To start, we show
non-parametric estimates of the survival and hazard functions of the time it
takes for a rm to borrow again.65 These results refer to the two denitions
of access discussed previously, that is, the ability to borrow more money than
before (strict denition) and the ability to keep having some loans (broad
denition). Figures 4.4 and 4.5 refer to the former, while Figures 4.6 and 4.7
65The survival function is dened as the probability of regaining access to credit until w:
V(w) = Pr(W  w) = 1  I (w). The hazard function is dened as the probability of a rm
leaving the exclusion state in the time interval [w> w+gw), conditional on being excluded from
credit markets after the default is cleared: k(w) = lim Pr(wWw+gw|Ww)gw > gw $ 0. W denotes
the time a rm remains excluded from access to credit after default.
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refer to the latter.
Figure 4.4: Hazard function for time until more access
Note: Analysis time defined as quarters since the end of the first
default episode. The hazard function is defined as the probability
of regaining access to credit in the time interval [t, t+dt),
conditional on not being in default: h(t) = lim Prob(t<=T<t+dt
| T>=t)/dt, as dt->0. More access is defined as having a larger
amount of outstanding bank loans (including credit lines) than at
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As seen in these gures, the two denitions are substantially dierent: while
in one case around 60% of rms never regain access again (the strict denition
of access), in the other case this gure is substantially lower (slightly less than
25%). Despite the dierences that are found in the right tails of the survival
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Figure 4.5: Time until more access
Note: Analysis time defined as quarters since the end of the first
default episode. The survivor estimate is defined as the
probability of regaining access after default at t:
S(t)=Prob(T>=t)=1 - F(t). More access is defined as having a
larger amount of outstanding bank loans (including credit lines)
than at the end of the default episode and not having any record
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Figure 4.6: Hazard function for time until access
Note: Analysis time defined as quarters since the end of the first
default episode. The hazard function is defined as the probability
of regaining access to credit in the time interval [t, t+dt),
conditional on not being in default: h(t) = lim Prob(t<=T<t+dt
| T>=t)/dt, as dt->0. Access is defined as having a positive
amount of outstanding bank loans (including credit lines) without 
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Figure 4.7: Time until access
Note: Analysis time defined as quarters since the end of the first
default episode. The survivor estimate is defined as the
probability of regaining access after default at t:
S(t)=Prob(T>=t)=1 - F(t). Access is defined as having a positive 
amount of outstanding bank loans (including credit lines) without 
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functions, when we compare the two hazard functions we see that their shapes
are very similar. In particular, we see that the rst 4 to 6 quarters after
exiting default are fundamental for determining the ability to regain access to
bank credit. When a rm is not able to regain access during this period, the
probability of regaining access at any given time becomes very low (almost
0%).
In Table 4.5 we look at dierent snapshots of the distribution of possible
outcomes after default in dierent moments in time, namely, 1 quarter, 2
quarters, and 1, 2 and 3 years after the rst default episode of each rm ends.
We consider the same set of outcomes depicted in Table 4.4.
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Table 4 .5  - Distributions over time o f possible outcomes a fter leaving default
Number % of 
total
Number % of 
total
Number % of 
total
Number % of 
total
Number % of 
total
Number % of 
total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Time since first 
default episode 
ended
1 quarter 10,552 12.8 38,022 46.1 7,355 8.9 11,252 13.6 - - 15,298 18.5 82,479
6 months 9,074 11.4 27,435 34.6 4,994 6.3 10,100 12.7 13,003 16.4 14,792 18.6 79,398
1 year 8,292 11.1 20,314 27.2 3,575 4.8 9,069 12.1 17,914 23.9 15,647 20.9 74,811
2 years 7,172 10.9 14,310 21.7 2,116 3.2 7,953 12.1 16,343 24.8 18,057 27.4 65,951
3 years 6,398 11.0 10,799 18.6 1,777 3.1 6,985 12.0 13,245 22.8 18,805 32.4 58,009
Notes: This table depicts snapshots of the distribution of possible outcomes after default in different moments in time
(namely, 1 quarter, 2 quarters and 1, 2 and 3 years after default ends). A default episode is considered resolved if there
is no record of loans with late repayments or in litigation in the end of the following quarter. We exclude firms that
were in default in 2008Q4, the last quarter in the sample, and consider only the first default episode of each firm during
the sample period. After default, firms can either continue to be observed in the credit register (columns 1-10) or they
can cease to appear in the CRC (columns 11-12). In the latter case firms can have either ceased to operate or they can
still be in operation but without having access to loans from financial institutions. By construction, there are no firms
in default in the quarter after the default episode ended. Firms with more access are those with more outstanding bank
loans (including credit lines) than at the end of the default episode and without any record of default or write-offs.
Firms with less access than before are those which have the same or less loans outstanding that at the end of the default
episode. 
Total






















Regarding the rms that continue to be observed in the CRC database after
default, several things happen. First, we see that the percentage of rms with
more access and without problem loans is relatively stable over time (column
2). At the same time, the percentage of rms with access to credit, but less
than before, decreases substantially as time goes by — it goes from 46% to
19% in 3 years (column 4). This large variation seems to be directly related
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to recidivism, as after 6 months around 16% of rms are in default again and
after 1 year this value is around 24% (column 10). If we add columns (4) and
(10) we see that the sum of the two is relatively stable over time. This suggests
that a strong indicator of recidivism may be the inability to borrow more than
before. Regarding the other possible outcomes, rms with access but still with
some written-o loans (columns 5 and 6) and rms only with written-o loans
but no access (columns 7 and 8), we observe that over time the number of
rms with access and with written o loans decreases substantially while the
number of rms without access and with written-o loans does not change
much. Finally, with respect to the rms that are not observed in the CRC, we
see that this percentage is relatively stable in the rst year, but after 2 and
3 years it increases substantially — from around 18% to 30%. This possibly
re ects the relatively short life span of micro and small rms, which comprise
the bulk of our sample.66
4.5.2 Determinants of the duration of exclusion
In order to better understand why some rms are able to regain access to
credit relatively fast after exiting default, while other rms are not, we show
in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 how the severity of the default episode may help explain
66According to Mata and Portugal (1994, 2004), the median life expectancy for Portuguese
rms is around 4 to 5 years.
178
Chapter 4 What happens after corporate default?
such dierences.
Table 4 .6  - Characteristics o f fi rms that rega in access after their fi rst default episode - broad access definition
Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median diff t-test p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Default severity
Credit outstanding 28,606 592,326 48,325 24,716 66,795 7,292 525,532 8.9 0.00
Credit overdue 28,606 29,743 1,900 24,716 23,310 2,840 6,433 3.2 0.00
Credit overdue ratio 28,606 20.9 5 24,716 83.5 100.0 -62.6 -230.0 0.00
Write-offs 28,606 1,774 0 24,716 19,336 0 -17,562 -17.1 0.00
Loss estimates (%) 28,606 0.8 0 24,716 14.2 0 -13.5 -69.2 0.00
Duration of default 28,606 2.4 1 24,716 7.5 5 -5.2 -94.9 0.00
Relationships
No. of bank relationships 28,606 2.8 2 24,716 1.3 1 1.5 121.36 0.00
No. of bank relat. in default 28,606 1.1 1 24,716 1.2 1 -0.1 -30.71 0.00
No. of bank relat. in default % 28,606 54.2 50 24,716 95.0 100 -40.8 -200.0 0.00
Default with main bank 28,606 0.5 1 24,716 0.9 1 -0.4 -100.0 0.00
Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median diff t-test p-value
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Default severity
Credit outstanding 17,197 643,922 57,860 25,790 81,531 10,050 562,391 8.1 0.00
Credit overdue 17,197 33,087 2,020 25,790 22,179 2,644 10,908 4.1 0.00
Credit overdue ratio 17,197 21.1 5 25,790 69.6 100.0 -48.5 -140.0 0.00
Write-offs 17,197 2,183 0 25,790 13,736 0 -11,553 -12.6 0.00
Loss estimates (%) 17,197 1.0 0 25,790 10.5 0 -9.5 -55.0 0.00
Duration of default 17,197 2.4 1 25,790 5.7 3 -3.3 -72.8 0.00
Relationships
No. of bank relationships 17,197 3.0 2 25,790 1.5 1 1.5 91.1 0.00
No. of bank relat. in default 17,197 1.1 1 25,790 1.2 1 -0.1 -20.88 0.00
No. of bank relat. in default % 17,197 51.2 50 25,790 87.8 100 -36.6 -140.0 0.00
Default with main bank 17,197 0.5 1 25,790 0.8 1 -0.3 -74.0 0.00
Notes:  Firms with access are those with outstanding bank loans (including credit lines) and without any record of 
default or write-offs after 1 year (columns 1 - 3) or 3 years (columns 9-11). Firms without access are those that are not 
in the credit register after leaving default, as well as those which continue to be present in the credit register, but only 
with written-off loans. The results for 1 year after default exclude firms that defaulted for the first time in 2008 and the 
results for 3 years after default exclude firms that defaulted for the first time in 2006, 2007 or 2008. All variables are 
defined as in previous tables and refer to the last period of default. Mean difference tests are computed assuming 
unequal variances in the two groups considered. 
Mean difference
Firms with access Firms without access
After 3 years
After 1 year
Firms with access Firms without access
Mean difference
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Table 4 .7 - Characteristics o f fi rms that rega in access a fter their fi rst default episode - strict access definition
Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median diff t-test p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Default severity
Credit outstanding 8,292 934,087 56,871 45,030 240,940 17,971 693,147 4.5 0.00
Credit overdue 8,292 29,349 1,490 45,030 26,284 2,490 3,064 1.1 0.28
Credit overdue ratio 8,292 21.4 4 45,030 55.2 63.4 -33.8 -79.8 0.00
Write-offs 8,292 3,554 0 45,030 11,085 0 -7,531 -6.1 0.00
Loss estimates (%) 8,292 1.1 0 45,030 8.1 0 -7.0 -49.7 0.00
Duration of default 8,292 2.3 1 45,030 5.2 2 -2.9 -65.8 0.00
Relationships
No. of bank relationships 8,292 3.0 2 45,030 1.9 1 1.1 44.4 0.00
No. of bank relat. in default 8,292 1.1 1 45,030 1.1 1 -0.1 -21.3 0.00
No. of bank relat. in default % 8,292 51.1 50 45,030 77.1 100 -26.0 -71.6 0.00
Default with main bank 8,292 0.5 0 45,030 0.7 1 -0.3 -44.3 0.00
Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median diff t-test p-value
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Default severity
Credit outstanding 6,398 696,117 44,875 36,589 238,390 17,550 457,727 3.5 0.00
Credit overdue 6,398 23,552 1,329 36,589 27,066 2,640 -3,513 -1.5 0.12
Credit overdue ratio 6,398 23.2 5 36,589 54.9 58.8 -31.7 -64.5 0.00
Write-offs 6,398 2,784 0 36,589 10,221 0 -7,437 -7.1 0.00
Loss estimates (%) 6,398 1.0 0 36,589 7.6 0 -6.6 -43.3 0.00
Duration of default 6,398 2.3 1 36,589 4.7 2 -2.5 -54.9 0.00
Relationships
No. of bank relationships 6,398 3.0 2 36,589 1.9 1 1.1 37.0 0.00
No. of bank relat. in default 6,398 1.1 1 36,589 1.1 1 -0.1 -20.0 0.00
No. of bank relat. in default % 6,398 52.3 50 36,589 76.8 100 -24.5 -58.7 0.00
Default with main bank 6,398 0.5 0 36,589 0.7 1 -0.3 -37.6 0.00
Notes:  Firms with more access are those with more outstanding bank loans (including credit lines) than at the end of 
the default episode and without any record of default or write-offs after 1 year (columns 1 - 3) or 3 years (columns 9-
11). Firms without access or with less access than before are those that are not in the credit register after leaving 
default, those that continue to be present in the credit register, but only with written-off loans, as well as those that 
have the same or less loans outstanding that at the end of the default episode. The results for 1 year after default 
exclude firms that defaulted for the first time in 2008 and the results for 3 years after default exclude firms that 
defaulted for the first time in 2006, 2007 or 2008. All variables are defined as in previous tables and refer to the last 
period of default. Mean difference tests are computed assuming unequal variances in the two groups considered. 
Mean difference
After 3 years
Firms with more access than 
before
Firms without access or 




Firms with more access than 
before
Firms without access or 
with less access than 
before
In these two tables we compare various default severity measures (credit
outstanding, credit overdue, existence of write-os, duration of default) for
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rms that were able to regain access after 1 and 3 years and for rms that
were not. In Table 4.6 we consider the broader denition of access, whereas in
Table 4.7 we provide similar results for the stricter denition. In all cases we
systematically nd that the probability of regaining access is lower when the
default events are longer and more severe. This is not surprising and to some
extent it should be expected. This result re ects not only the fact that banks
will impose harsher punishments on rms that generate more losses, but it
also re ects the fact that rms that generate more losses are also those with
greater nancial problems and are therefore less creditworthy.
We also observe that larger rms regain access to credit more easily than
smaller rms. The same is true for rms that hold more bank relationships,
though this may be correlated with rm size. Our interpretation is that large
rms are usually perceived as less risky and more stable. Therefore, banks
are willing to extend credit faster to large rms than to small rms. Another
result we obtain is that rms that default with their main bank lender also
face more di!culties in regaining access to bank loans. This result, together
with the eect of holding more bank relationships, re ects the costs rms may
have when their pool of lenders is not su!ciently diversied. Thus, when the
relationship between a borrower and a lender is interrupted due to nancial
distress, rms will face more di!culties in regaining access to credit if they
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borrow from one or a few banks or if they default with their main lender. This
increased di!culty should re ect the destruction of value that had previously
been created through that relationship, as smaller and opaque rms trans-
mit valuable information to their lenders over time, which cannot be easily
transferred to a new bank relationship.
In order to test whether the previous results hold in a multivariate setting
and at the same time to be able to tell which factors matter more for the
speed of re-access, we estimate a Cox proportional hazard model for the time
to access, such that:
k(w>[l) = #([l> )k0
where #(=) is a non-negative function of [l and , the vectors of covariates
and parameters, and k0 is the baseline hazard. In this model, the baseline
hazard is common to all rms and individual hazard functions dier from each
other proportionally, with #(=) representing the factor of proportionality. One
advantage of this method is that it is a semi-parametric approach, thereby
allowing us to estimate  without specifying the form of the baseline hazard.
Under this setup, the covariates do not aect the shape of the overall hazard
function, conditioning only the relative failure risk of each rm. The failure
risk is dened as the time until a rm regains access to credit (using our two
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dierent denitions of access) after it has resolved its rst default episode.
The estimation results, which are presented in the form of hazard ratios,
are shown in Table 4.8.67 Columns (1) to (4) refer to the broad access deni-
tion, whereas columns (5) to (8) consider the strict denition. The dierences
between the columns re ect the type of time controls used.
67In these regressions, an estimated coe!cient below (above) 1, should be interpreted as
contributing to a longer (shorter) time until the rm regains access to credit.
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Table 4 .8  - Cox regressions:  determinants o f time unti l  access
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln Credit outstanding (ln(euros)) 1.016 1.015 1.015 1.015 1.010 1.008 1.007 1.008
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.08
Credit overdue ratio (%) 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.998 0.997 0.997 0.997
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Loss rate (%) 0.974 0.974 0.974 0.974 0.980 0.980 0.980 0.980
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Duration of default (quarters) 0.937 0.939 0.940 0.939 0.921 0.927 0.928 0.927
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
No. of bank relationships 0.957 0.956 0.957 0.956 1.010 1.008 1.007 1.008
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.15 0.16 0.15
No. of bank relat. in default % of total 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.994
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Default with main bank (binary) 1.058 1.063 1.063 1.063 0.877 0.896 0.898 0.896
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Recession (binary) - - - 1.092 - - - 1.103
- - - 0.00 - - - 0.06
D_1996 - 1.145 - 1.145 - 1.421 - 1.421
- 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00
D_1997 - 1.170 - 1.170 - 1.335 - 1.335
- 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00
D_1998 - 1.159 - 1.159 - 1.424 - 1.425
- 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00
D_1999 - 0.977 - 0.977 - 1.515 - 1.515
- 0.05 - 0.05 - 0.00 - 0.00
D_2000 - 1.010 - 1.010 - 1.326 - 1.326
- 0.34 - 0.34 - 0.00 - 0.00
D_2001 - 1.040 - 1.040 - 1.485 - 1.485
- 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00
D_2002 - 0.996 - 0.996 - 1.226 - 1.226
- 0.63 - 0.63 - 0.00 - 0.00
D_2003 - 1.039 - 0.952 - 0.967 - 0.877
- 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.26 - 0.03
D_2004 - 0.932 - 0.912 - 0.852 - 0.831
- 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00
D_2005 - 0.990 - 0.990 - 0.856 - 0.856
- 0.27 - 0.27 - 0.00 - 0.00
D_2006 - 0.951 - 0.951 - 0.916 - 0.916
- 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00
D_2007 - 0.982 - 0.982 - 1.085 - 1.085
- 0.02 - 0.02 - 0.00 - 0.00
Quarter dummies N N Y N N N Y N
Number of subjects 73,980 73,980 73,980 73,980 73,980 73,980 73,980 73,980
Number of failures 54,282 54,282 54,282 54,282 21,055 21,055 21,055 21,055
Time at risk 384,240 384,240 384,240 384,240 893,125 893,125 893,125 893,125
Log-likelihood -589,282 -589,180 -589,097 -589,177 -226,434 -226,022 -225,864 -226,020
Notes: p-values in italics. All models estimated using a Cox regression that evaluates the time until access using robust variance
estimates. An estimated coefficient lower than 1 should be interpreted as contributing a longer time until access. In columns (1) -
(4), the dependent variable is the time until access using the broad definition (see Table 6). In columns (5) - (8) it is considered the
strict definition of access (see Table 7). All explanatory variables are defined as in previous tables (except recession, which is a
dummy variable that takes the value one in recession years) and refer to the last period of default.
Failure event: access (broad definition) Failure event: access (strict definition)
Al l  fi rms
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The results are broadly consistent with those of Tables 4.6 and 4.7. Taking
the total amount of credit outstanding as a proxy for rm size, we observe that
larger rms regain access faster (columns (1)-(4)). However, this result is not
strongly statistically signicant when we consider the time it takes a rm to
regain access to a new bank loan after default (columns (5)-(8)). The intensity
of the default episode is a key determinant in the process of regaining access:
rms that have higher credit overdue ratios and higher loss rates take more
time to regain access to credit, especially when the broad denition of access
is considered. The impact of default duration goes in the same direction, but
now the eect is stronger for the stricter access denition, i.e., a longer default
inhibits the ability of rms to gain access to new bank loans.
The choice of the number of bank relationships also seems to in uence
how easily rms regain access to bank credit after default, though only in the
broader denition case.68 Firms that borrow from more banks take more time
to regain access to bank loans. This result is not entirely in line with the
insights we gained from Table 4.6, where we observed that rms with more
bank relationships were more likely to regain access. However, this previous
result could be somewhat in uenced by the strong correlation between rm
size and the number of bank relationships. This fact may explain why this
68The results for the stricter denition are not statistically signicant at a 5% level.
185
Chapter 4 What happens after corporate default?
result does not hold in a multivariate setting. Indeed, when controlling for the
total amount of credit outstanding of each rm, we observe that rms with
many bank relationships may actually have more di!culties in regaining access
to bank loans. Hence, engaging in single bank relationships may provide some
benets for rms in nancial distress.69 We also nd that rms that default
on a larger percentage of existing bank relationships take more time to regain
access to credit, which may also be regarded as evidence that more severe
default episodes lead to a more prolonged exclusion from credit markets.
Finally, with respect to rms that default with their main lender, the results
are rather mixed: these rms seem to have more di!culties in gaining access
to new loans, but the opposite happens when the broad denition of access
is considered. This result is likely driven by the way we dene access in the
latter case: a rm regains access when it records a positive amount of credit
outstanding without having any problem loans. Thus, if a rm defaults for a
given period of time and at some point it is able to repay the overdue debt,
we consider that the rm has regained access. As we observe that most rms
actually default with their main lender, the time it takes to regain access may
69For instance, Carmignani and Omiccioli (2007) argue that the overall eect of more
concentrated banking relationships is a lower probability of liquidation, but a higher prob-
ability of nancial distress. In turn, Elsas and Krahnen (1998) show that when there are
strong bank-customer relationships, banks provide liquidity insurance to rms in nancial
distress.
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be mechanically driven by this feature of the data.
As mentioned above, the dierent columns in Table 4.8 consider essentially
the same explanatory variables, with the exception of time controls. Time ef-
fects seem to play a relevant role: rms that emerged from default in the
earlier years of our sample took less time to regain access to credit than rms
that defaulted in more recent years. In order to better explore these eects, in
columns (4) and (8) we include a binary variable for recession years. We nd
that rms that exit default during recessions are able to regain access to bank
loans sooner, controlling for all other default and loan characteristics. This
is an interesting result, as it suggests that when a rm is able to resolve an
adverse situation during adverse times, banks perceive this as being a signal
of the quality and strength of the rm.70 In particular, banks possibly con-
sider that these rms are of higher quality (in terms of creditworthiness) and
therefore grant credit faster than if the default resolution had happened in
non-recession years.71 Moreover, these rms are more likely to have defaulted
70For robustness purposes, we also consider the eect of entering default during a recession
on the time it takes until rms regain access to credit, but the results are not statistically
signicant. In addition, we also consider simultaneously the eect of entering and/or leaving
default during a recession, plus an interaction between these two possibilities (i.e., a binary
variable that takes the value 1 when the rm enters and leaves default during a recession).
If this is the case, rms are able to regain access signicantly faster. In contrast, rms that
entered default during a recession should take more time to regain access. The eect of
leaving default during a recession is not signicant in this specication.
71Acharya et al. (2007) study the impact of industry-wide distress on the recoveries of
defaulted rms in the US and nd that defaulting rms that belong to industries in distress
are more likely to spend more time in bankruptcy. However, these rms are also more likely
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due to an exogenous systematic shock than due to idiosyncratic fragilities,
which supports the creditworthiness assessment made by banks.72
4.5.3 Access and bank choice
Thus far, we observed that many rms are able to borrow again from banks
after resolving a default, but only a small percentage have access to new bank
loans. A key issue in this analysis is then to look at which banks are granting
these new bank loans. Are rms borrowing from the banks with whom they
had ongoing bank relationships before the default or are they borrowing from
new banks? In Table 4.9 we provide some preliminary results on this question.
to be restructured than to be acquired or liquidated.
72For robustness purposes, we also estimate probit regressions where the dependent vari-
able is a dummy variable (gl), indicating whether the rm regains access to credit in the 3
years after leaving default (gl = 1) or not (gl = 0), for both access denitions. The results
are qualitatively consistent with those obtained with duration analysis, with the exception
of those relating to the recession variable, which has a negative coe!cient in the probit
regressions. These results are available upon request.
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Table 4 .9  - Regaining access through new banks
% % %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1995 330 136 41.2 - - - - - -
1996 641 226 35.3 356 210 59.0 - - -
1997 604 200 33.1 467 282 60.4 - - -
1998 538 214 39.8 529 291 55.0 349 265 75.9
1999 761 227 29.8 534 318 59.6 505 371 73.5
2000 545 223 40.9 469 292 62.3 564 424 75.2
2001 1,189 559 47.0 541 385 71.2 569 481 84.5
2002 1,091 412 37.8 1,239 811 65.5 411 342 83.2
2003 957 262 27.4 766 432 56.4 456 388 85.1
2004 752 188 25.0 670 389 58.1 997 804 80.6
2005 577 171 29.6 630 375 59.5 719 562 78.2
2006 662 160 24.2 547 322 58.9 657 509 77.5
2007 985 266 27.0 652 366 56.1 629 506 80.4
2008 920 177 19.2 892 464 52.0 542 427 78.8
Total 10,552 3,421 32.4 8,292 4,937 59.5 6,398 5,079 79.4
Notes: Firms with more access are those with more outstanding bank loans (including credit
lines) than at the end of the default episode and without any record of default or write-offs. Firms 
with more access and with a new bank defined as those borrowing from a bank which was not a





Firms with more 






Firms with more 
access and with 
a new bank




Firms with more 
access and with a 
new bank
We previously saw that, in the quarter immediately after the default episode
is cleared, 13% of rms have access to a new bank loan (Table 4.4). From this
group of rms, almost one third of the rms obtain that new loan from a bank
with which they had no relationship when the default was resolved (Table 4.9).
This percentage is higher in the rst years of the sample period. When we
examine this situation one and three years after default, we observe that the
percentage of rms that obtained a loan from a new lender increases markedly:
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60% after one year and 80% after 3 years.
These results must be analyzed bearing in mind that the CRC is designed
to be an information sharing mechanism between banks. When a rm defaults
on a bank loan, the other banks currently lending to the rm can observe that.
Prospective lenders can also ask to have access to that information, with the
rms’ consent, which is usually the common procedure. Notwithstanding this,
banks seem to be generally willing to give rms a second chance. However, as
mentioned before, it should be noted that the CRC only includes the current
status of bank loans. Thus, participating banks cannot observe the history of
past defaults for new borrowers.
In Table 4.10 we compare rms that regain access through an existing bank
relationship to rms that regain access through a new bank relationship. We
consider only the strict denition of access, as this analysis is relevant only
for obtaining new bank loans. We observe that rms that are able to borrow
from a new bank are, on average, smaller, and have fewer bank relationships.
This result may be somewhat unexpected, but possibly re ects the fact that
banks may be reluctant to lend to rms that defaulted and, simultaneously,
have many bank relationships (or, alternatively, rms that already have many
bank relationships may nd it too costly to engage in additional relationships).
Firms that obtain a loan from a new bank are also slightly more likely to have
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defaulted to their main lender, possibly suggesting that if a rm defaults with
its most important provider of funds, it may be more likely that it is forced to
look for a new lender, as the former main bank may not be willing to extend
new loans to the rm. Default duration and severity do not seem to be relevant
in explaining why some rms are not able to obtain loans from a new lender.
Table 4 .10 - Characteristics o f firms that regain access with a new bank after their fi rst default episode (strict definition)
Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median diff t-test p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Default severity
Credit outstanding 4,937 451,545 48,400 3,355 1,644,164 73,480 -1,192,619 -3.3 0.00
Credit overdue 4,937 22,214 1,221 3,355 39,848 2,150 -17,635 -2.9 0.00
Credit overdue ratio 4,937 20.9 4 3,355 22.1 4.0 -1.2 -1.6 0.10
Write-offs 4,937 3,151 0 3,355 4,149 0 -998 -0.5 0.65
Loss estimates (%) 4,937 1.0 0 3,355 1.2 0 -0.1 -0.8 0.44
Duration of default 4,937 2.3 1 3,355 2.3 1 -0.1 -1.0 0.32
Relationships
No. of bank relationships 4,937 2.9 3 3,355 3.3 2 -0.4 -7.1 0.00
No. of bank relat. in default 4,937 1.1 1 3,355 1.1 1 0.0 -1.5 0.14
No. of bank relat. in default % 4,937 51.8 50 3,355 50.1 50 1.7 2.5 0.01
Default with main bank 4,937 0.5 0 3,355 0.5 0 0.0 1.8 0.07
Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median diff t-test p-value
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Default severity
Credit outstanding 5,079 345,756 42,100 1,319 2,045,234 61,860 -1,699,478 -2.8 0.01
Credit overdue 5,079 21,043 1,180 1,319 33,217 2,245 -12,174 -2.1 0.03
Credit overdue ratio 5,079 23.2 5 1,319 23.1 4.2 0.1 0.1 0.90
Write-offs 5,079 2,351 0 1,319 4,450 0 -2,099 -0.8 0.44
Loss estimates (%) 5,079 0.9 0 1,319 1.5 0 -0.6 -2.1 0.04
Duration of default 5,079 2.3 1 1,319 2.2 1 0.1 0.8 0.40
Relationships
No. of bank relationships 5,079 2.8 2 1,319 3.6 2 -0.7 -7.6 0.00
No. of bank relat. in default 5,079 1.1 1 1,319 1.1 1 0.0 -0.6 0.53
No. of bank relat. in default % 5,079 53.1 50 1,319 49.0 50 4.1 4.3 0.00
Default with main bank 5,079 0.5 0 1,319 0.4 0 0.1 3.3 0.00
Notes:  Firms with more access and a new bank are those with more outstanding bank loans from a new bank (including 
credit lines) than at the end of the default episode and without any record of default or write-offs after 1 year (columns 1 - 3) 
or 3 years (columns 9-11). Firms with more access than before but not with a new bank have the same characteristics, with 
the exception of borrowing from a new bank. The results for 1 year after default exclude firms that defaulted for the first time 
in 2008 and the results for 3 years after default exclude firms that defaulted for the first time in 2006, 2007 or 2008. Only 
firms with less than 9 bank relationships are considered. All variables are defined as in previous tables and refer to the last 
period of default. Mean difference tests are computed assuming unequal variances in the two groups considered. 
After 3 years
After 1 year
Firms with more access than 
before and a new bank
Firms with more access than 




Firms with more access than 
before and a new bank
Firms with more access than 
before but not with a new 
bank
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In order to see if the previous results hold under a multivariate framework,
and at the same time to get estimates of the relative importance of each of the
factors, we estimate a probit model for the event of accessing credit through
an existing bank relationship or through a new one. The dependent variable
in this model is a binary variable (gl) indicating whether the rm had access
to a new bank loan with the same bank (gl = 0) or with a new bank (gl = 1).
We consider the same explanatory variables presented in Table 4.8 and add a
variable indicating the duration of exclusion (i.e., the time elapsed since the
default is cleared until the rm obtains a new loan under our strict access
denition). Table 4.11 presents the results of these regressions.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln Credit outstanding (ln(euros)) -0.082 -0.079 -0.082 -0.079
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Credit overdue ratio (%) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Loss rate (%) 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003
0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01
Duration of default (quarters) -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004
0.19 0.22 0.37 0.22
No. of bank relationships -0.013 -0.016 -0.014 -0.016
0.06 0.03 0.04 0.03
No. of bank relat. in default % of total 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.54 0.86 0.98 0.86
Default with main bank (binary) 0.023 0.029 0.036 0.030
0.32 0.21 0.12 0.19
Duration of exclusion (quarters) -0.018 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Constant 0.871 0.583 0.545 0.583
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Recession (binary) - - - 0.145
- - - 0.04
Year dummies N Y N Y
Quarter dummies N N Y N
Number of observations 21,055 21,055 21,055 21,055
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03
Wald test 315.7 609.1 867.2 613.8
Log pseudolikelihood -14,110 -13,970 -13,836 -13,968
Dependent variable: access with a new 
bank (strict definition)
Notes: p-values in italics. All models estimated using a probit regression using
robust variance estimates. The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the
value 1 if the firm is able to obtain a new loan from a new bank within the 3 years
after its first default episode is resolved; and takes the value 0 if the firm obtains a
new loan in the same situation, but not from a new bank (see Table 10). Only firms
with less than 9 bank relationships are considered. All explanatory variables are
defined as in previous tables (except for the duration of exclusion, which measures
the number of quarters since the default is resolved until the firm obtains a new loan
under our strict access definition) and refer to the last period of default.
Table 4 .11 - Probit regressions:  determinants o f the l ikel ihood o f 
obta ining a  new loan from a new bank
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These results indicate that, in agreement with the results of Table 4.10,
the larger the rm is, the less likely it will obtain a loan from a new bank. The
results regarding the number of bank relationships and default with the main
bank are also consistent with those of Table 4.10. Furthermore, we also nd
that rms with higher credit overdue ratios are less likely to establish a new
bank relationship after default, even though we nd the opposite result for the
loss rate. Thus, the results on default severity are not clear cut. The duration
of exclusion has a negative impact on the likelihood of obtaining a new loan
with a new bank: the longer a rm takes to obtain a new bank loan, the less
likely it is that this new loan will be granted by a new bank. Finally, the
recession variable also plays an important role, in line with the results of the
previous subsection. When a rm emerges from default during a recessionary
episode, it is much easier to obtain a loan from a new bank than otherwise.73
4.5.4 Recidivism
Thus far we have shown that many rms are able to regain access to credit
markets after default. The probability of regaining access is especially high in
73For robustness purposes, we also estimate the regressions presented in Table 11 using a
logit model. The results are remarkably consistent, with the exception of the explanatory
power of the number of bank relationships: while in the probit regressions this variable is
marginally statistically signicant to explain the likelihood of obtaining a new loan from a
new bank (with a negative impact), in the logit regressions this variable is not statistically
signicant.
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the quarters immediately after the default is resolved. If a rm is not able to
regain access during the rst few quarters after default, it is very unlikely that
it ever will. Many banks are willing to give rms a second chance and some
banks may oer a loan to a new customer even if they had a default episode
in their recent past.
However, an interesting, and somewhat surprising, result we obtain relates
to the high levels of recidivism. Previously, in Table 4.5, we showed that
after 6 months around 16% of rms were in default again, and after 1 year
this number increases to 24%. In fact, as shown in Table 4.4, almost half of
the rms default again during the 3 years after their rst default episode is
resolved. In order to better understand why some rms default again while
others do not, we conduct an analysis similar to those in Tables 4.6 and 4.7,
but for the event of a rm defaulting again. The results are presented in Table
4.12 for the broad access denition.
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Table 4 .12 - Characteristics o f fi rms that regain access but default again
Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median diff t-test p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Default severity
Credit outstanding 17,914 318,697 39,469 28,606 592,326 48,325 -273,630 -4.5 0.00
Credit overdue 17,914 27,630 3,250 28,606 29,743 1,900 -2,112 -1.0 0.34
Credit overdue ratio 17,914 36.0 12 28,606 20.9 5 15.1 42.0 0.00
Write-offs 17,914 12,114 0 28,606 1,774 0 10,341 5.8 0.00
Loss estimates (%) 17,914 5.4 0 28,606 0.8 0 4.6 31.8 0.00
Duration of default 17,914 4.1 2 28,606 2.4 1 1.7 38.5 0.00
Relationships
No. of bank relationships 17,914 2.5 2 28,606 2.8 2 -0.2 -13.1 0.00
No. of bank relat. in default 17,914 1.2 1 28,606 1.1 1 0.1 32.8 0.00
No. of bank relat. in default % 17,914 65.2 50 28,606 54.2 50 11.0 36.9 0.00
Default with main bank 17,914 0.6 1 28,606 0.5 1 0.1 22.7 0.00
Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median diff t-test p-value
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Default severity
Credit outstanding 13,245 397,972 57,080 17,197 643,922 57,860 -245,950 -3.2 0.00
Credit overdue 13,245 33,277 4,065 17,197 33,087 2,020 190 0.1 0.95
Credit overdue ratio 13,245 32.4 9 17,197 21.1 5 11.3 26.6 0.00
Write-offs 13,245 14,574 0 17,197 2,183 0 12,392 4.9 0.00
Loss estimates (%) 13,245 4.9 0 17,197 1.0 0 3.9 23.7 0.00
Duration of default 13,245 3.6 2 17,197 2.4 1 1.2 26.1 0.00
Relationships
No. of bank relationships 13,245 2.9 2 17,197 3.0 2 -0.1 -4.5 0.00
No. of bank relat. in default 13,245 1.2 1 17,197 1.1 1 0.1 26.3 0.00
No. of bank relat. in default % 13,245 59.2 50 17,197 51.2 50 8.1 22.4 0.00
Default with main bank 13,245 0.6 1 17,197 0.5 1 0.1 12.9 0.00
Notes:  Firms again in default are those that record a new default episode after 1 year (columns 1-3) or 3 years 
(columns 9-11). Firms with access are those with outstanding bank loans (including credit lines) and without any 
record of default or write-offs after 1 year (columns 4 - 6) or 3 years (columns 12-14). The results for 1 year after 
default exclude firms that resolved their first default episode in 2008 and the results for 3 years after default 
exclude firms that resolved their first default episode in 2006, 2007 or 2008. All variables are defined as in 
previous tables and refer to the last period of default. Mean difference tests are computed assuming unequal 
variances in the two groups considered. 
After 1 year
Firms again in default
After 3 years
Firms again in default Firms with access and 
without default
Mean difference
Firms with access and 
without default
Mean difference
From Table 4.12 we see that rms that default again are, on average,
smaller and their initial default episode was longer and more severe.
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In Table 4.13, we present the results of Cox regressions, having as a depen-
dent variable the time it takes for a rm to default again after having resolved
the rst default episode.
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Table 4 .13  - Cox regressions:  determinants o f time unti l  new default
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln Credit outstanding (ln(euros)) 1.033 1.032 1.032 1.032
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Credit overdue ratio (%) 0.995 0.994 0.994 0.994
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Loss rate (%) 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Duration of default (quarters) 0.987 0.989 0.990 0.989
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
No. of bank relationships 1.031 1.029 1.029 1.029
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
No. of bank relat. in default % of total 1.002 1.002 1.002 1.002
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Default with main bank (binary) 1.165 1.176 1.178 1.176
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Recession (binary) - - - 0.833
- - - 0.00
D_1996 - 1.390 - 1.389
- 0.00 - 0.00
D_1997 - 1.502 - 1.502
- 0.00 - 0.00
D_1998 - 0.967 - 0.967
- 0.25 - 0.25
D_1999 - 1.221 - 1.221
- 0.00 - 0.00
D_2000 - 0.990 - 0.990
- 0.70 - 0.70
D_2001 - 1.069 - 1.068
- 0.00 - 0.00
D_2002 - 1.110 - 1.110
- 0.00 - 0.00
D_2003 - 1.018 - 1.221
- 0.39 - 0.00
D_2004 - 0.853 - 0.890
- 0.00 - 0.00
D_2005 - 0.873 - 0.873
- 0.00 - 0.00
D_2006 - 0.910 - 0.910
- 0.00 - 0.00
D_2007 - 1.144 - 1.144
- 0.00 - 0.00
D_2008 - - - -
- - - -
Quarter dummies N N Y N
Number of subjects 73,980 73,980 73,980 73,980
Number of failures 39,756 39,756 39,756 39,756
Time at risk 681,425 681,425 681,425 681,425
Log-likelihood -420,012 -419,623 -419,009 -419,613
Failure event: new default
Notes: p-values in italics. All models estimated using a Cox regression that
evaluates the time until a new default, using robust variance estimates. An estimated
coefficient lower than 1 should be interpreted as contributing a longer time until
default. The dependent variable is the time until a new default occurs after the first
default episode is resolved. All explanatory variables are defined as in previous tables 
and refer to the last period of default.
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We nd that rms are more likely to default again if they are larger, have
more bank relationships, and if they have defaulted with their main lender.
Quite surprisingly, rms with more severe and longer defaults take more time
to default again. However, this last result deserves a more careful analysis. In
fact, this repeated default is conditional on regaining access to credit which,
as we found previously, is less likely for rms with long and severe episodes of
nancial distress.74
As before, we explore the time eects, observing that these are indeed
signicant. In fact, when we control for whether rms emerged from default
during a recession, we observe that if this is the case then the rm is less
likely to default again. Thus, if a rm is able to overcome the severe nancial
distress that led to a bank loan default during a recession, its future default
probability declines signicantly.
74For robustness purposes, we run the same regressions, but conditional on rms regaining
access to new bank loans, i.e., the strict access denition. The results are qualitatively
similar, with the exception of default duration: rms with longer distress episodes default
faster, conditional on having regained access to a new bank loan after default. The variable
number of bank relationships also becomes statistically insignicant. These results are
available upon request.
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4.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we investigate several questions: What happens to rms after
they default on their bank loan obligations?; What happens to rms while
they are in default?; How many rms are able to overcome nancial distress
and regain access to bank credit?; Which default characteristics in uence these
outcomes? To address these questions we use a unique dataset from Portugal,
the Central Credit Register, which gathers information on all loans above 50
euros that are granted by any nancial institution operating in Portugal.
We rst analyze what happens while rms are still “in default” and, in the
second part of the chapter, we examine what happens after rms are no longer
classied as “in default”.
With respect to the “in default” period, our main ndings are:
i) Defaults became more frequent during the sample period, but also be-
came less severe and involved smaller amounts;
ii) The median duration of default is 5 quarters, and this value had some
variation over time;
iii) Default episodes can either be very short-lived or very long. If a default
episode is not resolved within 1 year, it can take several years to be cleared;
iv) The duration of default is positively correlated with its severity. More-
over, rms that stay longer in default are typically rms that entered default
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in worse conditions than the ones that exit faster; and
v) Of all the default events that we analyze, only one third of these lead to
write-os. For those loans that lead to a write-o, the average loss incurred
by banks is around 34%, while the average loss when all loans are considered
(i.e., with and without write-os) is slightly above 10%.
Regarding what happens after the default episode is cleared, our main
results are:
i) In the rst quarter after leaving default, almost two thirds of rms have
access to credit again, but only one quarter is able to get a new bank loan;
ii) Exclusion from credit markets is either very short or very long. Firms
that are not able to regain access in the rst year after exiting default are very
unlikely to ever regain access;
iii) The severity of the default impacts the duration of exclusion: the more
severe the default was, the longer the rm is unable to borrow. This is true for
the amount defaulted on, the amount that was written-o, and the duration
of default;
iv) Firms regain access mainly with the banks with whom they had previ-
ously ongoing relationships. However, as time goes by, rms are more likely
to regain access through new bank relationships;
v) There is a very high rate of recidivism: one year after exiting default,
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almost 25% of rms are in default again. We nd that recidivism is related to
the severity of default; and
vi) Firms that leave default during recession periods regain access to credit
faster and are less likely to default again.
These results provide valuable empirical evidence on corporate post-default
dynamics, an issue that, in our opinion, has not been su!ciently explored in
the literature. However, many questions remain unanswered, some of which
are raised by the results discussed above. Two of these questions that we plan
to tackle in future research are whether banks charge higher interest rates
to rms after a default and also what factors can explain the high rates of
recidivism?
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CHAPTER 5
5 Counterfactual Analysis of Bank Mergers
5.1 Introduction
We analyze the eects bank mergers exert on market structure and credit
conditions75. The conventional approach employed in the banking literature
relies on the comparison of market characteristics before and after the merg-
ers, overlooking endogenous changes in market structure in the post-merger
equilibrium in the banking system. In this chapter, we present a methodol-
ogy that allows overcoming this gap in the evaluation of merger impact in
banking. By deriving a structural model of the credit market, we are able
to perform a counterfactual analysis of mergers, combining the pre-merger
equilibrium setting with characteristics of the post-merger environment, while
accounting for endogenously propagated changes in market structure. Using
this procedure we are able to estimate loan  ows and interest rates that would
be observed if the pre-merger equilibrium was not altered, i.e., if mergers had
not occurred. We obtain estimates of the impact of mergers accounting for the
75This chapter is based on joint work with Pedro Pita Barros, Moshe Kim and Nuno Mar-
tins, published as Barros, P.P., D. Bonm, M. Kim and N. Martins (2013), Counterfactual
Analysis of Bank Mergers, Empirical Economics, forthcoming.
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eects associated with endogenous changes in conduct and market structure
after mergers have taken place. Moreover, we disentangle the eect of changes
in the macroeconomic and nancial environment from endogenous changes in
market structure resulting from the mergers. These eects are usually ignored
in the assessment of merger impact and can lead to a signicant bias in the
results obtained76.
We apply the proposed methodology to a detailed dataset with unique char-
acteristics. This dataset covers a banking system that went through a wave
of mergers, thus constituting an ideal laboratory for estimating a counterfac-
tual scenario. Our dataset allows for the investigation of the merger impact
on corporate and household bank loans separately77. We are able to analyze
the eects of mergers on the merged banks as well as on those banks outside
the merging circles, taking into account endogenous changes in the post-merger
market structure. Furthermore, we analyze the resulting changes in local com-
petition by modeling the eects of changes in local market structure on the
aggregate industry conguration.
There is a large literature on the gains banks obtain from merging (see De-
gryse et al., 2009). Berger et al. (1999) argue that there is consistent evidence
76The dangers of neglecting this issue in the analysis of dierent economic periods are
extensively discussed in Lerner and Tufano (2011).
77Beck et al. (2009) provide evidence regarding the importance of analyzing household
and rm loans separately.
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that bank mergers increase market power, improve prot e!ciency and allow
for risk diversication, though the impact on cost e!ciency is small on average.
Focarelli et al. (2002) nd that mergers increase return on equity, but they
also lead to a rise in sta costs. In turn, they nd that acquisitions generate
a long-term reduction in lending, mainly for small rms, and a permanent
decrease in bad quality loans, which positively aects long-run protability.
Focusing on European mergers, Altunbas and Marqués (2008) nd that im-
provements in banks’ performance subsequent to mergers are more signicant
if there are strategic similarities between the merging banks. Mergers and ac-
quisitions also generate important changes in market structure and nancial
stability, as discussed in Adams et al., 2009, Berger et al., 2004, Cerasi et al.,
2010, Craig and Santos, 1997, or in Gowrisankaran and Holmes, 2004). Some
authors also nd that mergers may enhance cost reduction and improve re-
source allocation. Moreover, mergers may generate informational gains, which
improve banks’ screening abilities and customer discrimination (see, for in-
stance, Hauswald and Marquez, 2006, or Panetta et al., 2009). In turn, Beck
et al. (2006) show that bank mergers may have implications for nancial
stability.
It is also important to assess the impact of bank mergers on customers
with varying characteristics. Several authors conclude that bank mergers may
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negatively aect borrowers, most notably if they are small and medium size
rms, dependent on bank funding and with a limited number of bank rela-
tionships. For instance, Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi (2007) nd that, for a
sample of Italian rms, bank mergers have a negative eect on credit, partic-
ularly if the lending relationship comes to an end after the merger. This eect
persists only during the three years after the merger. Still, this negative eect
is not su!cient to generate a negative impact on rms’ investment or cash-
 ow sensitivity. Other authors nd mixed evidence regarding the impact of
bank mergers. Also using a sample of Italian rms, Sapienza (2002) concludes
that in-market mergers benet borrowers if these mergers involve banks with
limited market power. However, as the market share of the acquired bank
increases, the e!ciency gains are oset by an increase in market power, which
may imply a decrease in loan supply, especially to small borrowers. In another
study, Scott and Dunkelberg (2003) analyze the results of a survey on US rms
and nd that bank mergers do not aect loan supply or interest rates, even
though there is some deterioration in non-price loan terms, such as fees for
specic services. Degryse et al. (2011) nd that the impact of a bank merger
is more negative for smaller borrowers and for single relationship borrowers.
Moreover, target bank borrowers should be more harmed by the merger than
borrowers of the acquiring bank. Fraser et al. (2011) also provide evidence
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showing that large mergers generate highly negative wealth eects on borrow-
ers. In contrast, Erel (2011) nds that bank mergers reduce loan spreads,
most notably when the mergers generate cost savings. Finally, Karceski et
al. (2005) argue that mergers may have impacts on borrowers beyond credit
availability and interest rates. These authors show that mergers may in fact
have important consequences on rm value, observing that borrowers of the
acquiring banks usually benet from the mergers, whereas rms that borrow
from the target bank suer an opposite impact78 > 79.
In the present chapter, we use a structural model of equilibrium in credit
markets to analyze the impact of changes in market factors due to the merger
wave. One of the most common approaches in the literature is to estimate the
dierential impact of mergers. Using the structural model, we are able to go
further and estimate a counterfactual scenario for the post-merger period, thus
going beyond the simple (and insu!cient) comparison of variables before and
after mergers occur, which is usually performed for the assessment of merger
impact. Using this methodology, we compare the interest rate and credit  ows
78There is less work done on the impact of bank mergers on depositors. There is some
empirical evidence for Italian rms which suggests that bank mergers may have positive
consequences for depositors in the long-run, even though there may be some negative eects
in the short run (Focarelli and Panetta, 2003). However, Craig and Dinger (2009), using US
data, obtain a dierent result, given that they do not observe any positive long-term eect
of mergers on deposit interest rates. Their results are consistent with previous work done
by Prager and Hannan (1998).
79For a more detailed review of the recent literature on the impact of bank mergers, see
Degryse et al. (2009) and DeYoung et al. (2009).
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in the post-merger equilibrium setup with the value of these variables under
a counterfactual equilibrium. This counterfactual equilibrium is estimated
using the after-merger exogenous environment under the pre-merger market
structure.
As an alternative to structural estimation, a possibility would be to esti-
mate a reduced-form treatment eects model. This would require comparing
banks involved in mergers (treated) with those not involved (non-treated).
However, given the magnitude and impact of the mergers analyzed, this em-
pirical strategy would hardly lead to accurate estimates of the merger eects,
as the changes in market structure and conduct originated by the mergers
should have aected to some extent all banks, either directly or indirectly.
Hence, our methodology is especially useful to analyze large mergers in small
(and concentrated) banking systems.
The estimation of counterfactuals to assess the impacts of a merger may be
considered an important policy tool. For instance, Ivaldi and Verboven (2005)
emphasize that the evaluation of a merger from a policy perspective should
not be based solely on a static comparative analysis, but should also consider
dynamic eects and alternative merger scenarios. Berry and Pakes (1993) also
argue that static models of equilibrium do not take into account the long-
run reactions of merging and non-merging rms, thus generating misleading
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results. More recently, Lerner and Tufano (2011) show that the simple compar-
ison of dierent economic periods suers from serious endogeneity problems,
stressing the need to develop a structured counterfactual approach to analyze
what would have happened if a given event had not occurred. In an appli-
cation to the airline industry, Peters (2006) demonstrates the importance of
designing a counterfactual analysis to evaluate the impact of mergers, but is
silent regarding the possibility of collusion or strategic interactions between
rms. Berger et al. (1998) nd empirical evidence that supports the view
that the dynamic eects of mergers may generate results dierent from those
obtained using static analysis. The authors identify a decrease in lending to
small business after a merger, even though this static eect is largely oset
by dynamic eects associated with changes in the focus of the merging banks
or with the reaction of other banks. Nevertheless, these authors do not con-
sider local changes induced by mergers, neither do they compare the impact
on dierent institutional sectors80.
Our paper contributes to the literature on merger impact in banking mar-
kets by presenting a counterfactual analysis, based on a structural model of
equilibrium that clearly disentangles the eects of bank mergers on loan  ows
and interest rates and takes into account changes in market structure and
80Other papers have also analyzed local indicators of bank competition (see, for instance,
Berger et al., 1995, and Berger et al., 1998).
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conduct that may occur after the merger takes place. Our analysis is based
on loan  ows, as opposed to outstanding amounts, thus allowing us to better
capture changes in credit markets over time. Moreover, the data used allow
us to discriminate eects among corporate and household borrowers, and to
simulate the counterfactual equilibrium to the mergers that occurred. This
approach lends itself to the reporting of intuitive measures of merger impact
upon the degree of competition in the market. The use of a counterfactual sce-
nario becomes necessary, as mergers change the market structure underlying
bank competition. This issue is important to stress, as virtually all banking
merger studies rely on some exogenously treated market structure measure
for the post merger conguration, even though the merger itself endogenously
propagates the new equilibrium conguration.
We are able to make use of a signicant change in market structure in
the Portuguese banking market. Portugal is a small economy participating
in the European Union, and joined the euro area at its inception. Like other
European Union countries, it experienced a wave of mergers in the banking
sector. The most signicant changes occurred in 2000, with the merger of
several nancial institutions. The almost simultaneous nature of these mergers
provides a natural break point in time, allowing us to dene a pre- and a post-
merger period. Hence, we divide the 1995-2002 period in two: the pre-merger
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1995-1999 period and the post-merger 2000-2002 period81. Four out of the
seven major nancial groups were directly involved in those operations, either
by selling or by acquiring at least one nancial institution. In this chapter, we
analyze two dierent products (credit to households and to rms), two dierent
groups of institutions (those that are directly involved in the mergers and those
that are not) and consider two dierent periods (pre- and post-mergers).
Several interesting ndings emerge from our analysis. We nd that the
2000 merger wave increased total credit granted and decreased interest rates.
However, the analysis of aggregate credit  ows hides important dierences
between institutional sectors. In fact, we nd that the amount of credit  ow
granted to the household sector decreased, while the amount of credit granted
to the corporate sector increased during the same period. The changes in credit
 ows aected both the banking groups involved in the mergers and the groups
not involved. In fact, all nancial institutions experienced an increase in the
corporate credit sold following the mergers and a decrease in the interest rate
charged. However, the banks directly involved in the merger recorded a larger
increase in corporate credit than the banks that were not directly involved in
81Even though Portugal joined the euro area at its inception in 1st January 1999, the
eects of the convergence process in credit markets were felt mainly during the 90s. As
discussed in Antão et al. (2009), interest rates decreased gradually during the 90s due to
this convergence process and, simultaneously, credit accelerated during this period. Hence,
the eects of joining the euro area were gradual and not concentrated specically around
1999.
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the merger. The decline in credit granted to the household sector after the
merger period, which was concentrated in banks not involved in the merger
wave, suggests that households may be more sensitive to changes in local
market competition. These results show that mergers may actually aect the
degree of competition in the market, through the changes in the local market
structure, to a larger extent than predicted by aggregate market analysis.
In sum, we observe that potential e!ciency gains generated by the merg-
ers seem to have been transmitted to customers through lower lending rates82.
Moreover, access to credit improved signicantly for rms after the mergers,
though the same was not observed for households. When compared to the dif-
ferential analysis usually implemented in the banking literature, the counter-
factual estimation allows for a more precise and correct quantication of these
impacts, while isolating changes in the exogenous environment from changes
in endogenous market structure. The results obtained suggest that changes
in banks’ exogenous environment were behind most of the changes in interest
rates and loan  ows after the merger, particularly so for loans to households.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 develops the model of the
equilibrium in the credit market. Section 5.3 describes the data and the major
corporate changes in the banking system in 2000. Section 5.4 estimates the
82For a discussion on e!ciency gains arising from bank mergers, see Sapienza (2002).
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structural model of equilibrium in the credit market and Section 5.5 analyzes
the impact of the merger wave. Section 5.6 presents some concluding remarks.
5.2 The Analytical Framework
5.2.1 Demand Equation
Given our purpose of assessing the market equilibrium eects of bank merg-
ers, our approach to estimation has to rely on a minimum structure, such
that alternative market equilibria can be computed. At the same time, the
model needs to be parsimonious and  exible. Moreover, changes in competi-
tion should be analyzed at the most disaggregated level possible. Even though
there is no information on the local market operations of each bank, we do
have information on the location of branches and on characteristics of local
markets (such as population), thus allowing us to consider dierences in local
bank competition. In fact, as local market competition certainly depends on
the number and location of branches, the relative position of the branch net-
work of each bank does aect the demand faced by the bank, and thus own
and rival banks branch densities are considered in our model. The branch
density is commonly used in the empirical literature on local banking compe-
tition (see, for instance, Degryse and Ongena, 2005). We consider that rivalry
between banks is relevant on the choice of interest rates. Finally, economy-
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wide variables should in uence demand and must be included as demand-side
controls.
Since our unit of observation is the bank, we consider the total market
demand Olw directed at each bank (l), during a quarter (w). Loan demand,
Olw, is measured by loan  ows, rather than outstanding loans, thus capturing
loan demand in each quarter. Loan demand depends on two dierent sets
of variables: economy-wide variables that simultaneously aect all banks (Yw)
and bank-specic determinants (Vlw)83:
Olw = Yw Vlw
The set of variables Yw includes the aggregate average interest rate on new
loans granted in the country in quarter w, uw, and ]w which refers to overall
macroeconomic conditions (captured by the quarterly GDP). The vector Yw is
thus given by:
Yw = D0yu1w ]2w
where D0y is a constant, and 1 and 2 are parameters to be estimated.
The bank specic variables, Vlw, include the number of branches of a bank
83See Kim and Vale (2001) for further details.
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and of its rivals, Elw and E3lw = (Ew  Elw), respectively. The bank-specic
interest rate, ulw, should also be a determinant of the loan demand directed at
each bank. It is important to note that in each period, the decision variable
ulw is the average interest rate that bank l charges on new loans granted during
quarter w, not the average interest rate on existing loans. The overall demand
directed at bank l is also determined by the level of competition the bank
faces in the local markets in which it is active, as well as by the relative size
of such markets. In fact, for a given number of branches, dierent locations
can imply signicant dierences in demand generated. Therefore, we include
a set of local market competition variables [lw.
The vector of bank-level determinants is thus given by:







where D0v is a constant and !1, !2, !3 and !4, are parameters to be estimated.
Pooling all variables together, the demand equation we estimate is:
lnOlw = 0+l+1 ln uw+2 ln]w+!1 lnElw+!2 lnE3lw+!3 ln ulw+!4 ln[lw+%lw
(5.1)
where 0 is a constant and l are bank xed eects.
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where the sum is performed for all the n districts in the country84.
The variables capturing local market characteristics deserve some further
justication. The rst one, SRSlw, is a measure of the importance of each
market to bank l in period w, taking into account the population (SRS ) in
that market. It is dened as the proportion of branches each bank has in
market n is weighted by the population in that market. Thus, banks that
have a higher proportion of branches in more heavily populated areas will
have, ceteris paribus, a higher demand for their loans.
The second measure, OFlw, attempts to capture not a rough indicator of the
level of potential demand in eachmarket, but the intensity of local competition.
The basic element is the share of (branch) competition faced by bank l in
market n. This is given by the share of rival banks in the total number of
branches in market n, weighted by the importance of market n, branch-wise,
to bank l. This index can accommodate the dierences involved in having
84There are 18 districts in Portugal.
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branches in markets where other banks have no branches relative to crowded
markets.85
5.2.2 The Bank’s Problem
After setting the demand function faced by each bank, we turn now to the
supply side of the market. The prot function of a bank relevant for our
analysis, which focuses on the loan market, can be simply stated as interest
rate income less marginal costs multiplied by total (new) loan demand in each
period. Marginal costs include the opportunity cost of nancial funds.
The relevant (short-run) decision variable of bank l is its interest rate. To
account for possible strategic interactions among banks belonging to dierent
economic groups, we take a simple approach, assuming that they take into
consideration the impact they have on the prots of other banks. Under perfect
collusion (or joint management) banks would maximize joint prots, while
under perfectly independent behavior each would maximize own prots. Thus,
this approach accommodates intermediate situations by the introduction of a
single parameter, which measures to what extent a bank considers the impact
of its decisions on the prots of other banks86.
The bank’s problem is to maximize prots using the interest rate as the
85A similar index can be found in Barros (1999).
86For a similar approach, see Barros (1999).
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lw = Olw(ulw  flw) +
X
m 6=l
lmOmw (umw  fmw)
where m represents all remaining banks and flw is a measure of weighted funding
costs, taking into account deposits and interbank funding. Parameters lm
are the competition factor that accounts for the eect of bank m on bank l’s
objective function. If lm = 1, there is collusion, whereas if lm = 0 banks
maximize prots independently.
Using the demand equation dened in the previous section, it becomes
straightforward to characterize the optimal interest rate choice taken by bank


















































where we have used the fact that (1 + uw) = [ql=1 (1 + ulw)]
1@qw and qw is the
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total number of banks in quarter w.
Simplication allows us to write the rst-order-condition as:












For estimation purposes, it becomes useful to solve the equation with re-














(umw  fmw) + l +  lw (5.2)
where l are bank xed eects and  lw are estimation errors.
5.2.3 The System of Equations
Together, the system of equations (5.1) and (5.2) characterize the equilibrium
in the credit market. As discussed above, the strategic eects between bank l
and its m rivals are captured by the group of parameters lm. As the number
of parameters implied by lm is potentially quite large, restrictions on possible
values will be imposed during estimation. Hence, in order to simplify the em-
pirical estimation, we will reduce the number of strategic eects and consider
the interaction of bank l with its main rival, which is dened to be the nancial
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institution with the lowest interest rate during the quarter, Uminlw.87 As a




lnOlw = 0 + l + 1 ln uw + 2 ln]w + !1 lnElw + !2 lnE3lw + !3 ln ulw+
+!41SRSlw + !42OFlw + %lw









Olw (umw  fmw)
i
(5.3)
The system (5.3) highlights the nonlinear constraint involving the parame-
ters 1 and !3, representing a link between equations (5.1) and (5.2).
87We have tried dierent strategic eects and the results do not change signicantly.
For instance, we have considered (i) dening the main rival as the bank that has granted
more credit during the quarter ([pd{lw), (ii) the bank with the closest loan  ow in each
quarter, (iii) the interaction of the ve main rivals, (iv) the average of the interaction
of the ve main rivals Xmaxlw = 1@5
P
m=1>===>5[maxmw or (v) the interactions given by:
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5.3 The Data
The nal dataset is the result of merging three dierent sources of data.
The rst dataset includes information on the branches’ location. The sec-
ond dataset includes unique interest rate and credit data, which allows distin-
guishing between the household and the corporate sectors. The third database
gathers the regional characterization. The nal dataset consists of quarterly
data from the rst quarter of 1995 to the third quarter of 2002 and each
observation corresponds to a bank in each quarter.
Regarding branch location, the data are collected by the Banking Supervi-
sion Department at Banco de Portugal. Whenever a bank establishes a branch,
it is required to report this event to the supervisor within a period of three
months. The same time period is set for a branch change of address, closing
or other major change.
The data on credit and interest rate is collected from the Monetary and
Financial Statistics (MFS) of Banco de Portugal. The MFS are a monthly
mandatory survey sent to all nancial institutions operating in the country
and includes information on end-of-period stocks and  ows of credit granted
to households and to non-nancial corporations88. Data on interest rates are
88For further details on the Monetary and Finan-
cial Statistics, please see http://www.bportugal.pt/en-
US/Estatisticas/Dominios%20Estatisticos/Pages/EstatisticasMonetariaseFinanceiras.aspx
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based on the  ows of new credit granted. There was a major revision in
interest rate statistics at the end of 2002, with the purpose of harmonizing
methodologies within the Eurosystem, which prevents the use of more recent
data. In fact, from 2003 onwards, interest rate statistics began to be estimated
using a sample of representative banks, instead of using the whole universe of
banking institutions, as before. Hence, there are several banks (including
small banks belonging to the seven largest banking groups) for which there is
no interest rate data after end-2002. Nevertheless, a longer estimation period
would probably not be adequate, given that the eects of mergers should
be more strongly and clearly captured in the years immediately after these
mergers89. Moreover, it would be a very strong assumption to require that the
pre-merger equilibrium holds for many years after the merger wave, as changes
in economic and nancial variables should also shape this equilibrium.
Finally, we further collected data on the demographic characteristics of the
districts from Statistics Portugal, including total population by municipality.
or http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/1005/1021/html/index.en.html.
89For instance, Berger et al. (1998) consider that the dynamic eects of bank mergers
should be analyzed in the three years following the merger.
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5.3.1 Description of the 2000 Merger Wave
During the 1995 to 2002 sample period, the Portuguese nancial system expe-
rienced several restructuring processes. Among the main corporate changes,
we highlight the most signicant ones:
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Date Event
January 1996 Banco Português de Investimento (BPI) buys Banco
Borges & Irmão (BBI) and Banco Fonsecas e Burnay
(BFB).
December 1997 Banco Comercial de Macau (BCM) changes to Expresso
Atlantico.
September 1998 Merger between BBI, Banco Fomento e Exterior (BFE)
and BFB. The new institution is named as BBPI.
March 2000 The group Banco Pinto e Sotto Mayor (BPSM), which
included the banks BPSM, Banco Totta e Sotto Mayor
Inv (BTSM Inv), Banco Totta e Açores (BTA) and
Credito Predial Português (CPP), is extinguished.
March 2000 The bank BPSM is bought by Banco Comercial Por-
tuguês (BCP).
March 2000 BTSM Inv is acquired by Caixa Geral de Depósitos
(CGD).
March 2000 CPP is acquired by BTA.
September 2000 Santander buys BTA.
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Among the main events, the ones occurred in 2000 are by far the most im-
portant, as they involved major banks as well as major nancial groups. These
are universal banks operating in most retail market segments throughout the
country. Among the seven major nancial groups, four were directly involved
either by selling a nancial institution or by acquiring one, thus generating
profound changes in the structure of the Portuguese banking market. Due to
the signicant changes occurring in 2000, we may distinguish between specic
characteristics of the pre-2000 period, which we designate as the pre-merger
period (comprehending the years 1995-1999), and specic characteristics of the
after-2000 period, which we denominate the post-merger period (including the
years 2000-2002).
To better understand the changes occurring in the credit market during
2000 we analyze the evolution of the stock of credit and total number of
branches in the country during the 1995-2002 period. The pattern is pre-
sented in Figure 5.1. The gure reveals that credit  ows seem to peak at mid-
1999, while the total number of branches increased more signicantly between
1995 and 1998. Figure 5.1 also reveals a decelerating trend in the number of
branches following the important consolidation move in 2000.
An inspection of the aggregate numbers in Figure 5.1 suggests that the
merger and acquisition activity in 2000 did not signicantly aect the total
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Stock of credit 
(rhs; EUR million)
Notes: The stock of credit and the credit flow reported are aggregate values from the Monetary and Financial Statistics, Banco de Portugal.
credit gures but that is not necessarily so for the within group composition.
In Figure 5.2 we are able to take a closer look at the corporate changes and
compute the market shares of the total stock of credit for the main nancial
groups during the 1995-2002 period. We observe that the 2000 merger wave
signicantly changed the market share of some groups. Moreover, as illustrated
in Figure 5.3, the banking groups involved in the 2000 merger wave experienced
a larger gain in market shares than the remaining banks90.
We also observe that after the merger wave there was some increase in the
90We consider that both the acquiring and the acquired banking groups are involved in
the merger.
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Notes: Market shares are computed by taking into account the total outstanding amount of credit. Banks were grouped into 8 major groups: the 7 largest banking 
groups in the banking system, plus one additional group including all other small banks. Only the 7 largest banking groups are considered in this figure. Each line 
represents a different group. 
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Not involved in mergers
Involved in mergers
Notes: Market shares are computed by taking into account the total outstanding amount of credit. The group of financial institutions directly involved in the 
merger includes institutions belonging to financial groups that have acquired or sold a financial institution to a different financial group in 2000. The small 
banks not belonging to any large banking group are considered in the set of banks not directly involved in the mergers.
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1995Q1 1996Q1 1997Q1 1998Q1 1999Q1 2000Q1 2001Q1 2002Q1
Notes: The relative interest rates are computed as the average rate on new loans granted by each banking group relative to the average rate on all new loans 
granted in each quarter. Banks were grouped into 8 major groups: the 7 largest banking groups in the banking system, plus one additional group including all 
other small banks. Only the 7 largest banking groups are considered in this figure. Each line represents a different group. 
dispersion of interest rates of the larger banking groups (Figure 5.4). This
heightened dispersion was mostly due to a relative increase in interest rates
oered by the groups directly involved in the 2000 merger wave (Figure 5.5).
All this evidence suggests that the signicant changes occurring in 2000
may have had important consequences in the credit market, namely on credit
granted, interest rates charged and on the strategic eects among the nancial
players. This chapter analyzes those changes.
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Not involved in mergers
Involved in mergers
Notes: The relative interest rates are computed as the average rate on new loans granted by each banking group relative to the  average rate on all new loans 
granted in each quarter. The group of financial institutions directly involved in the merger includes institutions belonging to financial groups that have acquired 
or sold a financial institution to a different financial group in 2000. The small banks not belonging to any large banking group are considered in the set of banks 
not directly involved in the mergers.
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5.3.2 Summary Statistics
Overall, there are 71 banks in the dataset that are in operation for at least
one quarter during the sample period. Banks are grouped in 8 major nancial
groups: we consider the seven most important nancial groups that include 26
banks and one additional group including the remaining banks in the sample91.
Four of these banking groups were directly involved in the 2000 merger wave.
Table 5.1 presents the summary statistics of our sample for the stock of
credit,  ows and other variables for three dierent groups of banks: i) the four
large banking groups involved in the merger wave, ii) the three large banking
groups not involved in the mergers, and iii) the remaining banks that were
not involved in the merger wave. The average credit market share of a bank
belonging to the group of banks engaged in mergers is 3.4 percent, while the
large banks that do not belong to this group have on average 6.7 percent of the
total stock of credit. In turn, the smaller banks not involved in mergers have
only, on average, 0.6 percent of the credit market. Statistical tests show that
these banks are indeed quite dierent. This evidence highlights the importance
of treating these banks separately and, hence, they will be excluded from
regression analysis.
91As shown by Park and Pennacchi (2009), bank mergers aect dierently large and small
banks, hence justifying analyzing them separately.
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Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Stock o f credit
Total stock of credit 323 2751 5134 1.5 31866
Number of branches 323 175 249 1 1312
Market share (total credit) 323 3.4 4 0.0 26.1
Flow of credit
Total credit flow 323 2268 6064 0.2 39776
Credit flow (households) 323 318 761 0 5769
Credit flow (corporate sector) 323 1950 5335 0 35655
Interest rates
Interest rate 323 11.1 5 3.2 25.7
Interest rate (household credit) 287 13.2 5 3.2 25.7
Interest rate (corporate sector credit) 264 9.9 4 3.1 23.5
Interbank market rate 323 5.2 2 2.4 9.1
Bank speci fi c and demographic variables
ROA 323 0.003 0.0 -0.1 0.03
LC 323 0.3 0.3 0.1 1.0










Stock o f credit
Total stock of credit 232 5422 7270 0.04 37014 *** 791 419 580 0.24 3268 ***
Number of branches 232 242 229 1 786 *** 791 26 44 1 217 ***
Market share (total credit) 232 6.7 8 0.0 27.4 *** 791 0.6 1 0.0 3.9 ***
Flow of credit
Total credit flow 232 1903 2866 0 16420 791 314 555 0 3514 ***
Credit flow (households) 232 401 567 0 2750 791 41 78 0 437 ***
Credit flow (corporate sector) 232 1502 2341 0 13812 791 273 496 0 3116 ***
Interest rates
Interest rate 232 9.2 4 3.8 20.0 *** 791 8.5 4 2.6 23.6 ***
Interest rate (household credit) 213 10.4 4 3.2 20.0 *** 622 10.2 5 1.5 28.0 ***
Interest rate (corporate sector credit) 226 9.3 4 3.8 18.8 736 7.9 3 2.6 22.3 ***
Interbank market rate 232 5.0 2 2.4 9.1 791 4.9 2 2.4 9.1 **
Bank speci fi c and demographic variables
ROA 232 0.003 0.0 -0.1 0.02 791 0.001 0.0 -0.3 0.04
LC 232 0.3 0.3 0.1 1.0 ** 791 0.5 0.3 0.1 1.0 ***
POP 232 13.0 3.7 2.4 21.4 *** 791 15.0 5.1 2.5 21.4 ***
Notes: The group of financial institutions directly involved in the merger includes institutions belonging to financial 
groups that have acquired or sold a financial institution to a different financial group in 2000. All credit values are in Eur 
million. Market shares are computed by taking into account the total outstanding amount of credit and are displayed as 
percentages. Interest rates are annualized and refer to new loans granted in each quarter. ROA is the return on assets of 
each bank, LC is a measure of local competition and POP is a measure of the importance of each market to bank i in 
period t. LC and POP are defined in Section 2.1. The columns "mean tests" refer to mean comparison tests between each 
group and the group of banks involved in the mergers. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Table 5 .1  - Summary stati stics
Banks invo lved in mergers
Large banks not invo lved in mergers
Other banks not invo lved in 
mergers
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The average interest rate on the total credit  ow charged by the banks
involved in mergers is 11.1 percent (9.2 percent for the other large banks and
8.5 for the smaller banks). The household market experiences higher interest
rates (13.2, 10.4 and 10.2 percent for the groups of banks under analysis) than
the corporate sector (9.9, 9.3 and 7.9 percent, respectively)92.
These statistics refer to the entire sample period. We will analyze how the
merger wave aected credit  ows and interest rates, both for households and
for rms.
5.4 Analysis of Equilibrium in the Credit Market
Table 5.2 presents the results of the estimation of the system (5.3). The model
is estimated for quarterly data and covers the 1995-2002 period. Estimating
the model for the full period allows for a characterization of market structure,
which can be useful as a benchmark to assess the impact of mergers. Columns
(1) - (2) characterize the equilibrium for the total credit granted, aggregating
household and corporate credit, and columns (3) - (4) and (5) - (6) correspond
to the estimations for the household and corporate sectors, respectively. It
should be noted that, in this setting, we are able to dierentiate banking output
92Most of the banks in the sample operate in both the household and the corporate credit
markets, even though some small banks display null credit  ows in one of these segments in
some quarters. All banks considered grant credit to households and only two small banks
never grant credit to rms during the entire sample period.
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into household and rm loans without making any assumptions regarding their
complementarity or substitutability, given that these are two dierent and
independent markets. This implies null cross-elasticities of demand between
these markets, given that, by denition, customers cannot switch between
these two markets. Thus, specifying linear demand functions should not in ict
problems that would exist in markets where these cross-elasticities vary in
response to dierent strategies93.
93Berg and Kim (1998) empirically document such separability in the Norwegian market
and present a discussion on cross-market interactions when banks produce multiple outputs.
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Table 5 .2 - Characterization o f the determinants o f credit flows and interest rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Credit) rit ln(Credit) rit ln(Credit) rit
ln(number of branches) 1.250 *** 0.884 ** 1.658 ***
(3.98) (2.48) (3.53)
ln(number of branches other banks) -0.863 0.475 -3.076 ***
-(1.23) (0.69) -(3.21)
ln(rt) -0.417 -0.119 -0.265
-(1.41) -(0.30) -(0.54)
ln(rit) -0.194 *** -1.155 *** -1.197 ***
- - -
GDP 0.031 0.075 *** 0.008
(1.46) (3.08) (0.23)
POP 0.069 0.013 -0.199 *
(0.88) (0.12) -(1.70)
LC 8.277 *** 5.356 * 20.126 ***
(3.62) (1.94) (6.23)
cit 1.198 *** 1.210 *** 1.213 ***
(27.05) (23.11) (23.46)
Rmin -1.683 -0.110 0.132 ***
-(0.15) -(0.09) (3.51)
constant 5.247 5.279 *** -3.412 6.304 *** 25.161 *** 5.419 ***
(0.81) (7.57) -(0.52) (7.89) (2.73) (7.04)
Lambda -3.3 0.1 -0.1
Standard error -39.3 -3.1 -0.1
H0: Ȝ = 0 0.88 0.93 0.59
H0: Ȝ = 1 0.85 0.60 0.00
Observations 562 562 507 507 496 496
Notes: All regressions include banks' fixed effects and robust standard errors. Robust t statistics are presented in
parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** signficant at 1%. The estimations are performed for
quarterly data during the 1995-2002 period. Estimation is based on a seemingly unrelated (SUR) model. The interest
rates refer to the new loans granted in each quarter. LC is a measure of local competition and POP is a measure of the
importance of each market to bank i in period t. LC and POP are defined in Section 2.1. Cit is a measure of weighted
funding costs, taking into account deposits and interbank funding. Rmin is a variable that measures the strategic
interaction between banks, being defined as Rmin = (1/nbanks) * Ljt / Lit * (rjt - cjt), where Ljt and rjt are,
respectively, the loan flow and the interest rates of each banks' rival, defined as that with the lowest interest rate in
that quarter, in each market segment. 
The t statistics for the coefficient associated with ln(rit) in columns (1), (3) and (5) are omitted, as this coefficient is
determined by a constraint in the model. The lower number of observations in the regressions for households and firms
is due to the fact that some small banks show null credit flows in one of these market segments in some quarters (two
small banks never grant credit to firms during the entire sample period). Lambda reflects the effect of the rival banks
on the profit maximization function of each bank and is derived from a combination of the estimated coefficients,
resulting from the model.
Total credit flows Households Firms
System of equations System of equations System of equations
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The system of equations (5.3) is estimated using a seemingly unrelated
(SUR) model, which allows for cross-equations correlation of the residuals.
All regressions are estimated using banks’ xed eects and robust standard
errors94.
Looking at the results for the aggregated credit  ows, in columns (1) - (2),
we observe that the total number of branches is positively and signicantly
related to the logarithm of total credit granted, indicating that local branching
arrangements are an important factor in liquidity provision95. We obtain an
estimate for !1 equal to 1.25, with a w-statistic of 3.98. This means that a
small increase in the number of bank branches had signicant eects on the
loan demand faced by each bank during the period analyzed.
In addition, the interest rate charged by the bank is negatively related
to the total credit granted96. As expected, the interest rate charged by the
bank l, ulw, is strongly and positively related to banks’ funding costs, flw. The
94For robustness purposes, banking group xed eects were also included in the regres-
sions, to take into account possible similarities or synergies between nancial institutions
integrated in the same banking group. The results are broadly consistent and are available
upon request. Nevertheless, the value added by these additional xed eects is marginal
and implies an important loss of the degrees of freedom used in the estimations.
95In a recent paper, Corvoisier and Gropp (2009) argue that the widespread use of web-
based banking platforms should have decreased sunk costs and increased contestability in
retail banking, as establishing branches became less important. Nevertheless, the authors
nd that even though this hypothesis may be true for time and saving deposits, it does not
hold for small business loans, where establishing a branching network with local connections
is still important.
96In the table, we omit the t-stats for this coe!cient in columns (1), (3) and (5), as this
coe!cient is determined by the constraint in system (5.3).
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estimate for the coe!cient 1 is 1.20, with a w-statistic of 27.05. Hence, when
banks’ funding costs increase or decrease, the change in loan rates charged to
customers is proportionally more signicant.
Although columns (1) and (2) allow to identify the determinants of the
credit and interest rates charged by the bank, the analysis for these aggregate
credit  ows smoothes important idiosyncratic characteristics of the determi-
nants of the household and corporate sectors credit markets. Columns (3) and
(4) present the results for system (5.3) for the household sector and columns
(5) and (6) present a similar analysis for the corporate sector. The distinc-
tion across these institutional sectors highlights important dierences in these
markets, thus justifying a disaggregate specication rather than treating the
credit market as a homogeneous market97.
We observe that the banks’ own number of branches positively in uences
credit granted, both to households and to rms (the estimated coe!cients are
0.88 and 1.66, respectively). In turn, the number of branches of the remaining
banks is not signicantly correlated with credit granted to households, as illus-
trated in column (3), while it has a negative and signicant impact on credit
supplied to the corporate sector (column (5)).
97The lower number of observations in the regressions for households and rms is due to
the fact that some small banks show null credit  ows in one of these market segments in
some quarters, as discussed in Section 5.3.2. Moreover, two small banks never grant credit
to rms during the entire sample period.
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Looking at the macro determinants, Table 5.2 reveals that the impact of
the GDP level on credit granted is positive for both credit markets. Given that
GDP re ects changes in global macroeconomic conditions and also changing
industry risk, this result conrms the usually observed pro-cyclicality of liquid-
ity provision98. However, this impact is statistically signicant only for credit
to households. Moreover, local branch competition has a positive impact on
the credit  ow. This impact is fourfold larger in the corporate than in the
household sector99.
The evidence on strategic behavior, measured by the coordination para-
meter , suggests that there is no collusion between banks, as  is always less
than one. The statistical tests on these parameters show that we can reject
the hypothesis of perfect collusion ( = 1) in the corporate credit market,
thus suggesting that banks behave competitively in this market. However,
for households we cannot rule out either the hypothesis of perfect collusion
( = 1) or perfect competition ( = 0). These results are consistent with pre-
vious evidence obtained by Berg and Kim (1998), who argue that the mobility
of customers in the corporate market is stronger than in other markets, thus
98Controlling for GDP should capture the most relevant time xed eects. To mitigate
concerns about potential cointegration issues, we also considered the GDP growth rate,
having obtained broadly similar results.
99The estimated coe!cient !42 is 5.36 for households (with a w-statistic of 1.94) and 20.13
for rms (with a w-statistic of 6.23).
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generating more competitive behaviors by banks. More recently, Degryse et
al. (2011) show that rms may benet from switching banks after mergers
occur, what is related to banks’ competitive strategies.
Having analyzed the determinants of credit  ow and interest rates for the
household and corporate markets, we can now determine how these parameters
change following bank mergers.
5.5 The Impact of the Merger Wave
This section analyzes the impact of the 2000 merger wave on the determinants
of credit  ows and interest rates. On the one hand, we are interested on the
impact of the merger wave on the credit  ow and interest rates charged and,
on the other hand, we aim at determining how the merger has aected local
branch competition and coordination moves in the banking industry.
For illustration purposes, we begin by estimating the dierential impact
of the merger wave, given that this is one of the most common approaches
in the literature (see for example Erel, 2011, Focarelli and Panetta, 2003, or
Sapienza, 2002). However, this reduced form dierential analysis suers from
several drawbacks. In fact, this analysis does not take into account changes in
market structure and conduct. In our opinion using a Herndahl Hirschman
Index should not be su!cient to adequately capture changes in market power
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resulting from mergers, as this measure is endogenous and may re ect other
market dynamics. In fact, the magnitude of the merger wave should gener-
ate changes in the interaction between banks and possibly also in consumer
preferences. Given these changes, the dierential analysis, usually conducted
in the literature, may lead to biased and incorrect estimates of the merger
impact. Hence, we propose a new methodology for the comparison between
the pre- and post-merger periods, through the estimation of a counterfactual.
We explicitly consider that the merger wave might have generated a new setup
in credit markets in the post-merger period. In this estimation we combine
the pre-merger equilibrium setup with the post-merger observed environment
to answer the "what if" question.
5.5.1 The Dierential Impact of the Merger Wave
Taking into account one of the most common approaches used to assess the
impact of mergers, we compute the dierential impact of the merger wave on
the equilibrium in the credit market. In particular, we analyze how variables
such as the strategic behavior and local competition change after the merger.
In order to pursue this objective, we consider a dummy variable DIWHU that
has value one if the quarter is in year 2000 or after, and zero otherwise, and
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lnOlw = 0 + l + 01DIWHU+ 1 ln uw + 2 ln]w + !1 lnElw + !2 lnE3lw + !3 ln ulw+
+!41SRSlw + !42OFlw + !43OFlw DIWHU+ %lw









Olw (umw  fmw)
i
(5.4)
In this model, the coe!cient 01 and 01 capture possible changes in the
level of credit  ow and of interest rates after the merger wave and !43 considers
the dierence in the impact of the local branch competition on the quarterly
credit  ow following the 2000 merger with respect to the impact during the pre-
merger period. Using the coe!cient 3 and equation (5.2) we can compute a
similar dierential eect for the strategic interaction, , which we name diwhu.
In Section 5.4 we assumed that the coe!cients are time-invariant and thus
100The choice of the year 2000 is motivated by the large number of mergers observed, some
of which involving some of the largest banks. As illustrated in section 5.3.1, these mergers
had a substantial impact on market structure.
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not aected by the merger wave. Hence, if any of these additional variables is
signicant, the results presented in Section 5.4 are inaccurate. In this subsec-
tion we will test the stability of these coe!cients.
The results for the dierential impact are presented in Table 5.3. Columns
(1) - (2) present the analysis for the total credit  ow (household plus corporate
credit) and columns (3) - (4) and (5) - (6) present the results for the household
and corporate sectors, respectively.
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Table 5 .3  - Analysis o f the di fferentia l  impact o f the merger wave
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Credit) rit ln(Credit) rit ln(Credit) rit
AFTER 0.343 ** -1.628 *** -0.471 ** -2.003 *** 0.971 *** -1.939 ***
(2.09) -(8.07) -(3.01) -(8.22) (4.48) -(8.40)
ln(number of branches) 0.974 *** 1.052 *** 1.168 **
(3.07) (2.89) (2.50)
ln(number of branches other banks -0.745 0.774 -3.337 ***
-(1.05) (1.13) -(3.56)
ln(rt) -0.133 0.343 -0.545
-(0.38) (0.81) -(1.04)
ln(rit) -0.310 *** -1.064 *** -1.268 ***
- - -
GDP 0.041 0.130 *** -0.045
(1.37) (4.01) -(0.91)
POP 0.130 * -0.023 -0.213 *
(1.65) -(0.21) -(1.87)
LC 6.066 *** 6.559 ** 17.389 ***
(2.63) (2.31) (5.46)
LC*AFTER -1.021 *** 0.462 -2.289 ***
-(4.02) (1.47) -(5.21)
cit 1.046 *** 1.036 *** 1.068 ***
(22.71) (19.30) (20.68)
Rmin -15.475 -1.147 0.622 ***
-(1.34) -(1.01) (4.47)
Rmin*AFTER 4.953 -6.171 -0.491 ***
(0.12) -(0.42) -(3.49)
constant 4.598 6.102 *** -9.142 7.247 *** 32.409 *** 6.202 ***
(0.68) (9.12) -(1.36) (9.55) (3.53) (8.64)
Lambda -80.6 -0.2 -0.3
Standard error -33.2 -2.7 -0.3
H0: Ȝ = 0 0.71 0.53 0.31
H0: Ȝ = 1 0.71 0.00 0.00
Lambda*AFTER 25.8 -1.2 0.2
Standard error -114.6 -35.0 -0.3
H0: Ȝ = 0 0.91 0.71 0.32
H0: Ȝ = 1 0.91 0.49 0.00
Observations 562 562 507 507 496 496
Notes: All regressions include banks' fixed effects and robust standard errors. Robust t statistics are presented in
parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** signficant at 1%. The estimations are performed for
quarterly data during the 1995-2002 period. Estimation is based on a seemingly unrelated (SUR) model. AFTER is
a binary variable which takes the value one if the observation is on or after 2000. The interest rates refer to the new
loans granted in each quarter. LC is a measure of local competition and POP is a measure of the importance of each
market to bank i in period t. LC and POP are defined in Section 2.1. Cit is a measure of weighted funding costs,
taking into account deposits and interbank funding. Rmin is a variable that measures the strategic interaction
between banks, being defined as Rmin = (1/nbanks) * Ljt / Lit * (rjt - cjt), where Ljt and rjt are, respectively, the
loan flow and the interest rates of each banks' rival, defined as that with the lowest interest rate in that quarter, in
each market segment. 
The t statistics for the coefficient associated with ln(rit) in columns (1), (3) and (5) are omitted, as this
coefficient is determined by a constraint in the model. The lower number of observations in the regressions for
households and firms is due to the fact that some small banks show null credit flows in one of these market
segments in some quarters (two small banks never grant credit to firms during the entire sample period). Lambda
reflects the effect of the rival banks on the profit maximization function of each bank and is derived from a
combination of the estimated coefficients, resulting from the model.
Total credit flows Households Firms
System of equations System of equations System of equations
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The rst row of the estimated coe!cients in Table 5.3 shows the results
for the variable DIWHU. The negative coe!cient in column (3) reveals that
the quarterly credit  ow decreased after the mergers for the household sector,
despite the decrease in interest rates (column (4)). This suggests that there
were important changes in market equilibrium after the mergers, given that a
pure shift along the demand curve would imply a positive eect on credit due to
the decrease in interest rates. We conducted some estimations that suggested
that the decrease of loan  ows to the household sector after the merger were
mainly concentrated in loans for consumption and other purposes. For the
corporate sector, the sale of credit increased after the merger, as observed in
column (5), and the interest rate charged decreased, as shown in column (6)101.
Post-merger equilibrium loan rates decrease when the merger induces large
cost advantages relative to the increase in banks’ market power, as shown by
Carletti et al. (2007). Our results are consistent with Fonseca and Normann
(2008), who argue that even though a merger involving the largest rm in
101To explore in more detail the timing of these eects, we estimated another modied
version of our empirical model where instead of 01DIWHU and 01DIWHU we consider
01DIWHUG2000+02DIWHUG2001+03DIWHUG2002 and 01DIWHUG2000+
02DIWHU  G2001 + 03DIWHU  G2002. This analysis shows that the negative eect
on credit granted to households was gradual, but became slightly larger over time. In turn,
the positive eect on loans to rms was concentrated in the immediate post-merger period.
For interest rates, the decrease attributable to mergers was gradually felt over time, both
for households and for the corporate sector.
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a market creates a more asymmetric market structure, asymmetric markets
exhibit lower prices than symmetric markets with the same number of rms.
In order to conrm the validity and strength of these dierential impacts,
we tested for the existence of a structural break after the merger wave, using a
Chow test. In all the tests performed we reject the null hypothesis of structural
stability of the parameters. These results show that the coe!cients estimated
for the entire sample period in Section 5.4 were inaccurate, as the merger wave
had a relevant impact on credit  ows and interest rates.
For robustness purposes, we considered the possibility that the eect of
bank mergers takes some time to be re ected in credit  ows and interest rates.
To test this possibility, we estimated the same regressions, but considering
that the dummy variable DIWHU would take the value of unity only from
2001 onwards. The results for households remain broadly unchanged. For
rms, we continue to observe the negative impact on interest rates, but the
positive impact on credit ceases to be signicant. Nevertheless, the impact
of the mergers should have been felt almost immediately, as suggested by the
rapid change in banks’ names and identities. To test the hypothesis that the
merger impact could have had immediate impacts, we also estimated these
regressions with the dummy variable DIWHU taking the value of unity from
1999 onwards. We observe that, in this situation, the dierential impact of
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the merger wave on credit  ows looses signicance, thus conrming 2000 as a
sensible break point.
Looking at the eect of local branch competition, we nd that the impact
was most signicant for the corporate sector. In this credit market, we nd
that the merger leads to a decrease in the impact of local competition on
the credit  ow. Hence, the positive impact of local bank competition on credit
granted to rms becomes slightly smaller (though still positive and large) after
the merger wave.
The strategic eect of the main rival following the merger is presented in
the last two groups of rows in Table 5.3. In what concerns the market for
household loans, we clearly reject the hypothesis of collusion, though that
conclusion does not hold for the post-merger period. In turn, in the corporate
loan market we always reject the existence of full coordination moves between
banks, even though  increased somewhat after the merger wave.
5.5.2 Counterfactual Analysis of the Merger Wave
The previous analysis computes a dierential eect of specic variables and
assumes that all remaining interactions remain constant. However, this analy-
sis does not fully take into account the structural changes that should have
occurred in credit markets after the merger wave. Given the magnitude and
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extension of the mergers, the way banks (and their costumers) interact should
have changed substantially after the merger. In this section, we assume that a
new scenario is created that in uences all variables in the credit market. Un-
der this scenario, the evaluation of the dierences in strategic eects requires
the comparison between the results for the post-merger period and the ones
obtained from the estimation of the pre-merger equilibrium using the post-
merger data (counterfactual). The main advantage is that we can analyze the
merger impact using the post-merger environment, which is obviously a much
more realistic assumption.
The way we construct the counterfactual for the empirical estimation is
the following. We rst estimate the model (5.3) for the 1995-1999 period and
obtain estimates for the pre-merger period. We then use the pre-merger coe!-
cient estimates of this model for the 2000-2002 data on exogenous variables to
obtain the value of the estimated post-merger credit  ows and interest rates
charged by the bank.102 This means that these two estimated variables are
the credit and interest rates in the post-merger period assuming the impact of
the market environment, strategic eects and local market competition in the
pre-merger period.
We also consider the possibility of ignoring changes in the branch network
102Given the recursive nature of the model, the estimated interest rates are used to estimate
credit  ows in the counterfactual.
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after the mergers, given that the mergers should have had eects on the struc-
ture of the branch network and, most notably, on local bank competition.
Hence, we also estimate counterfactual values for credit and interest rates by
assuming that the branch network remains unchanged at pre-merger levels.
Counterfactual estimates of credit and interest rates Table 5.4 presents
the main counterfactual estimations. The Table is divided in two panels. In
Panel A we present the global results, while in Panel B we show separate
results for two groups of nancial institutions: (i) the ones that are directly
involved in the merger wave and (ii) the ones that are not directly involved
in the merger wave. By "directly involved" we mean that the nancial group
acquired or sold a nancial institution to a dierent nancial group.103
103As previously documented, out of the seven major nancial groups, four were directly
involved in the merger wave and three were not directly involved.
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Total 5.76 5.81 5.93 4.72 ***
Households 4.10 4.77 5.26 *** 4.97 *
Firms 5.59 6.01 4.36 *** 3.86 ***
Interest rates
Total 11.46 8.20 9.53 *** 9.53 ***
Households 13.31 9.37 11.08 *** 11.08 ***




















(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Credit flows (ln)
Total 5.50 5.76 5.33 * 3.98 *** 6.16 5.88 6.68 *** 5.65
Households 3.74 5.07 5.13 4.93 4.60 4.37 5.44 *** 5.02 ***
Firms 5.39 6.14 3.92 *** 3.26 *** 5.84 5.89 4.79 *** 4.43 ***
Interest rates
Total 12.18 8.92 10.71 *** 10.71 *** 10.39 7.30 8.06 *** 8.06 ***
Households 14.49 10.46 12.34 *** 12.34 *** 11.68 7.96 9.46 *** 9.46 ***
Firms 11.30 6.58 9.74 *** 9.74 *** 10.68 7.07 8.14 *** 8.14 ***
Notes: The estimations are performed for quarterly data during the 1995-2002 period. The pre-merger period comprehends the 1995-1999 
period, whereas the post-merger period goes from 2000 to 2002. The group of financial institutions directly involved in the merger includes 
institutions belonging to financial groups that have acquired or sold a financial institution to a different financial group in 2000. The 
interest rates refer to the new loans granted in each quarter. Columns (3), (7) and (11) present the counterfactual estimates for the post-
merger period, by taking into account the pre-merger equilibrium and the post-merger environment.Columns (4), (8) and (12) present 
similar counterfactual estimates for the post-merger period, with the difference that the branch network is assumed to remain unchanged at 
pre-merger levels. Asterisks refer to mean comparison tests between the counterfactual and the observed post-merger variables. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** signficant at 1%. 
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We begin by directly comparing observed credit  ows and interest rates
in the pre- and post-merger periods. After the merger wave, loan  ows were
higher than in the pre-merger period, both for households and rms. It is
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worth noting that this trend was stronger for the banks directly involved in
the mergers, given that the remaining banks actually recorded some decrease
in loan  ows, especially in what concerns loans to households. Comparing
interest rates in the pre- and post- merger periods, we observe that there was
a widespread decrease in interest rates after the mergers occurred, partly re-
 ecting lower banks’ funding costs arising from lower money market interest
rates during this period, as well as from access to more varied funding sources
due to the integration in the European Monetary Union. However, the data
clearly show that banks directly involved in the mergers decreased interest
rates more aggressively than the other banks, narrowing their interest rate
margins in order to attract more customers and, possibly, also re ecting ef-
ciency and informational gains arising from the merger process104 (see, for
example, Sapienza, 2002, Hauswald and Marquez, 2006, Panetta et al., 2009,
and Erel, 2011).
In columns (3), (7) and (11), we present the counterfactual estimates of
loan  ows and interest rates. As described above, these estimates result from
predicting these two variables for the post-merger period, by taking into ac-
104These e!ciency gains are expected to be larger when there is a signicant market overlap
between merging banks. Indeed, this is the case in our sample, where merging banks are
large universal banks operating throughout the whole country in most retail segments. It is
thus reasonable to argue that the restructuring of overlapping branch networks and business
segments may have contributed to e!ciency gains.
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count the pre-merger equilibrium and the post-merger environment. Hence,
variables such as money market interest rates, GDP or number of branches
are considered in the post-merger period to obtain these estimates. In these
columns we also present the results of mean comparison tests between the
counterfactual estimates and the post-merger observed variables.
By comparing credit  ows observed after the merger with the estimated
post-merger  ows, we conclude that loan  ows would have increased even more
if mergers would not have occurred. When total credit  ows are considered,
the dierence between the counterfactual and the actually observed loan  ows
is not statistically signicant, except for the banks that were not directly
involved in the merger wave. In fact, the latter recorded a decrease in credit
granted after the merger wave that would not have occurred if the mergers
had not taken place, according to the counterfactual estimates. This result
demonstrates that mergers induced important market shifts, with merging
banks gaining market share.
Our results show that there are important dierences between the evolution
of loans to households and to rms105. On the one hand, the model predicts
that household credit could be larger than what was actually observed (es-
pecially for the banks not involved in the merger wave). On the other hand,
105These dierences may have important economic implications, as shown by Beck et al.
(2009).
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the model predicts a slowdown in credit granted to rms, in striking contrast
with the acceleration actually observed during this period. The dierence be-
tween estimated and observed corporate loans was larger for the banks directly
involved in the merger wave.
The counterfactual estimates also suggest that interest rates would still
decrease if no mergers had occurred. However, comparing these estimates to
the post-merger observed values, we conclude that the observed decrease in
interest rates was, by any means, larger than that predicted by the pre-merger
equilibrium, even taking into account the developments in money market in-
terest rates in the post-merger period. The most impressive dierence comes
from the interest rate on loans to rms applied by the banks involved in the
merger wave, which may suggest e!ciency and informational gains arising
from these mergers.
Finally, in columns (4), (8) and (12) we present the results for the counter-
factual estimates when the branch network is assumed to remain unchanged
at the pre-merger levels. This may be a strong assumption, given that it is
unlikely that the branching structure and the intensity of local bank competi-
tion would not change between 1999 and 2002. However, without the mergers
this branching network would probably be considerably dierent from the one
actually observed, thus making these results relevant for this counterfactual
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estimation. In this version of the counterfactual, interest rates would be the
same as in the previous counterfactual estimation, given that the model es-
tablishes that the number of branches does not directly aect interest rates
charged by banks (see equation 5.3)106. However, in what concerns loan  ows,
the estimates show that if there were no changes in the branch network, the
estimated loan  ows would not be as large as predicted by the counterfactual
that assumes changes in branches. This result is especially strong for corporate
loans.107
This table also allows us to compare the counterfactual outcome for banks
involved and not involved in the merger wave. The predicted increase in loan
 ows to households would be higher for the banks not directly involved in the
merger wave (assuming that these mergers had not occurred). However, this
dierence is not statistically signicant, when predicted loan  ows for these
two groups of banks are compared. In turn, the decrease in loan  ows to rms
106In these columns, the interest rates, loan  ows and the strategic interaction variable
were computed using the values predicted by the model, instead of using directly the values
observed. The results are consistent under both hypotheses.
107For robustness purposes, we conducted several sensitivity tests on the denition of
the post-merger period (as done for the analysis of the dierential impact of the merger
wave). More specically, we consider the possibility that the eect of bank mergers takes
some time to be re ected in credit  ows and interest rates. Moreover, it is also possible
that immediately before the merger there were some strategic eects. To take all this into
account, we exclude the last two quarters of 1999 and the year 2000 from our estimations.
The results are qualitatively robust. The eect of bank mergers on total credit  ows is
slightly less signicant for the banks directly involved in mergers, but more signicant for
the whole sample.
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predicted by the counterfactual would not be so large for the banks not in-
volved in the merger (with this dierence being statistically signicant), thus
suggesting some market shifts induced by the mergers. Finally, the counter-
factual predicts that the interest rates charged by the banks involved in the
mergers would always be signicantly higher than for the banks that did not
have an active role in this process, even though after the merger the interest
rates charged by the banks involved in loans to the corporate sector became
lower than in the other group of banks, thus conrming possible e!ciency
gains for the banks that merged.
A decomposition of merger impacts using counterfactuals Using
these counterfactual estimates, we can decompose the merger impacts into
several dierent components, distinguishing between changes in the exoge-
nous environment and changes in the branch network and market structure.
This decomposition is presented in Table 5.5.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit flows (ln)
Total -1.04 1.21 -0.12 0.05
Households 0.87 0.29 -0.50 0.67
Firms -1.73 0.51 1.65 0.42
Interest rates
Total -1.93 0.00 -1.33 -3.26
Households -2.23 0.00 -1.71 -3.95







































(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Credit flows (ln)
Total -1.52 1.36 0.42 0.26 -0.51 1.03 -0.80 -0.28
Households 1.20 0.19 -0.06 1.33 0.42 0.41 -1.06 -0.23
Firms -2.14 0.66 2.22 0.74 -1.42 0.36 1.11 0.05
Interest rates
Total -1.47 0.00 -1.79 -3.26 -2.33 0.00 -0.76 -3.09
Households -2.16 0.00 -1.87 -4.03 -2.21 0.00 -1.51 -3.72
Firms -1.56 0.00 -3.16 -4.72 -2.54 0.00 -1.07 -3.62
Notes: The estimations are performed for quarterly data during the 1995-2002 period. The pre-merger period comprehends the 1995-1999 period, whereas 
the post-merger period goes from 2000 to 2002. The group of financial institutions directly involved in the merger includes institutions belonging to 
financial groups that have acquired or sold a financial institution to a different financial group in 2000. The interest rates refer to the new loans granted in 
each quarter. The change in exogenous environment (1) is the difference between the estimated value for the after merger period keeping the branching 
network at pre-merger levels and the value predicted for the pre-merger period. The change in the branch network (2) is the difference between the values 
estimated for the post-merger period with and without changes in branches. Other structural changes (3) are the difference between the values estimated and 
observed for the after merger period. The total effect (4) is the sum of all the previous effects, being the difference between the values observed after and 




Banks directly involved in mergers Banks not directly involved in mergers
In columns (1), (5) and (9) we present the eect of changes in the exoge-
nous environment on loan  ows and interest rates, for the three groups of banks
under analysis. This eect is computed as the dierence between the counter-
factual estimates for the post-merger period when holding the branch network
and market structure at pre-merger levels, but taking into account changes
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in macroeconomic and nancial conditions after the merger wave (columns
(4), (8) and (12) in Table 5.4). In what concerns interest rates, the eect
was clearly negative and close to 2 p.p. Hence, a considerable part of the
decrease in interest rates in the post-merger period was due to changes in
macroeconomic conditions. Regarding loan  ows, changes in banks’ economic
and nancial environment led to an increase in loan  ows to households and
to a decrease in loan  ows to rms. As discussed above, this result means that
the counterfactual estimates without changes in branches suggest that loans
to households should have been higher if the mergers had not occurred (the
opposite being true concerning loans to rms). The impact of the changes in
the macroeconomic and nancial environment on loan  ows was stronger for
the banks directly involved in the merger wave.
When changes in the branch network and in local market competition are
considered (columns (2), (6) and (10)), we observe a positive impact in loan
 ows, when compared to the impact of considering only changes in the ex-
ogenous environment. These estimates correspond to the dierence between
columns (3) and (4) in Table 5.4, i.e., the dierence between the counterfactu-
als with and without changes in branches. Hence, when changes in the branch-
ing network observed after the merger wave are considered, we conclude that
loan  ows should have been even higher if mergers had not occurred. This dif-
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ference assumes a larger magnitude in loans to rms. As previously discussed,
interest rates estimates remain unchanged, given that they are not directly
in uenced by the number of branches in our structural model.
Finally, we present the estimates for the impact of other structural changes
(which includes a prediction error), dened as the dierence between interest
rates and loan  ows observed after the merger wave and the counterfactual
estimates (with changes in the branch network), for these variables. In other
words, these estimates represent the merger impact that is not accounted for by
the change in the macroeconomic environment neither by the change in market
structure. For interest rates, this impact is negative and larger for the banks
directly involved in the merger wave, thus showing that these banks decreased
interest rates more aggressively after the merger than what would have been
predicted by the model if mergers had not taken place. In what concerns loan
 ows to households, we obtain a similar result: these  ows were lower after
the merger than what is predicted by the counterfactual analysis. In contrast,
loan  ows to rms were higher than those predicted by the counterfactual
estimates, as previously discussed, especially for the banks directly involved
in the merger wave.
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Main counterfactual results In sum, we observe that mergers have in-
creased the amount of credit granted to rms and decreased the availability of
loans to households. Moreover, the merger wave induced a stronger decrease
in interest rates than what could have been expected, thus beneting con-
sumers. By decomposing the merger impact, we conclude that the decrease in
interest rates was mainly explained by changes in banks’ macroeconomic envi-
ronment, even though the merger wave contributed to intensify this decrease.
The increase in loan  ows to households after the merger was mainly explained
by changes in the macroeconomic environment, given that structural changes
generated by the mergers had a negative eect on loan  ows to households.
Finally, the increase in loan  ows to rms in the post-merger period can be
mostly explained by structural changes generated by the mergers, as macro-
economic changes would have implied a deceleration in loans to rms during
this period.
These results are broadly consistent with those resulting from the dieren-
tial analysis of the merger wave impacts, even though that would not neces-
sarily have to be the case. The counterfactual analysis provides a much more
rigorous and detailed framework to disentangle the merger impacts, by relying
on a structural model of equilibrium. In turn, the reduced form dierential
approach allows only analyzing how aggregate market outcomes change af-
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ter the merger occurs. The structural analysis derived from the counterfactual
scenario is incomparably richer, allowing to clearly disentangle changes in mar-
ket structure and conduct from changes in the macroeconomic and nancial
environment.
5.6 Concluding remarks
Bank mergers usually have important consequences in terms of bank compe-
tition, access to credit or loan pricing. However, the eects of bank mergers
on these variables are hard to disentangle from other market and macroeco-
nomic dynamic eects that occur simultaneously, aecting loan demand and
supply, as well as its pricing. In this chapter, we present a structural analysis
of the impact of mergers in the Portuguese banking market. In the late 90s,
several large banks were involved in a strong and fast consolidation process,
thus providing an empirical setup to assess changes in market structure after
the mergers.
Using a structural model, we derive the equilibrium in the pre-merger set-
ting. Combining this estimated equilibriumwith the post-merger environment,
we are able to construct a counterfactual estimate of loans and interest rates.
This allows us to compare the observed loan  ows and interest rates with those
resulting from the pre-merger equilibrium, thus assessing the impacts of the
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bank merger wave. Moreover, the counterfactual estimation allows for taking
into account changes in conduct and market structure after the mergers take
place. These eects are usually ignored in the assessment of merger impacts
and may lead to a signicant bias in the results obtained.
We obtain several interesting results. The interest rates observed after the
mergers were lower than those predicted by the model, in the pre-merger equi-
librium. This may re ect e!ciency and informational gains resulting from the
mergers and translated into more competitive pricing. In turn, there are im-
portant dierences between loans granted to households and to rms: whereas
loans granted to households were in fact lower than what would be suggested
using the pre-merger equilibrium, loans granted to rms actually recorded a
stronger growth than what could have occurred if no mergers had taken place.
All in all, households may have faced some constraints in access to credit after
the merger, even though loans to households recorded robust growth rates dur-
ing this period. On the contrary, loans granted to rms seem to have surpassed
by a large extent the counterfactual estimates.
The counterfactual estimates also highlight important dierences between
the banks directly involved in the merger wave and the remaining large bank-
ing groups. The banks directly involved in this process decreased their interest
rates on corporate loans much more aggressively than other banks. Simultane-
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ously, credit granted to rms by these banks was also much larger than what
could have been expected if no mergers had occurred. In turn, the estimated
decrease of loans granted to households assumed a larger magnitude for the
banks that did not directly participate in the merger wave.
By decomposing the merger impacts through the use of the counterfactual
estimates, we conclude that changes in banks’ macroeconomic and nancial
environment were the main driving force when explaining the dierences in
interest rates and loan  ows before and after the merger wave. Structural
changes generated by the mergers contributed to intensify these changes in
loans and interest rates on rms, but had the opposite impact on loans to
households.
The structural model used to perform these counterfactual estimates allows
for clear identication of the eects of bank mergers on credit and interest
rates, isolating changes in the exogenous environment and in market structure.
Changes in market equilibrium resulting from the mergers aect signicantly
banks’ decisions, as well as their strategic interactions, thus demonstrating
the importance of relying on a structural estimation method. All in all, we
observe that potential e!ciency and informational gains seem to have been
transmitted to customers through lower lending rates and rms have faced




In dit proefschrift onderzoek ik verschillende dimensies van risico in de banken-
sector en de gevolgen van risico voor de toegang van bedrijven tot krediet.
De wereldwijde economische en nanciële crisis heeft duidelijk gemaakt dat
een stabiel en goed functionerend banksysteem een belangrijke pijler is voor
economische groei. In deze context tracht ik in de vier hoofdstukken van dit
proefschrift licht te werpen op cruciale punten die van invloed zijn op de sta-
biliteit van het nanciële stelsel en uiteindelijk op de algehele economie.
Ten eerste, in hoofdstuk 2, beschouw ik de rol van strategische interacties
in het nemen van risico en richt mijn studie op liquiditeitsrisico. Individueel
gezien optimaliseren banken het beheer van het eigen liquiditeitsrisico, waar-
bij vaak de gevolgen voor het totale risico van het nanciële stelsel worden
verwaarloosd. Dit is het belangrijkste argument om de regulering van liq-
uiditeitsrisico te ondersteunen. Bepaalde stimulansen voor banken kunnen er
echter toe leiden dat banken deelnemen aan collectieve risico strategieën die
het systeem risico doen toenemen, bijvoorbeeld door de aanwezigheid van een
“Lender of Last Resort”. In dit hoofdstuk ga ik op zoek naar bewijs voor
coördinerend gedrag in het nemen van risico’s door banken en richt mij tot de
periode van vóór de wereldwijde nanciële crisis. Ik vind eenduidig en robuust
bewijs voor coördinatie in het beheer van liquiditeitsrisico van banken en houd
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rekening met mogelijke endogeniteit. Dit probleem wordt met name veroorza-
akt door de wederkerige aard van de beslissingen die genomen zijn door banken.
Het resultaat suggereert dat de prikkels voor het collectief nemen van risico’s
een rol speelt in de keuzes van banken en pleit voor een macro-prudentiële
aanpak van de regelgeving van liquiditeitsrisico.
In hoofdstuk 3, onderzoek ik een andere dimensie van bankrisico, namelijk
de invloed van de macro-economische omstandigheden op kredietrisico. De
aard van kredietrisico wordt hetzij voornamelijk gedreven door bedrijfsspeci-
eke kenmerken ofwel door systematische factoren. Het verschil in de mogelijke
oorzaak van kredietrisico is een belangrijke kwestie in de analyse van de nan-
ciële stabiliteit. Door het verkennen van de verbanden tussen kredietrisico en
macro-economische ontwikkelingen neem ik tijdens perioden van economische
groei een tendens tot het nemen van buitensporige risico’s waar. Met behulp
van een uitgebreide dataset welke gedetailleerde informatie bevat voor meer
dan 30.000 bedrijven, laat ik zien dat de kans op faillissement wordt beïnvloed
door verschillende bedrijfsspecieke kenmerken. Deze resultaten verbeteren
aanzienlijk door rekening te houden met tijd-eecten en macro-economische
variabelen. Alhoewel de nanciële situatie van de ondernemingen een centrale
rol speelt in het verklaren van de kans op faillissement zijn macro-economische




In hoofdstuk 4 onderzoek ik een verwante kwestie. Hoewel er een uitge-
breide literatuur bestaat over de oorzaken van faillissement, is daarentegen
bewijs beperkt over wat na het faillissement gebeurt met bedrijven. In dit
hoofdstuk onderzoek ik wat er gebeurt met bedrijven nadat ze hun verplichtin-
gen op bankleningen niet nakomen. Ik benader deze vraag door het creëren
van een reeks van gestileerde feiten in relatie tot de evolutie van faillissementen
en de daaropvolgende oplossing en leg de nadruk op de toegang tot krediet na
het faillissement. Met behulp van een unieke dataset over Portugal, merk ik op
dat voor de helft van de gevallen het faillissement wordt afgewikkeld binnen
vijf kwartalen. De meeste bedrijven behouden toegang tot krediet onmid-
dellijk na het oplossen van het niet kunnen nakomen van de verplichtingen.
Daarnaast heeft slechts een minderheid van de bedrijven daarna toegang tot
nieuwe leningen. Kleine bedrijven hebben meer problemen met het herstellen
van toegang tot krediet, met name: wanneer het faillissement lang en zwaar is;
indien zij lenen van slechts één bank; of als verplichtingen met de belangrijkste
geldschieter niet worden nakomen. Bovendien is het waarschijnlijk dat de helft
van de bedrijven met huidige betalingsproblemen in de toekomst opnieuw in
gebreke zal blijven. Ik merk dat bedrijven met herhaald verzuim van betaling




Tenslotte onderzoek ik in het laatste hoofdstuk een andere veel voorkomende
gebeurtenis in het bankwezen die de stabiliteit van de banken kan beïnvloeden,
evenals de toegang van ondernemingen en huishoudens tot krediet. Golven van
bank fusies kunnen structurele veranderingen in het evenwicht van de krediet-
markten genereren waardoor prijzen en hoeveelheden veranderen in deze mark-
ten, met belangrijke gevolgen voor de concurrentie. Ik voer een zogenaamde
counterfactual analyse uit voor bank fusies door het berekenen van het pre-
fusie evenwicht en dit evenwicht te vergelijken met de post-fusie kenmerken.
Hierbij houd ik rekening met endogene veranderingen in de marktstructuur.
Met behulp van deze procedure ben ik in staat om de eecten in de stroom
van leningen en in de rente te schatten. Deze stroom zou zijn waargenomen
als het pre-fusie evenwicht niet zou zijn gewijzigd. Resultaten worden afzon-
derlijk verkregen voor bedrijven, huishoudens en banken voor situaties waar
fusies zich wel voordoen, en niet voordoen. Ik ontdek dat fusies tot een betere
toegang voor bedrijven tot krediet leiden, maar dat ze een tegenovergesteld
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